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SUMMARY 
In order to obtain an optimal water resource planning and management, a fair and 
efficient rule of cost allocation among the different water users has a very 
important function. Starting from a correct assignation of costs it is possible to 
establish the basis to define the pricing policy that considers the principles of cost 
recovery and the adequate contribution for the different water uses as required by 
the Directive 2000/60/EC (EU, 2000). 
The majority of cost allocation methods currently used in water resources system 
do not highlight the motivation of adopted criteria; so, we wonder why the users 
should accept an assignation which exceeds their opportunity cost or their 
willingness to pay (Young, 1985). 
The main problem searching for a commonly accepted division of costs is how to 
share the costs in a fair and just way providing an adequate justification of criteria 
of the adopted methods. 
Therefore, the aim of the research is to individuate an impartial and fair method 
for cost sharing for all the users who respect the principles of individual 
acceptability and general agreement and to argue for voluntary cooperation 
among the interested agents in order to maximize the efficiency of water resource 
management. 
In this thesis we present a methodology of water services cost allocation based on 
Cooperative Game Theory, which can be a very usable instrument for the decision 
makers in order to elaborate pricing policies for water resources systems, 
according to the principles of the Directive 2000/60/EC. 
The validation of the methodology has been realized for the water system 
Flumendosa-Campidano in Sardinia. 
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RIASSUNTO 
Nella pianificazione e gestione ottimale dei sistemi di risorse idriche assume 
notevole importanza l’esigenza di ripartire i costi sostenuti tra i differenti utenti in 
maniera equa ed efficiente. A partire da una corretta assegnazione dei costi è 
possibile porre le basi per la definizione di una politica dei prezzi che tenga conto 
dei principi di recupero dei costi e di adeguato contributo per i differenti usi 
dell’acqua, come richiesto dalla Direttiva Quadro 2000/60/CE (EU, 2000). 
La maggior parte dei metodi di ripartizione dei costi, attualmente utilizzati 
nell’ambito della gestione delle risorse idriche, ha il difetto di non porre in giusto 
rilievo la motivazione dei criteri adottati: ci si chiede, infatti, il perché gli utenti 
debbano accettare un’assegnazione che ecceda i loro costi opportunità o la loro 
disponibilità a pagare (Young, 1985). 
Il problema principale, nella ricerca di una ripartizione condivisa dei costi, è 
quello di trovare una ripartizione che sia ritenuta equa e giusta fornendo 
un’adeguata giustificazione dei criteri posti alla base della legge di attribuzione.  
Pertanto, l’obiettivo della ricerca è quello di individuare una ripartizione 
imparziale ed equa da parte di tutti gli utenti, che rispetti i principi di accettabilità 
individuale e di consenso generale e che favorisca, laddove risulti vantaggioso, la 
cooperazione volontaria tra i soggetti interessati al fine di massimizzare 
l’efficienza della gestione della risorsa idrica. 
Nel presente lavoro di tesi si presenta una metodologia di ripartizione dei costi dei 
servizi idrici tra i vari utenti basata sulla Teoria dei Giochi Cooperativi. La ricerca 
si propone di definire uno strumento realmente fruibile dai decision maker per 
l’elaborazione delle politiche di prezzi nel settore delle risorse idriche, in accordo 
con i principi della Direttiva Quadro 2000/60/CE. 
La validazione della metodologia è stata realizzata per lo schema idrico 
Flumendosa – Campidano in Sardegna. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Motivation of the research 
1.1.1. The water services management 
Water, the essential element for life and an indispensable factor for human 
development, apart from being considered all along as a social good, has assumed 
the characteristic of an economic good over the last few years. Consequently it is 
important to assign to it the right value considering its utilization, consumption, 
deterioration and possible pollution in order to encourage the user to use it 
sustainably. 
In Italy and in the majority of European countries the assignation of grants, 
subsidies, refunds and contributions from the Government to the different 
enterprises, syndicates and operators of the water service has been a very common 
practice for years and almost taken for granted, which has quite often led to a 
depreciation of the resource. 
However, new stricter European economic politics are in progress. In particular 
the recent European Directive 2000/60/EC (EU, 2000) promoted the necessity of 
an economic analysis of water use, introducing the principle of recovery of costs in 
order to sustain the safeguard and the qualitative and quantitative improvement 
of bodies of water. 
In this context, it is fundamental to fulfil a pricing policy strongly based on an 
accurate analysis of cost allocation among the users of a water resources system. 
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1.1.2. The European Directive 2000/60/EC 
As we said before, over the last few years the European Community has paid 
particular attention to the problems of water resources management; in this 
context the directive 2000/60/EC aims to obtain the improvement of 
environmental conditions and in particular of the water bodies inside the 
Community territory. 
The Directive established a reference in water politics and its major purpose is to 
improve the quality of the water resource, protecting and avoiding its 
deterioration for the future. To achieve this objective great importance has been 
attributed to water analysis, which in turn aims at: the quantification of the water 
resource, resources management, participation, information and public 
information and finally an economic analysis to guarantee the efficiency of the 
systems. 
The problems linked to the definition of the criteria for the economically efficient 
management of the water systems represent one of the most important aspects of 
the European Directive. This matter is treated in particular in articles 5 and 9. The 
first one states that Member States shall ensure that for each river basin district, an 
economic analysis of water use is […]undertaken and completed at the latest four years 
after the date of entry into force of this Directive […]. In article 9 it is reported that 
Member States shall take account of the principle of recovery of the costs of water services, 
including environmental and resource costs, having regard to the economic analysis 
conducted […]in accordance in particular with the polluter pays principle. Moreover, 
Member States shall ensure by 2010 that water-pricing policies provide adequate 
incentives for users to use water resources efficiently, […] and there shall be a recovery 
of the costs of water services, for every different water uses, disaggregated into at least 
industry, households and agriculture, to the recovery of the costs of water services, based 
on the economic analysis conducted according to Annex III and taking account of the 
“polluter pays principle” (EU, 2000). 
The introduction of the aforementioned economic indicators necessary to achieve 
the environmental objectives implies a recognition that water resources have an 
economic value, as ended resources. Therefore, economic analysis plays a decisive 
role in water resources management and in the design of new water price policies. 
1.1.3. The cost allocation problem and the 
Cooperative Game Theory 
The pricing methods currently used, which will be analyzed in details in Chapter 
6, are found wanting, as they do not take into account the problem of our research 
question: we wonder why the final users have to accept an assignation which 
exceeds their opportunity cost or their willingness to pay (Young, 1985). 
Therefore the main problem in defining a new rating politics is not the research of 
a general cost allocation rule, but rather how to share in an fair and just way the 
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sustained costs among the users. This means finding an impartial cost allocation 
for all the participants in a project, in order to promote and guarantee the 
collaboration among them and so the feasibility of a common project which 
enables the reduction of costs for all the beneficiaries. 
As reported in Young’s article (1994) Cooperative Game Theory (hereafter CGT) 
provides the right instruments to analyze those situations in which it is important 
the research of a division mechanism that is efficient, fair and offers the 
appropriate incentives among the involved parts. Lemaire (1984) pointed out that 
the solution to a problem of cost allocation is equal to the determination of the 
value of a cooperative game. The cost division among different users can be seen, 
in fact, as a game in which it occurs to determine the right allocation among the 
different players. A cooperative game belongs to the mathematical science called 
Game Theory. 
Game Theory, developed around the first half of the last century (Von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1944), studies the situations of conflicts in different fields and it 
researches competitive and/or cooperative solutions analyzing the individual 
decisions in situations where there are interactions among participants. In the 
scientific literature different cases of cost allocation that use CGT principles are 
present: the applicative fields are very different and also concern studies related to 
water resources (TVA, 1938; Young et al. 1982; Lippai & Heaney, 2000; Deidda et al., 
2009). 
Using CGT methods it is possible to “make explicit” the process of negotiation 
through mathematical formulas which implement properties that guarantee 
equity, fairness, justice and cooperation among players involved in a project, in 
order to aim a commonly acceptable solution. 
Nevertheless, the application of CGT is limited essentially to economic and 
mathematical fields, avoiding the complexity and heterogeneity of engineering 
problems, i.e. water resources management. In fact, the calculation of a 
cooperative game requires an analysis of minimum cost of the system: this implies 
a process of optimization whose size increases exponentially in the function of the 
number of players. So the necessity to utilize adequate modelling instruments is 
the main obstacle to solve cost allocation problems in the case of complex systems 
(Deidda, 2009). 
1.2. Objectives of the research 
The main objective of the present study is the development of a methodology of 
cost allocation for water systems based on CGT that is able to contribute to the 
process of definition of water pricing according to the principles of the European 
Directive 2000/60/EC. 
The methodology has a general aspect, suitable to the conditions of different river 
basins and compatible with the current instruments of water resources modelling. 
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The field of application can be extended to the solution of cost allocation problems 
both for local and regional systems. 
Under a methodology based on the CGT it is possible to obtain a cost division 
among the users that can be shareable, can provide an adequate justification of 
adopted criteria and can favour cooperation among the interested subjects in order 
to maximize the efficiency of water resource management. This is a very important 
objective for Mediterranean water systems that are characterized by phenomena of 
water scarcity. 
As a consequence, this thesis will attempt to make an original contribution to both 
the mathematical sciences and hydro-economic modelling. 
Finally, this research belongs to the international project “Azioni Integrate Italia 
Spagna” (MIUR, 2007) between the department of “Ingegneria del Territorio” of 
the University of Cagliari and the department of “Ingeniería Hidráulica y Medio 
Ambiente” of the Polytechnic University of Valencia. The aim of the project is to 
develop a decisions supporting system to define measures to achieve the 
environmental and economic objectives required by the European Directive 
2000/60. 
1.3. Cost allocation methodology 
The first phase of methodology is the identification of all the necessary aspects for 
the description and characterization of the water system to be studied; then the 
cooperative game defining the players and the typology of costs to be shared must 
be planned. Players can represent both the individual water user and groups of 
them, as in the case of users that belong to a single macro demand, for example 
irrigational and industrial syndicate, municipal centers, etc. 
Then we can move on to the most important step, i.e. the definition of the 
characteristic function of the game, the basic element of the CGT. The function is 
formed by the set of minimum costs associated to all the possible coalitions of 
players, whose evaluation is carried out via the software WARGI (Sechi & Zuddas, 
2000; Manca et al., 2004; Sechi & Sulis, 2009) that is based on a model of 
optimization specifically developed for water resources systems. The program 
enables the representation of a water system and it is also easy to input the 
required data (economic, hydrologic, hydraulic, infrastructural, etc..) for the 
functional definition of the system. 
Once the characteristic function has been defined, it will be possible to solve the 
game applying the CGT methods. 
17 
 
1.4. Water system examined 
The methodology has been verified in the application to the water scheme 
Flumendosa – Campidano situated in Sardinia. 
The island is located in the centre of the western basin of the Mediterranean Sea 
and has a surface area of 24.000 km² with a population of 1.648.000 residents. The 
climate is prevalently Mediterranean, characterized by a long period of drought in 
summer and mild and rainy winters with isolated frosts. 
After the application of the Regional Law n.19 of the 6.12.2006, in Sardinia the 
concept of “multi purpose water system” was introduced. This means the set of 
works for water supplying that, individually or as parts of a complex system, have the 
possibility to supply (directly or indirectly) more territorial areas or more different 
categories of users, contributing to an equalization of quantities and costs of supply (RAS, 
2006b). The multi purpose system, whose management is entrusted to the Ente 
Acque della Sardegna – ENAS, supplies the wholesale water for the principal 
macro demands of the region: civil, irrigational and industrial. 
The infrastructures which belong to the multi purpose regional system have been 
grouped into different “schemes” in relation to the use of the resource, allocating 
to the same scheme all the water works that, even if not directly interlinked, aim to 
satisfy the water needs of the same territory.  
The Flumendosa-Campidano system consists of three multi purpose schemes and 
it supplies the water users of the central-southern zone of the island. 
1.5. Structure of the document 
The document is structured in nine chapters, including the present one with the 
introduction. 
In Chapter 2 the regulations related to the water resources management in Europe, 
Italy and Sardinia is described, showing in details the reference rules adopted for 
the research. 
In Chapter 3 the cost allocation problem is analyzed, examining principal 
allocation methods currently used, introducing the concept of “willingness to pay” 
and giving a possible solution to the introduced problem. 
Chapter 4 is dedicated to the presentation of CGT with a brief initial description of 
the more general Game Theory; we expose in details the definitions, the principles 
and the solutions of CGT and, to conclude, we show some applications to complex 
systems. 
The software WARGI is described in Chapter 5, where the different steps 
necessary to use it are analyzed; moreover the changes made to the program in 
order to better adapt it to the requirements of our research will be presented. 
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In Chapter 6 the Flumendosa-Campidano water system is described; furthermore 
we analyze the Sardinian water system and the different water sectors which 
compose it. 
Chapter 7 is dedicated to the description of the cost allocation methodology and to 
its application to a simplified Flumendosa-Campidano system. Two water 
demand scenarios and two different approaches will be considered. 
The application of the methodology to the complete Flumendosa-Campidano 
system is performed in Chapter 8, where the analysis of the results and the 
hypothesis of a new rating structure for the analyzed system are proposed. 
The thesis ends with Chapter 9 in which some possible future developments for 
the research are presented and the conclusions and the original contributions 
provided by this work are summarized. 
Moreover there are two final appendixes with the first and the last chapters in 
Italian.
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2. Reference regulations 
2.1. European regulations 
2.1.1. Directive 2000/60/EC 
Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 
establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy 
The European Union (EU) has established a Community framework for water 
protection and management by issuing Directive 2000/60/EC (often mentioned as 
Water Framework Directive, hereafter WFD). Its main purpose is to maintain and, 
where necessary, to improve the quantitative and qualitative status of water 
bodies in the Community area. The WFD provides, among other things, for the 
identification and analysis of European waters on the basis of individual river 
basin districts, and the adoption of management plans and programmes of 
measures appropriate for each body of water. 
This Directive provides that each Member State shall face waters' protection from 
the “river basin”; reference territorial unit to manage such basin is indicated in 
“river basin district”, an area of land and sea, made up of one or more 
neighbouring river basins together with their associated groundwaters and coastal 
waters. In every river basin district each Member State shall carry out: 
- an analysis of district's characteristics; 
- an exam of the impact of human activities on surface and groundwater; 
- an economical analysis of water usage. 
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For every district there shall be a program of measures that has to control made 
analysis and environmental objectives fixed from the Directive. These objectives 
should be set to ensure a “good status” of all waters within 2015 (except in cases 
clearly mentioned in this Directive). Programs of measures are indicated in 
Management Plans that Member States have to establish for every river basin and 
represent a programming instrument to reach objectives fixed from the Directive. 
Article 5 of the Directive establishes that Member States shall carry out, for every 
district, analyses of physical characteristics of districts, of human activities and the 
economic analysis of water usage within four years from the implementation of 
the Directive. Analyses and studies shall be reviewed after thirteen years and 
subsequently after six years. Starting from 2010 Member States will need to 
guarantee that water price policy stimulates consumers to use water resources in 
an efficient way and guarantee for different sectors a cost recovery of water 
service, including environmental and resource costs. 
The introduction of an economic analysis of water resources can be considered the 
most innovative aspect of this Directive. In practice, as stated before, article 5 
states that Member States shall ensure that for each river basin district, an economic 
analysis of water use is […]undertaken and completed at the latest four years after the date 
of entry into force of this Directive […]. Furthermore, in article 9 it is reported that 
Member States shall take account of the principle of recovery of the costs of water services, 
including environmental and resource costs, having regard to the economic analysis 
conducted […]in accordance in particular with the polluter pays principle. Moreover, 
Member States shall ensure by 2010 that water-pricing policies provide adequate 
incentives for users to use water resources efficiently, […]and there shall be a recovery of 
the costs of water services, for every different water uses, disaggregated into at least 
industry, households and agriculture, to the recovery of the costs of water services, based 
on the economic analysis conducted according to Annex III and taking account of the 
“polluter pays principle” (EU, 2000). In the following paragraphs economical 
references present on Directive 2000/60/EC are reported. 
2.1.1.1. Preliminary Considerations 
Paragraph 1 
Water is not a commercial product like any other but, rather, a heritage which must be 
protected, defended and treated as such. 
Paragraph 11 
[…] the Community policy on the environment is to contribute to pursuit of the objectives 
of preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment, in prudent and 
rational utilisation of natural resources, and to be based on the precautionary principle and 
on the principles that preventive action should be taken, environmental damage should, as 
a priority, be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay. 
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Paragraph 12 
[…] in preparing its policy on the environment, the Community is to take account of 
available scientific and technical data, environmental conditions in the various regions of 
the Community, and the economic and social development of the Community as a whole 
and the balanced development of its regions as well as the potential benefits and costs of 
action or lack of action. 
Paragraph 36 
It is necessary to undertake analyses of the characteristics of a river basin and the impacts 
of human activity as well as an economic analysis of water use. The development in water 
status should be monitored by Member States on a systematic and comparable basis 
throughout the Community. This information is necessary in order to provide a sound 
basis for Member States to develop programmes of measures aimed at achieving the 
objectives established under this Directive. 
Paragraph 38 
The use of economic instruments by Member States may be appropriate as part of a 
programme of measures. The principle of recovery of the costs of water services, including 
environmental and resource costs associated with damage or negative impact on the 
aquatic environment should be taken into account in accordance with, in particular, the 
polluter-pays principle. An economic analysis of water services based on long-term 
forecasts of supply and demand for water in the river basin district will be necessary for 
this purpose. 
2.1.1.2. Article 5. Characteristics of the river basin 
district, review of the environmental impact of 
human activity and economic analysis of water 
use 
1. Each Member State shall ensure that for each river basin district or for the portion of an 
international river basin district falling within its territory: 
- an analysis of its characteristics, 
- a review of the impact of human activity on the status of surface waters and on 
groundwater, and 
- an economic analysis of water use 
is undertaken according to the technical specifications set out in Annexes II and III and 
that it is completed at the latest four years after the date of entry into force of this 
Directive. 
2. The analyses and reviews mentioned under paragraph 1 shall be reviewed, and if 
necessary updated at the latest 13 years after the date of entry into force of this Directive 
and every six years thereafter. 
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2.1.1.3. Article 9. Recovery of costs for water services 
1. Member States shall take account of the principle of recovery of the costs of water 
services, including environmental and resource costs, having regard to the economic 
analysis conducted according to Annex III, and in accordance in particular with the 
polluter pays principle. 
Paragraph 38 of Article 2 defines «water services» as: 
all services which provide, for households, public institutions or any economic activity: 
(a) abstraction, impoundment, storage, treatment and distribution of surface water or 
groundwater; 
(b) waste-water collection and treatment facilities which subsequently discharge into 
surface water. 
Moreover Article 9 follows with these statements 
Member States shall ensure by 2010: 
- that water-pricing policies provide adequate incentives for users to use water resources 
efficiently, and thereby contribute to the environmental objectives of this Directive, 
- an adequate contribution of the different water uses, disaggregated into at least industry, 
households and agriculture, to the recovery of the costs of water services, based on the 
economic analysis conducted according to Annex III and taking account of the polluter 
pays principle. 
Member States may in so doing have regard to the social, environmental and economic 
effects of the recovery as well as the geographic and climatic conditions of the region or 
regions affected. 
2. Member States shall report in the river basin management plans on the planned steps 
towards implementing paragraph 1 which will contribute to achieve the environmental 
objectives of this Directive and on the contribution made by the various water uses to the 
recovery of the costs of water services. 
2.1.1.4. Article 11. Programme of measures 
1. Each Member State shall ensure the establishment for each river basin district, or for the 
part of an international river basin district within its territory, of a programme of 
measures, taking account of the results of the analyses required under Article 5, in order to 
achieve the (environmental) objectives established under Article 4. Such programmes of 
measures may make reference to measures following from legislation adopted at national 
level and covering the whole of the territory of a Member State. Where appropriate, a 
Member State may adopt measures applicable to all river basin districts and/or the 
portions of international river basin districts falling within its territory. 
2.Each programme of measures shall include the “basic measures” specified in paragraph 3 
and, where necessary, “supplementary” measures. 
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3. “Basic measures” are the minimum requirements to be complied with and shall consist 
of: 
[…] 
(b) measures deemed appropriate for the purposes of Article 9; 
[…]. 
2.1.1.5. Annex III. Economic Analysis 
The economic analysis shall contain enough information in sufficient details (taking 
account of the costs associated with collection of the relevant data) in order to: 
(a) make the relevant calculations necessary for taking into account under Article 9 the 
principle of recovery of the costs of water services, taking account of long term forecasts of 
supply and demand for water in the river basin district and, where necessary: 
- estimates of the volume, prices and costs associated with water services, 
- estimates of relevant investment including forecasts of such investments; 
(b) make judgements about the most cost-effective combination of measures in respect of 
water uses to be included in the programme of measures under Article 11 based on 
estimates of the potential costs of such measures. 
2.1.1.6. Annex VI. Lists of measures to be included within 
the programmes of measures 
PART B 
The following is a non-exclusive list of supplementary measures which Member States 
within each river basin district may choose to adopt as part of the programme of measures 
required under Article 11, paragraph 4: 
(i) legislative instruments 
(ii) administrative instruments 
(iii) economic or fiscal instruments 
[…] 
2.1.1.7. Annex VII. River Basin Management Plans 
A. River basin management plans shall cover the following elements: 
1. a general description of the characteristics of the river basin district required under 
Article 5 and Annex II. 
[…] 
6. a summary of the economic analysis of water use as required by Article 5 and Annex III; 
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7. a summary of the programme or programmes of measures adopted under Article 11, 
including the ways in which the objectives established under Article 4 are thereby to be 
achieved; 
[…] 
7.2. a report on the practical steps and measures taken to apply the principle of recovery of 
the costs of water use in accordance with Article 9; 
[…] 
2.1.1.8. Deadlines 
Table 1 reports the Directive deadlines that every Member State has to make 
reference. 
 
DEADLINES FULFILMENTS PROVIDED BY DIRECTIVE 2000/60/EC 
22 December 
2000 
Implementation of the Directive (Article 22) 
22 December 
2003 
Laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply 
with the Directive come into effect (Article 24). 
Identification of the appropriate competent authority (Article 3). 
22 June 2004 Member States shall provide the Commission with a list of their 
competent authorities (Article 3). 
22 December 
2004 
For each river basin district a complete analysis of surface water and 
groundwater characteristics, a review of the impact of human activity, 
and an economic analysis of water use (Article 5). 
Establishment of a register or registers of all protected areas (Articles 6 
and 7). 
22 December 
2005 
In the absence of criteria adopted under paragraph 2 at Community 
level, Member States shall establish appropriate criteria at the latest 
five years after the date of entry into force of the Directive  (Article 17, 
comma 4). 
In the absence of criteria adopted under paragraph 4 at national level, 
trend reversal shall take as its starting point a maximum of 75% of the 
level of the quality standards set out in existing Community legislation 
applicable to groundwater. (Article 17, comma 5). 
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DEADLINES FULFILMENTS PROVIDED BY DIRECTIVE 2000/60/EC 
22 December 
2006 
Establishment of programmes for the monitoring of water status in 
order to establish a coherent and comprehensive overview of water 
status within each river basin district (Article 8). 
Publication of and consultation on a timetable and on a work 
programme for the production of the plan (Article 14). 
In the absence of agreement at Community level, for substances 
included in the first list of priority substances (Article 16), Member 
States shall establish environmental quality standards for these 
substances for all surface waters affected by discharges of those 
substances, and controls on the principal sources of such discharges 
(Article 16). 
22 December 
2007 
Public information and consultation on an interim overview of the 
significant water management issues identified in the river basin. 
(Article 14). 
22 December 
2008 
Member States shall allow at least six months to comment in writing on 
those documents in order to allow active involvement and consultation 
(Article 14). 
22 December 
2009 
The drafting of a programme of measures for every basin district in 
order to achieve environmental objectives (Article 11) 
Predisposition and publication, for every district basin, of a 
management plan which includes the individuation of environmental 
objectives for every surface or subterranean water body and a summary 
of programmes of measures adopted to achieve such objectives (Article 
13). 
2010 Implementation of policies for a correct recovery of costs of water 
services (Article 9). 
22 December 
2012 
Efficacy of programmes of measures in every river basin district to 
achieve environmental objectives (Article 11). 
Submission of an interim report describing progress in the 
implementation of the planned programme of measures (Article 15). 
22 December 
2015 
Achievement of environmental objectives (Article 4). 
22 December 
2015  
and every 6 
years for the 
following years 
Review and updating of plans (Articles 13, 14 and 15). 
Table 1. Deadline of Directive 
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At the present moment, Italy is by far the country where the majority of delays, 
specially referred to economic analysis, are registered as reported in a recent 
workshop related to the accomplishment of WFD (Gruppo 183, 2009) 
2.2. Italian Regulations 
2.2.1. National legislation on water resources 
Until the issuing of the legislative decree 152 of 2006 Italian legislation on water 
resources was based on five legislative orders: 
- Royal Decree of 11 December 1933, n˚ 1775 (RD, 1933); 
- Law of 10 May 1976, n˚ 319 (Merli Law) (Law, 1976); 
- Law of 18 May 1989, n˚ 183 (Defence of Soil Law) (Law, 1989); 
- Law of 5 January 1994, n˚ 36 (Galli Law) (Law, 1994); 
- Legislative Decree of 11 May 1999, n˚ 152 (DL, 1999). 
The first Legislative Act on water resources was the Royal Decree 1775/33 where 
the principle of water as a public resource was declared for the first time and 
whose regulation was subordinated to the Public Administration. In this Act there 
was still an ancient view of water resources to be defended, but at the same time, it 
was necessary to exploit them through convenient infrastructures: so there was a 
gap in the concept of limited resource, to be conserved, to be protected and 
defended. The Decree established, moreover, suitable authorities, now 
recognizable as “Consorzi di Bonifica” (land-reclamation syndicates), entitled with 
a concession of water use for irrigational objectives. 
In 1976 the first national regularization of discharges on water bodies “Norme per la 
tutela delle acque dall'inquinamento” (Rules to protect waters from pollution) was 
promulgated. It is known as Merli Law, after the name of its author, who defined 
it as a “police law”. Such a law was introduced in order to avoid an increase in 
pollution, establishing the basis for an effective defence of waters and soil, and 
limiting and controlling the principle sources of pollution and emission. 
The first law in management and planning of water resources matters was the 183 
in 1989: “Norme per il riassetto organizzativo e funzionale della difesa del suolo” (Rules 
for organizational and functional readjustment of soil defence). This law had the 
power to assure soil defence, waters recovery and the management of water for 
economic and social development and the concerned safeguard of environmental 
aspects. For this reason, a subdivision of the national territory in River Basins 
classified as National, Interregional and Regional relief was planned, in which a 
new body was created: the so-called Autorità di Bacino (Basin Authorities). These 
was given the task of submitting the Piano di Bacino (Basin Plan), defined as 
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“cognitive, normative and operative instrument through which actions and rules 
of use have been planned and programmed, in order to safeguard, defend and 
valorise the soil and the direct usage of waters, on the basis of physical and 
environmental characteristics of the relevant territory. 
Subsequently in 1994 Law 36 was issued, known also as Galli Law, introduced to 
solve the massive fragmentation of the national water service for urban and civil 
use and to rationalize the legal situation. It proposed a unitary management of the 
cycle of depuration, distribution and drainage system. Besides clarifying the 
public nature of surface water and groundwater, whose usage for human 
consumption was declared a priority respect to others, the law introduced for the 
first time the concept of limited resource to use according to principles of 
solidarity. Another innovation was the identification of the so-called “Ambiti 
Territoriali Ottimali” (ATO) (Optimal territorial field), where an integrated 
management of drinking water service with a separation between property and 
management had to be guaranteed. To this end the law provided for an institution 
in every ATO of the Autorità d’Ambito (AATO), an institutional body charged 
with the task of controlling the managing subject of the “Servizio Idrico Integrato - 
SII” (integrated water service). Lastly there was an elaboration of a method to a 
reference rate in which it was to define new water rates for civil customers aimed 
to the principle of covering costs. 
Another legislative act in water resources matters is Decree 152/99 “Disposizioni 
sulla tutela delle acque dall'inquinamento dall'inquinamento e recepimento della direttiva 
91/271/CE e 91/676/CE” (Provisions about protection of waters from pollution and 
acknowledgement of the directive 91/271/EC, about urban waste-water 
treatment, and of the directive 91/676/EC, regarding the protection of waters 
against pollution caused by nitrates) which tried to rationalize and bring Italian 
regulations on the protection of water bodies up to date. The decree proposed to 
define the general subject to safeguard surface waters, marine and groundwater, 
in order to achieve objectives of prevention and reduction of pollution, improving 
the status of water bodies and sustainability for resources, keeping drinking 
resources a priority. The most relevant characteristics are the protection of 
quantitative and qualitative aspects in every river basin, individuation of 
environmental qualitative objectives which refer to definition of limits of 
discharge and the predisposition of measures for recovery and protection of water 
bodies. The administrative instrument used in the decree is the Piano di Tutela 
(Plan of Water Protection) in which environmental objectives, intervention and 
measures of pollution prevention are individuated. 
Legislative provisions represented an important benchmark for defence, safeguard 
and planning of water resources in Italy. At the moment, except Royal Decree 
1775/1933, such provisions are abrogated from Decree 152/2006 even though 
several concepts present in the Decree are in force. 
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2.2.2. Environmental Decree 152/2006 
Legislative Decree 152/2006 “Norme in materia ambientale” (Rules of environmental 
subjects) (DL, 2006) represents the first national text about the environment. It is a 
normative corpus which consists of 318 articles which try to rationalize the 
environmental legislation analyzing five fundamental sectors: 
- procedures to evaluate environmental strategy, to evaluate  environmental 
impact and to integrated environmental authorization;  
- defence of soil, fight against desertification, protection of waters against 
pollution and management of water resources;  
- management of waste materials and drainage;  
- defence of air and reduction of emissions on the atmosphere;  
- environmental damage.  
In water resources the Decree adopts the WFD and it specifically targets the 
following objectives:  
- to amplify water protection, and surface water or groundwater; 
- to reach the status of “good” for all the waters within the 31 December 2015; 
- to manage water resources on the basis of territorial unity of reference as 
the drainage basin; 
- to recognize all water services the right price which represent their real 
economic cost; 
- to acquaint citizens with adopted choices.  
Taking up what was provided by the Law 183/1989, national territory is divided 
into river basin districts (Figure 1), which in turn are divided into subunits as river 
basins. As regards Sardinia, the island represents a unique river basin formed by a 
unique basin which corresponds with regional territory. 
According to the Decree, economic analysis and the consequent politic rates 
should be defined by applying, on one hand, principles of total recovery for costs 
of water service, considering financial, environmental and resource costs, and on 
the other, “the polluter principle”. It is important to follow the objective to make 
the customer afford his costs linked to the consumption of resources: for this 
reason in 2010 water service pricing policy will have to be established in order to 
guarantee a correct use of water and to contribute the achievement the WFD’s 
objectives. At any rate, by applying this principle it is possible to consider the 
social, environmental and economic repercussions of costs recovery, together with 
the geographic and climatic conditions of the individual regions. Integral covering 
of costs service represents a guide principle to be achieved where possible.  
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Figure 1. National  river basin districts 
The new decree confirms what was established by the Galli Law, in terms of the 
drinking water cycle with the reaffirmation of ATO, SII and AATO, on which 
watches Comitato Nazionale per la Vigilanza sulle Risorse Idriche - CoNViRi 
(National Committee for the Water Resources Vigilance).  
In pursuance of WFD, the law dissolves the Basin Authorities and institutes the 
District Basin Authority, giving it new responsibilities in order to achieve, 
according to deadlines, environmental objectives and parameters and an 
equilibrium of territory as established by Community Normative. 
The District Basin Authority provides that there is a Piano di Bacino Distrettuale 
(District Basin Plan), a document filled by different parts like the Management 
Plan, which represents the institutional informative document as far as soil 
defence, safeguard of water and water resources management are concerned. 
As reported in Annex 4 – Part A of Annex in the third part of the decree, the 
Management Plan includes the following elements: 
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- general description of characteristics of river basin district; 
- a summary of significant pressures and impact of human activity on the 
status of water; 
- cartographic specification and representation  of protected areas; 
- a list of environmental objectives for bodies of water; 
- a summary of economic analysis on water use; 
- a summary of programs of measures adopted, as: 
- synthesis of necessary measures to adopt community normative on water 
defence; 
- a report on the practical steps and measures taken to apply the principle of 
recovery of the costs of water; 
- a register of any more detailed programmes and management plans for the 
river basin district to be dealt with. 
2.3. Sardinia regional regulations 
In the present thesis the following Sardinia regional regulations on water 
resources management will also be considered. 
2.3.1. Piano Stralcio di Bacino Regionale per 
l’Utilizzo delle Risorse Idriche - Regional 
River Basin Plan for Water Resources Use 
The Regional Management River Basin Plan for Water Resources Use (PSURI) of 
Sardinia (RAS; 2006a), is a part of the bigger River Basin Plan required by the Law 
183/1989. The objective of this document is to define structural and managing 
interventions aimed at obtaining a balance accounts between supply and demand 
on a regional level, according to economic and environmental limits of 
sustainability imposed by national and community rules. 
PSURI acquire information about estimation of available resources, typology and 
quantification of needs of different water uses; it defines a map of infrastructures 
and hydraulic structures of regional water service and proposes infrastructural 
investments, estimating selection activities and technical and financial feasibility. 
In the document there is an analysis about production cost of resource, id est, as 
shown in Chapter 1 of Study 5, “unitary cost of water production taken by surface 
resources for multiple uses as it can be determined on (theoretical) condition of 
entrepreneurial and unitary management of the system”. Such value “represents an 
element of reference to consider on following actions that Region (Sardinia) shall 
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undertake on achieving the right allocation of the production/use costs of resource, among 
user”. 
To define production costs of resource it was necessary, in advance, “to estimate 
costs to support in order to organize in an efficient and efficacious way operative activities 
and works which constitute the management”. Therefore, they have analyzed different 
items of cost linked to regional water systems and, more specifically:  
- employees costs; 
- costs of energy; 
- other costs (materials, informative system, parking etc.); 
- costs of supplementary maintenance (SM); 
- costs of routine maintenance (RM); 
- costs of maintenance of capital. 
For the present survey they have considered the analysis of Paragraph 1.3 of Study 
5 and they refer to the calculation of maintenance costs of hydraulic service, here 
reported. 
Costs of supplementary maintenance  
Interventions of supplementary maintenance to which is referred are those 
programmed and constituted from all activities of revision, substitution of works, 
machines, electric and/or hydraulic systems, single mechanic components, 
operations, carpentry, aimed at contrasting or eliminating ageing or wear, and 
aimed at maintaining an efficiency status and full functions existing works during 
all the period of useful life and they are not available to extend such life. 
This category of costs refers to the cost of investment of the infrastructure 
considering coefficients in relation with the different typology of work: 
CMS = CI ∙ cMS (1) 
 
where C	: cost of yearly supplementary maintenance; C
:cost of investment (inclusive of general costs, technical expenses and VAT); c	: coefficient of supplementary maintenance. 
 
Coefficients of supplementary maintenance adopted are the result of data traced 
in books and of information available by Operators working on regional water 
systems (Table 2). 
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Kind of works Coefficients of Supplementary 
Maintenance 
Dams 0,007 
Diversion Dams 0,004 
Pump station: electrical and mechanical works 0,015 
Pumping: Civil works 0,003 
Pipes (including tanks and divisors) 0,007 
Canals 0,008 
Tunnels 0,003 
Table 2. Coefficients of supplementary maintenance 
Costs of routine maintenance 
The activity of routine maintenance is based on interventions aimed at 
maintaining a good status of preservation and protecting technique efficiency of 
works and facilities to guarantee normal efficacy. Therefore, the cost of ordinary 
and programmed activities from third parties to maintain building works through 
a contract and the cost of materials used from the domestic staff during 
maintenance activity have to be included in this item. 
Maintenance costs, which, as shown above, do not include costs of domestic staff 
used employed for ordinary maintenance, are estimated for typology of works 
according to the following criteria: 
- yearly unitary cost of maintenance for every work as regards reservoirs, 
diversion dams, tanks, divisors, pumping; 
- yearly cost for kilometres concerning pipes, canals, tunnels. 
 
Estimation of such parameters is obtained on the basis of technique characteristics 
of single works. The following Table 3 reports, for typology of work, utilized 
parameters.  
 
Kind of work Unitary cost 
[€] 
Cost per km 
[€] 
Dams 180.000  
Diversion dams 10.000  
Tanks and divisors 3.500  
Pipes  4.500 
Canals  8.000 
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Kind of work Unitary cost 
[€] 
Cost per km 
[€] 
Tunnels  500 
Pump stations  <=1.000kw 8.000  
Pump stations  <=3.000 kw 12.000  
Pump stations  >3.000 kw 15.000  
Table 3. Adopted routine maintenance parameters  
Investment cost of existing infrastructures 
In order to estimate the costs of supplementary maintenance, it is necessary to 
understand the opening value of water infrastructures for which cost functions 
have been adopted. 
It is appropriate to show that realization costs of works reported here below 
include expenses related only to works and such costs do not include general 
costs, technical expanses and VAT. 
Dams 
In Figure 2 the function relative to realization cost of a concrete dam and in Figure 
3 the function relative to an embankment dam are shown. 
 
Figure 2. Cost function for a concrete dam 
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Figure 3. Cost function for an embankment dam 
Diversion dams 
As regards diversion dams a lump-sum realization cost, corresponding to 
1.000.000 €, has been adopted. 
Water transfer works 
The realization costs of water transfer works shown below also include the related 
works as tanks and divisors. 
In Figure 4 the relative function related to the realization cost of water pipes can be 
seen. 
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Figure 4. Cost function of pipes 
In Table 4 the relative function to the realization cost of tunnels is shown. 
 
Description Quantity Unitary costs 
 (€/m) 
Excavation (m3/m) 11,6 1.078,3 
Concrete per cement inclusive of iron and 
formworks (m3/m) 4,6 1.147,9 
Extra charge for centering 2 360,0 
others almost 10%   213,8 
TOTAL   2.800 
Table 4. Cost of tunnel 
In Figure 5 the functions relative to the realization costs of canals are shown. 
y = 123,13x
3
 - 249,88x
2
 + 765,51x
R
2
 = 0,9948
0
500
1.000
1.500
2.000
2.500
3.000
3.500
0,0 0,5 1,0 1,5 2,0 2,5 3,0
DN [m]
€/
m
Diameter [m] 
36 
 
 
Figure 5. Curves of realization costs of canals  
 
Pump stations 
Total cost of pump stations depends on prevalence H and on maximum water 
flow pumped Qmax: 
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In Figure 6, for example, curves for two values of pumped water flow are shown, 
from which, depending on prevalence, we obtain relative investment costs. 
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Figure 6. Cost function of pump station for two water flow values 
2.3.2. Regional Law n°19 of the 6th December 2006 
The Regional Law 19/2006 of Sardinia “Disposizioni in materia di risorse idriche e 
bacini idrografici” (Regulations about water resources and river basins) (RAS; 
2006b) accepts the National Legislative Decree 152/2006 and the European 
Directive 2000/60/EC. 
The law regulates functions and fundamental tasks in water resources under the 
qualitative, quantitative and managing profile, promoting: 
- responsible use and defence of water resources; 
- priority supplying to civil, so to agricultural and industrial usage and the 
guarantee of minimal vital run-off flow; 
- definition of politics in order to recover water service, resources and 
environmental costs.  
Functions and tasks to achieve hydrogeological equilibrium are regulated in order 
to favour: 
- prevention of water and landslide risk; 
- defence and consolidation of sides of unstable areas and coastlines. 
Amongst the most important regulations the following must be highlighted:  
- introduction of the concept of regional multi-purpose water system (Art. 3); 
- institution of “Agenzia Regionale del Distretto Idrografico della Sardegna - 
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agency for the management of the multi-purpose water system, named 
ERIS, now ENAS (Article 18); 
- predisposition of the “Piano per il recupero dei costi relativi ai servizi 
idrici” (Plan for recovery costs related to water service (Article 17) on which 
wholesale water rates have to be defined by users; such rates have to be 
unified for homogeneous categories and shall achieve what established on 
WFD. 
The most important articles of the Law, which support this thesis, are reported 
below. 
Article 2. River basins delimitations 
1. The whole regional territory is delimited as a unique river basin under the competence of 
Region and represents the river basin district of Sardinia [...]. 
Article 3. Definitions 
1. According to law: 
[…] 
c) multi-purpose water system is the sum of works for water that, individually or as parts 
of a complex system, have the possibility to feed, directly or indirectly, more territorial 
areas or more different categories of users, contributing to an equalization of quantities and 
costs of supply; 
d) regional system of hydraulic infrastructures is the sum of works which refer to 
organizations of channel, control of rivers, torrents and others bodies of water and 
handmade to regulate water bodies; 
e) other infrastructures are those included on water systems, aimed to single users 
categories;  
f) user categories are macrocategories on which water bodies uses are divided in; they are::  
1) civil uses: human consumption and collective and private hygienic services,;  
2) agricultural uses: those related to use of water resource aimed to production of 
agricultural products;  
3) industrial uses :those related to water resource for industrial purposes;  
4)environmental uses : those that guarantee a quote of minimal vital run-off flows 
necessary for water bodies protection. 
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Article 12. Agenzia regionale del distretto idrografico della Sardegna 
(Regional Agency of river basin of Sardinia). Institution, purpose and 
status in law. 
1. With the aim of guaranteeing the unity of management of the planning, programming 
and regulation activities on regional river basins, [...] the Regional agency of river basin of 
Sardinia is constituted. 
2. This agency has the function of operative secretary, a functional-logistic supporting 
system of the Basin Authority and as a technical support for application of rules provided 
by the directive 2000/60/EC […]. 
Article 13. Functions 
1. The agency looks out of Basin Authority functions giving a technical support to work 
and it arranges [...]:  
a) river basin plan projects, of the relative transitional plan and the project of planning 
management of the river basin;  
b) an analysis of characteristics of the river basin district of Sardinia, with modes and 
contents provided by Article 5 of the directive n˚ 2000/60/EC to proceed to an examination 
of the impact of human activities on the status of groundwater and surface water and to 
define an economic analysis of water use;  
[…] 
e) aims and objectives to produce, by the manager subject of multi-purpose water system, 
programs of intervention and financial plan, related to water supply service; 
[…] 
g) regional systems of corresponding amounts for wholesale water supply for multi-
purpose uses; 
Article 17. Plan for recovery of costs related to water services 
1. The Institutional Committee establishes yearly criteria to put into practice the principle 
of recovery of costs of water services depending on different sectors of use of wholesale 
water, on the basis of what is provided by Article 9 of directive n˚ 2000/60/EC. This takes 
account of:  
a) the need for conservation and saving of water resources to achieve objectives for a 
sustainable management;  
b) infrastructural investments made and to be made, which improve productivity quality 
and the organization of water service of regional multi-purpose water system; 
 c) targets to unify criteria of economic considerations related to the water service supply of 
regional water system across the whole territory for categories of users;   
d) social and economic consequences of recovery of costs for different categories of users;  
e) the need to proportion on time variations of contributions for recovery of costs.  
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2. The agency elaborates the recovery of costs Plan related to water services for wholesale 
water […]; the Plan divides costs between different sectors of use and for categories of 
users as considered in letter f) paragraph 1 and article 3 
[…] 
Article 18. Managing subject of regional multi purpose water system  
1. The “Ente Autonomo del Flumendosa”, has been transformed into the “Ente delle 
risorse idriche della Sardegna”, known hereafter as ERIS (now called “ENAS - Ente 
Acque della Sardegna”) since the present law came into effect. It is an instrumental body 
of the Region that manages regional multi-purpose water system. 
2. This body provides construction, management and maintenance of infrastructures, of 
plants  and works of regional multi-purpose water system granted by the Region [...]. 
3. Ownership of network and infrastructures and the title of licenses is property of the 
Region, while the management is attributed to ERIS (ENAS). 
2.3.3. Studio del Modello di Gestione del Sistema 
Idrico Regionale - Study of Regional Water 
System Management Model 
The Study (hereafter SMGSIR) (RAS, 2008) has the objective of analyzing regional 
water system and its adaptation to what is provided by the Directive 2000/60/EC 
and by Decree 152/2006. Its principal purpose is to determine components of 
financial costs of water resource both for multi-purpose system and for other 
sectors. 
The survey involves an analysis of the present structure of Sardinian water 
systems showing the subdivision by sector according to uses of resources. It also 
describes the system of infrastructures, scheme of flows of the resource among 
sectors and their institutional structure, and there is an analysis of different sectors 
downstream the multi purpose system: civil, irrigational and industrial. Finally 
the average financial cost per cubic metre of multi purpose system (wholesale 
water cost) is calculated. 
The unitary financial cost of wholesale water in 2008, calculated as a ratio between 
industrial cost in 2008 of the subject manager of multi purpose system  ENAS, and 
the volumes supplied the same year which corresponds to 0,077 €/m3. 
 
Year Industrial cost 
[€ x 103] 
Supplied volumes  
[m3x 103] 
Unitary financial cost 
[€/m3] 
2008 46.603 604.485 0,077 
Table 5. Unitary financial cost in 2008 for wholesale water 
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As stated in Chapter 9 from the regional document “unitary financial cost represents 
an average financial cost incorporated on resource supplied on every water system of multi 
purpose system and for every use”. 
The survey was developed by a workgroup of which the author of this thesis was 
a member, and represented the first important economic analysis of water service 
in Sardinia and represented the basis for the Management Plan of river basin 
District. 
2.3.4. Management Plan for River Basin District of 
Sardinia 
Management Plan for River Basin District of Sardinia (RAS; 2010), provided from 
Directive 2000/60/EC represents an operative instrument through which 
measures of defence, reclamation and improving of surface water and 
groundwater have to be planned and monitored. It also has to facilitate a 
sustainable use of water resources. 
In May 2009 the first draft of the document was drawn up and has since 
undergone many changes. The most recent versions (March 2010) is articulated in 
14 Chapters, where the following parts have been analyzed:   
- description of characteristics of river basin District in reference to Article 5 
of the European Directive;  
- evaluation of problems linked to water resources management in reference 
to Article 14 of the European Directive;  
- synthesis of pressures and impacts of human activities on qualitative and 
quantitative status of waters;  
- specification of protected areas, in reference to Article 6 of the European 
Directive;  
- synthesis of programmes of adopted measures and economic analysis on 
water use; 
- programme of work and mode of information and active participation of 
the public. 
Chapter 13 is dedicated to economic analysis on water use and, as indicated in the 
document, “it concerns informative contents provided by annex 10 part III of Legislative 
decree 152/2006 and from articles 5, 9 and 11 of directive 2000/60/EC”. Moreover, as 
stated in the same chapter, “evaluation on application of principle of water costs 
recovery, as established on article 9 of directive […], needs […] an estimation of prices and 
costs linked to water services”. 
To reinforce this point, the economic analysis of the present Management Plan is 
based on estimation of financial costs of regional water service, reporting costs of 
different water sectors (multi purpose, civil, irrigational and industrial). At any 
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rate, there is a failure on the evaluation of environmental and resources costs and 
on the estimation of politics for a correct costs recovery as provided by Article 9 of 
the European Directive, which have to be drawn up by 22 of December 2010. 
To conclude this view on reference regulations, some parts from Paragraph 13.7.2 
of the present version of Management Plan are included below; here the 
importance and the necessity of usage of the mathematical model of hydro-
economic optimization for water resources systems to achieve the instructions of 
WFD is emphasized. 
“Resources Costs” […] can be evaluated through optimization models. 
Resources Cost is different in time and space depending on water availability […] and on 
dynamics of water demand and on “willingness to pay”. Such variable can be captured 
only through optimization and simulation of hydro-economics models, so their 
development is essential for a correct determination of resources costs. 
These models are very useful for the analysis of environmental variables which contribute 
to the environmental status of water bodies, as a minimal vital run-off of water bodies and 
the minimal level on reservoirs.  
Use of hydro-economic models is necessary to analyze such problems on basin scale, 
reproducing the relationship between surface waters and groundwater, the infrastructural 
system complexity, the operative rules which manage it and the demand functions for 
different users. 
 
Mathematical models used for the Management Plan have been utilized for this 
thesis and have represented an operative instrument to achieve results that shall 
be presented later on. 
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3. Costs allocation problem 
How should the common costs of an enterprise be shared “fairly” among its 
beneficiaries? This problem is widespread, both in public enterprise and also 
within private firms. It arises in the pricing policies of public utilities providing 
telephone services, electricity, water, and transport. It occurs in the cost-benefit 
analyses of public works project designed to serve different constituencies, such as 
a multipurpose reservoir. It is implicit in the determination of access fees or user 
charges for common facilities such as an airport or waterways. In private 
corporation it occurs in the form of internal accounting schemes to allocate 
common and overhead costs among different divisions of the firm (Young, 1985). 
Such cost allocation problems typically exhibit two features: 
- cost must be allocated exactly, with no profit or deficit; 
- there in no objective basis at hand for attributing costs directly to specific 
products or services. 
3.1. Cost allocation methods 
Common practice principal cost allocation methods are the following: 
- Egalitarian methods: equal allocation of costs between persons. It results 
the easiest way which is usually used in cases where persons have 
homogeneous characteristics. 
- Proportional methods: subdivision of total cost proportioned to a 
determined characteristic measure as for example the quantity of good 
used. 
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- Methods based on marginal cost. Economic theory suggests that optimal 
rate is the one which maximizes consumer’s surplus, i.e. the rate which 
guarantees the maximum covering of a demand for a linear rate equal to 
marginal cost. Methods based on marginal costs are applicable in case total 
covering commitment of costs is not enforced. 
- Methods based on separable costs. The component of total cost strictly 
related to a person is directly assigned to them and the remaining part is 
allocated through others methods, for example through the proportional 
one. 
- Arbitrary methods or opportunity methods: these are methods based on 
imposed rates which do not derive from a particular methodology; in fact, 
they are the result of valuation and calculation on the basis of an experience 
developed on the specific sector. 
Other criteria of cost allocation among users are present, and they are based on the 
usage of specific mathematic formulations more or less complex which are 
corresponding to specific property, according to requests made by promoting 
enterprise. 
3.1.1. Fee methods in water resources 
In water resources, the most used methods are the proportional ones, where there 
is an assignment of costs in function of the amount of resource used or, in case of 
irrigational demands, in function of the number of irrigated hectares.  
For years in Italy assignment of subventions, subsides, refunds and grants-in-aid 
provided by the central government to companies, syndicates and operators of 
water system, has been, and is still a common practice. They are almost obligatory. 
Such practice led to use criteria of assignment which do not guarantee total 
coverage of sector’s costs. 
Moreover, only for the drinking sector, a rates regulation method has been 
defined, the so called “metodo normalizzato” (normalized method) established by 
Law 36/1994 and now used in every national ATO. This method was based on 
revenue cap criterion, according to which operator’s proceeds are established for 
one year and, at the same time, maximum limits to growing of reference rate 
which are settled, are calculated under the following formulation: '( = () + * + +)(,- ∙ (1 + . + /) (3) 
where: 
Tn is the rate for the current year; 
C is the component of operative costs; 
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A is the component of amortization’s costs; 
R is the component which indicates remuneration of investment; 
P is the inflation rate programmed for the present year; 
K is the “limit price", maximum growth rate for rate beyond P. 
Once determined reference rate every AATO shall determine real rate which will 
be applied to final users.  
For years normalized method has had many blames and few occasions of 
application, so water service operators, after having mentioned many times 
conflicting aspects, proposed a better overcoming. Many changes have been put 
forward even though such method is still in force on its original formulation.  
As regards other water sectors, at present costs allocation methods used follow 
closely those seen before. Nevertheless, such methods present a big arbitrariness 
of usage in all national territory. 
In Sardinia, different criteria have been carried out, depending on users’ typology 
and usage level of water resource. 
In regard to the regional multipurpose system, the rates applied to the three macro 
users (civil, irrigational and industrial) are proposed yearly by ARDIS and 
approved by the “Comitato Istituzionale Regionale” (Regional Institutional 
Committee) which belongs to Basin Authority. Their determination looks like a 
product of estimates and evaluations free from any criteria of calculation; and it is, 
in fact, totally absent a methodology which justify their application. 
The following rates indicate the period from 2005 to 2010. 
 
ENAS rates [€/mc] 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Civil I 0,1 0,07 0,056 0,056 0,025 0,025 
Civil II - 0,1 0,07 0,07 0,056 0,056 
Irrigational I 0,02 0,02 0,015 0,007 0,007 0,005 
Irrigational II - - - 0,015 0,015 0,015 
Industrial 0,23 0,23 0,23 0,23 0,23 0,23 
Table 6. ENAS rates 2006 – 2010 – Source: Management Plan 
Starting from 2006 for the civil demand and from 2008 for irrigational demand, 
two rates have been applied depending on the amount of used water resource. For 
the civil demand the first rate is adopted for a maximum consumption of 130 
millions of cubic meters and, after this, the second rate has to be applied. Instead, 
as it regards to irrigational demand, basic volumes in function of the amount of 
the resource consumed the previous year are yearly defined for every land 
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reclamation syndicate. If such syndicate is able to consume a volume of resource 
within the basic volume assigned it will be adopted the first rate, on the contrary it 
will be applied the second rate to the exceeding resource. 
 
Figure 7. Trend of ENAS rates 2006 - 2010 
From the analysis of data it is clear that industrial demand is the only one which 
does not exhibits changes in rates. However, the civil and irrigational demand 
registered a reduction of the 75% during the last 6 years. As we said, this trend is 
decided without any criterion. 
Moreover, income for rates for multi purpose system does not guarantee the total 
recovery of costs of operator ENAS. Within 2010  they can cover almost the half 
(Table 7). 
 
 [M€] 
Expenditure Budget ENAS 2010 39,980 
Income Budget ENAS coming from rates 17,624 
Table 7. Budget plan ENAS 2010. Source: Management Plan 
In the case of irrigational sector rates applied by Sardinian Land-Reclamation 
Syndicates are different. Such operators recover financial costs of water services 
through two sources:  
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- transfers from Central Government and from the Region; 
- rate applied to their associated users. 
Generally, at the end of every year they quantify final costs and, depending on the 
amount of received grants-in-aid, establish rates for a break even. On the basis of 
such method, due to variability of year costs and of income of contributions, there 
is a big variation of applied rates among these operators, and also inside the same 
between one year and the following one. 
Several times a yearly fixed rent plus a variable fixed rent in function of irrigated 
hectares or consumption of resources is assigned to irrigational final user. But 
every syndicate fixes rates as he wants. Also, in this case it is very arbitrary when 
it comes to define the associated costs to final users due to a failure of a unique 
allocation costs methods. Moreover, for their intrinsic definition due to public 
grants, rates do not guarantee recovery of costs of irrigational water service. 
In such a context the Management Plan reports that Land reclamation Syndicates 
will have to modify their methods of rating, trying to unify to an unique criterion 
acceptable for all the operators. 
As far as the industrial sector is concerned, three situations can be settled: 
- areas linked to municipal water system. In this case a rate established by 
AATO is applied; 
- users linked to multipurpose water system by cooperative aqueducts. They 
pay rate fixes by ENAS; 
- users which dispose of concessions for water use. In such case an annual tax 
is in force. 
3.2. Willingness to pay 
One of the worst problems of cost allocation methods that are found, is that they 
almost completely ignore the problem of motivation: “why, for example, should 
agents accept an allocation that exceeds their opportunity costs (i.e. the cost 
related to the next-best choice available to someone who has picked among several 
mutually exclusive choices) or willingness to pay?” (Young, 1985). 
To better explain the concept of “willingness to pay” here it is presented a simple 
example which follows the one proposed by Young (1994) . 
Two nearby cities [A] and [B], 50 thousand residents the first and 10 thousand the 
second one, have to build a water distribution system. If the two cities would 
decide to build separately a facility for itself, [A] afforded a cost of 20M€, while [B] 
10M€. If they cooperated, id est in case of realization of a unique facility serving 
both communities, total cost would be of 25M€, which would be lower respect to 
the sum of single costs of the two autonomous aqueducts (30M€). Clearly it makes 
sense the second solution, since they can jointly save 5M€. Cooperation will be 
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possible if the two users agree on how to divide the charges for project’s 
realization.  
 
 Residents Cost [M€] 
City A 50.000 20 
City B 10.000 10 
City A+B 60.000 25 
Table 8. Example of the two cities 
One possible solution to costs sharing would be to divide total cost in equal parts 
between the two cities, according to an equalitarian method, which means 12,5M€ 
for each. Such division means the same power for both cities and this would be 
acceptable if the two cities have the same dimension. Otherwise, in such case, the 
same division would imply that every resident of the city [A] paid only one fifth 
respect to what paid [B], even though they use the same facility. This hardly seems 
fair and it is predictable that [B] will not participate to this cooperation project. 
Another possible solution would be to divide the costs equally among residents, 
according to a proportional method, obtaining a per capita cost of 416,67€. So [A] 
would have a total cost of 20,8M€ while [B] of 4,2M€. 
 
 Town A Town B 
Cost of building their own aqueduct 20 M€ 10 M€ 
Equal division of costs between cities 12,5 M€ 12,5 M€ 
Equal division of costs among persons 20,8 M€ 4,2 M€ 
Table 9. Costs allocation for the two cities (1) 
Such proposals do not take into account the opportunity costs of the parties 
participating on the project. In fact, on the first case [B] is not likely to agree since 
it would afford a bigger cost respect to what would afford for an own aqueduct, 
similarly [A] is not like to agree to an equal division per capita. 
Here three more criteria of cost allocation will be proposed. They take into account 
availability of paying from the two cities. 
The first criterion proposes to divide in equally saving due to cooperation of the 
two cities. Saving corresponds to the difference between the cost of project of the 
two autonomous aqueducts and the cost of common project, i.e. 5M€. If we divide 
saving in equal parts and we subtract it to the opportunity cost we obtain: 
- for [A]: 20M€ - 2,5M€ = 17,5 M€; 
- for [B]: 10M€ - 2,5M€ = 7,5M€. 
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A second criterion, otherwise, is to divide saving in equal parts among the 
residents; here it corresponds to a per capita saving equal to 5M€/60000ab = 83,3 
€/residents, which would determine: 
- for [A]: savings of 4,17M€, associated cost 20M€ - 4,17M€ = 15,83M€; 
- for [B]: savings of 0,83M€, associated cost 10M€ - 0,83M€ = 9,17M€. 
A third solution would be to subtract savings in proportion to opportunity cost of 
the two users.  
- for [A] savings (5*20/30) M€= 3,3M€, associated cost 20M€ - 3,3M€ = 16,7M€; 
- for [B] savings (5*10/30) M€ = 1,7 M€, associated cost 10M€ - 1,7M€ = 8,3M€. 
Note that this is the same thing as allocating total cost in proportion to each city’s 
opportunity cost: 
- for A: (25 * 20/30) M€ = 16,7M€; 
- for B: (25 * 10/30) M€ = 8,3M€. 
 
 Town A Town B 
Cost of building their own aqueduct 20,0 M€ 10,0 M€ 
Equal division of savings between cities 17,5 M€ 7,5 M€ 
Equal division of savings among persons 15,83 M€ 9,17 M€ 
Savings proportional to opportunity cost 16,7 M€ 8,3 M€ 
Table 10. Costs allocation for the two cities (2) 
Such example shows several aspects. First, there doesn't exist an easy unique 
answer for costs allocation, even if it apparently looks simple. In fact, it is 
impossible to find just one criterion to follow; it is necessary to analyze in details 
every case. 
Moreover, it is important to underline the absence of market mechanisms to value 
a solution. Actually, one solution would be to imitate market behaviour equalizing 
charges to marginal costs, equal to the difference between the cost with/without 
the relative city. In this example we obtain: 
- for [A] 25M€ - 10M€ = 15M€; 
- for [B] 25M€ - 20M€ = 5M€. 
However, in this case, the sum of marginal costs do not correspond to total costs, 
i.e. such sum doesn’t cover all the charges; so it is not an acceptable criterion if 
covering costs is considered a basic principle to guarantee.  
Moreover, dealing with costs allocation, it is necessary to consider some concepts 
interconnected among themselves: efficiency, equity and sustainability. Such 
instruments are basic to reach a solution of cooperation among the players in 
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order to achieve better savings and to obtain the most economically efficient 
solution.  
3.3. Fair allocation and Cooperative 
Game Theory 
As we could observe, a fair cost allocation has to comply with general principle of 
equity, efficiency, and justice. For that it shall respect principles of individual 
acceptance and agreement among users in order to support their voluntary 
cooperation. 
Moreover the majority of cost allocation methods have the default of not 
underlining motivation on criteria in assigning water services costs. So, one of the 
main objectives of this study is the research for a shared cost allocation, giving an 
adequate justification of the adopted criteria. 
The main problem is not in finding a modality of cost allocation among users, i.e. 
searching a determined law of charges allocation, but rather how to allocate equally 
and fairly sustained costs. This means to find an impartial allocation of costs for all 
the users of such project, in order to promote and guarantee cooperation among 
users and the feasibility of a common project which can allow reduction of costs 
for all the beneficiaries.  
The goal of analysis is to devise criteria and methods for solving these problems in 
a just, equitable, fair and reasonable manner. Cost allocation is thus ultimately 
concerned with fairness. The methods and principles of cost allocation that are 
likely to find acceptance must somehow be grounded in primitive, common-sense 
ideas of fairness and equity (Young, 1994). 
But precisely what is meant by the word fair? According to Webster (1981), it 
stems from fagar, an Old High German term meaning "beautiful". Fair means, 
firstly, "attractive in appearance: pleasant to view". Significantly, a secondary 
meaning is "pleasing to hear: inspiring hope or confidence often delusively ... 
specious". It is closely connected to such ideas as just, equitable, impartial, unbiased, 
objective. "Fair ... implies a disposition in a person or group to achieve a fitting and 
right balance of claims or considerations that is free from undue favouritism even 
to oneself ... Just stresses, more than fair, a disposition to conform with, or 
conformity with the standard of what is right, true, or lawful, despite strong, 
especially personal, influences tending to subvert that conformity" (Young, 1994). 
On the basis of such considerations, the definition of a criterion of equitable and 
impartial costs assignment represents the basis to guarantee binding agreements 
among interested users, by supporting cooperation to achieve more efficient 
solutions and by ensuring stability of consensual solutions. On the contrary, the 
impossibility to define an unique criterion of costs assignment, which can result 
satisfactory for all the parts, can provoke total or partial abandonment of 
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cooperative projects, so causing a loss of efficiency and an increase of  externalities 
produced by individual projects. (Deidda, 2009). 
As reported by Young (1994) Cooperative Game Theory provides necessary 
instruments to analyze situations in which it is basic to research a sharing 
mechanism considered efficient, fair and it has to supply appropriate incentives 
among the parts. Lemaire (1984) points out that a cost allocation problem is 
identical to the determination of value of a cooperative game with transferable 
utilities. Sharing cost between users can be seen as a kind of game where it is 
necessary to determine the fair allocation among different players. A cooperative 
game with transferable utilities belongs to the science called Game Theory. 
By using techniques of assignment of costs belonging to Game Theory, it suggests 
to possibly make the process of negotiation explicit through mathematic formulas 
which focus on such properties that guarantee equity, justice and cooperation 
among users involved in a project, with the objective to obtain an acceptable 
solution for everyone. 
Using such procedures, cost allocation results an inside procedure to the project 
because there is an a priori solution. Such denomination is in contrast with what 
usually occurs when costs allocation is an external procedure to planning steps 
and it is considered only once such project is already carried out, i.e. an a posteriori 
solution. 
Criterion of costs allocation does not have to be a support but rather the result of a 
decision making process.  
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4. Game Theory 
Game Theory (hereafter referred to as GT) is a mathematical science developed 
around the first half of the last century whose origin was to solve situations of 
conflict among different players  in conditions of cooperation or competition. The 
name comes from “Theory of Games and Economic Behavior” written by Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). 
According to Parrachino et al. (2002) GT is the study of mathematical modelling of 
strategic behaviour of decision makers (players), in situations where one player’s 
decisions may affect the other players. Contrarily, in respect to classic Operative 
Research on which decisions relative to a problem are taken by one player who 
can play in complete autonomy and freedom, GT deals with situations on which 
the result depends on choices made by different people, called players. These 
participants operate to achieve objectives that can be in common, different and 
even in contrast (Fragnelli, 2010). The basic assumption is that decision makers are 
rational players, “intelligent”, so they take into account other decision-makers’ 
behaviours. 
GT is quite recent and conventionally begins in 1913 thanks to Zermelo who 
analysed different strategies for chess. Such game belongs to qualitative games  
where the only objective is to win, the sum is equal to zero (if you win, the other 
loses: eat or be eaten) and you know all the information (you play fear). Until the 
fifties, GT dealt with similar cases, of limited importance. 
The firsts step was in the forties when in 1944 the book written by Von Neumann e 
Morgenstern was published. They were respectively a mathematician and an 
economist who introduced the concept of “strategy” and proposed different 
applications. Strategy is commonly defined as “policy” that individuates in every 
game’s situation a “move” among the many possible ones. 
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Another incentive was given by the mathematician John Nash, who, in 1950, 
introduced the concept of Nash equilibrium and in 1953 that of bargaining 
equilibrium which is the “typical” solution of a “non-cooperative game”. The 
importance of Nash's discoveries was treated on the famous film “A Beautiful 
Mind”. 
During the same period Shapley (1953) indicated another solution to solve 
“cooperative“ games, i.e., those games on which the players can make binding 
agreements among themselves to improve their condition. 
Subsequently Harsanyi (1968) expanded the research to incomplete information 
games, i.e. those games on which players do not know all the characteristics of the 
game, as, for example, the reward for the other participants.  
Currently, GT plays a very important role in economy. In fact many publications 
have been produced for such theory and, thanks to studies relative to GT, 
scientists like Nash, Harsanyi and Selten in 1994, Mirrlees and Vickrey in 1995, 
Schelling and Aumann in 2005 and Hurwicz, Maskin and Myerson in 2007 
received the Nobel prize.  
Besides economic world, the applications of GT ranges from military to politic 
sector, from psychology to informatics, from biology to sociology and also concern 
studies related to sport (Camerer, 2000; Hofbauer & Sigmund, 2003). For instance, 
equal sharing of properties and heritage is an area which can be studied through 
TG techniques (Aumann, 2006); in social science we can find interesting 
applications regarding the study of power distribution in legislative procedures 
(Brams, 1975; Odershook, 1986;); sociologists developed a whole branch of the 
theory in order to study group’s decisions matters (Parson & Wooldridge, 2000); 
even the epidemiologists  use the GT, specially for immunization procedures and 
methods to verify vaccines and other medicines (Roth, 1984); finally a very used 
sector of application is military strategy (Aumann, 2006). 
If we enter into details of the structure of GT, we can distinguish two branches of 
games, according to the classification made by Harsanyi (1966): 
- non-cooperative games, where binding agreements among the players are 
not possible; 
- cooperative games , where binding agreements among the players are 
possible. 
The main distinction between the two games is that the first games analyze 
situations where the players consider only their own strategic objectives and thus 
binding agreements among the players are not possible, while the second ones are 
mainly based on agreements to allocate cooperative gains among the players 
(Parrachino et al., 2002). 
Cooperative games can be divided, in their turn, in: 
- non transfer utility-games, where the players receive a pre-assigned payoff 
(the value of the utility or the payment); 
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- transfer utility-games where the players of a coalition can divide the utility, 
that they have, in any possible way. 
Depending on the models of game, even the searched solution takes different 
meanings: in the case of non-cooperative game or non transfer utility-game the 
solution of the game consists in giving indications to one or more players, possibly 
all the players, about strategies to adopt; but, for transfer utility-games it means to 
determine a division of the winning among all the participants. 
4.1. Non-cooperative Game Theory 
In this branch of games, binding agreements and communication among the 
players are not possible, apart from the fact that their objectives are in contrast or 
common and that they can have interests in coming on agreements (Fragnelli, 
2010). So every player plays in an autonomic way in function of possible actions 
which other participants of the game shall fulfil. 
Non-cooperative Game Theory (NCGT) allows to interpret paradoxical 
phenomena on which it is possible to show how the research of an optimal 
solution for every player can lead a general loss of well-being, contrary to what 
stated by the theory of efficiency according to Pareto. In order to explain such 
concept, here below it is presented one of the most classic examples of non-
cooperative game.  
Prisoner’s dilemma 
The so-called “prisoner’s dilemma” is, probably, the most famous problem of 
NCGT, introduced in 1958 by Dresher and Flood (Flood, 1958) and previously 
adapted in an informal way by Tucker in 1953 (Tucker, 1953). 
Two persons A and B are arrested by the police for the same crime and are 
interrogated separately by the judge. Every person can choose, independently to 
confess [C] or not to confess [NC].  
If both of them do not confess, they will be condemned for small punishment with 
2 years of prison, but if they both confess they will receive a five years sentence; if 
one confesses and the other not, the one who admits obtains a reduction of 
sentence and he gets a one year sentence while the other gets an aggravating 
circumstance and he is condemned for six years. The punishments are reported on 
the following table. 
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B 
[C] [NC] 
A 
[C] 5; 5 1; 6 
[NC] 6; 1 2; 2 
Table 11. Game of the prisoner 
Rationally A chooses [C] because he can get a small punishment whatever the 
choice of B is (5 < 6 ; 1 < 2) and similarly also B chooses C. So the strategy of not 
confessing is dominated by the confessing strategy. By eliminating dominated 
strategies we can get to Nash equilibrium (1950) where the prisoners both confess 
and are condemned to a 5 years  sentence. The expected decision is [C, C], while 
more advantageous for both the prisoners would be [NC, NC] and the consequent 
two years of prison for every one (Pareto optimum). 
If we consider that the two players had previously decided the common choice of 
not to confess in case of arrest, once closed in two separate cells every prisoner 
would wonder if the other prisoner's promise is going to be maintained. Every one 
will have the dilemma if to confess or not to confess. TGNC shows that it exists 
only one point of equilibrium [C, C]. 
Prisoner’s dilemma was used to describe the situation between USA and USSR 
during the Cold War. Considering the two superpowers as the two prisoners, the 
choice to confess as the atomic armament and, on the other hand, the choice not to 
confess as unilateral disarming, it is clear that in that period it was necessary the 
arms race for the two countries, even if such final result was not optimal for 
anyone of the two superpowers and neither for the whole planet.   
To conclude, it is suitable to reflect on the concept of Nash equilibrium. This is the 
product of the dominating strategy of every player; it represents, therefore, the 
situation of the game in case in which every player realizes what is the best for 
himself, trying to maximise his own profit apart from the other participant’s 
choice. However, as we said, it doesn't mean that Nash equilibrium is the best 
solution from a general point of view, so it is possible that a group of players or, at 
least, all the participants of the game can improve their situation going away from 
the equilibrium. In fact, as we said, Nash equilibrium cannot be a Pareto optimum, 
so, there can be other combinations which conduct to improve the gain of some 
players without reducing the game of others; in extreme case, it is possible to 
improve the situation of all the participants of the game. 
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4.2. Cooperative Game Theory 
Cooperative Game Theory (CGT), as the name reports, differently from NCGT, 
analyses situations in which participants can cooperate among themselves in order 
to achieve a common purpose. The players are not obliged to have contrasting 
interests, so it is possible that some of them tend to cooperate to improve their 
result. In order to cooperate, it has to be possible, above all, to communicate and to 
make agreements among the players. Furthermore there must be an authority 
necessarily strong and accepted by all the participants able to make such 
agreements respected (Fragnelli, 2010). In particular, CGT tries to supply answers 
about how to share gains and costs of a common action among participants in 
order to guarantee those principles of equity, individual acceptability and general 
agreement among the players. 
As we said before, cooperative games can be divided in: 
- non transfer utility-games, where the players receive a pre-assigned payoff 
(the value of the utility or the payment); 
- transfer utility-games where the players of a coalition can divide the utility 
in any possible way. 
Such research belongs to the second branch for which three hypotheses must be 
satisfied (Fragnelli, 2010): 
- from a normative perspective, the transfer of utility among the players must 
be possible; 
- there must be a common mean of exchange, for example money, through 
which it is possible to transfer utility from a material perspective; 
- utility functions among the players must be equivalent, for example linear 
functions of the quantity of money.  
Now it is necessary to explain in details the most important elements on the 
basis of CGT with transferable utility. Afterwards the most used concepts, 
principles and solutions will be illustrated; so, at the end of the chapter, some 
applications of CGT in literature will be presented. 
4.2.1. CGT with transferable utility 
Firstly the following basic elements can be defined (Young, 1994):  
We will refer N = (1,2, .., n) as a set of players participating in the game. Every 
subset 0 ⊆ 2 is called “coalition”, and for S = N we have the “Grand Coalition”. 
The players can represent real subjects, as the users of a water system, or member 
of a more abstract set as the sector of a company, or they can also represent 
different planning alternatives to realize commonly or separately.  
58 
 
c(i) represents the cost connected to the user i considered in a independent and 
autonomous way with respect to the other players, called “stand-alone cost”, and 
c(S) the cost linked to coalition S, i.e. the cost commonly sustained by all the users 
of S. Consequently, c(N) is the cost associated to the Grand Coalition, i.e. the 
common cost sustained by all the participants of the game. Finally by convention 
the cost linked to an empty coalition corresponds to zero c(Φ) = 0. 
The cost associated to a generic coalition (formed by only one player, by their sets 
or by all the participants of the game) represents the least cost of serving such 
coalition by the most efficient way, i.e. the minimum cost necessary to satisfy its 
players. Discrete function c formed by the set of all associated costs to all the 
possible coalitions is called “characteristic function” of a cooperative game. 
Here it is presented a simple example of cooperative game to explain in a clear 
way mostly above-stated concepts.  
We  consider the realization of a multipurpose reservoir necessary to satisfy three 
different objectives: regulation, flood control and hydroelectric production; every 
one of them represent a different player. The realization of a dam represents a case 
of project characterized by economies of scale for which cooperation among 
different users is fundamental to obtain economic savings. In fact, it is more 
convenient to realize just a unique large-sized work which satisfies the different 
users, instead of the construction of more works for every user.  
In function of the number and the type of user there is a variation on height of the 
work and consequently the relative cost of construction. We hypothesize the 
following costs:   
 
Coalition Cost 
Regulation (R) 160 
Flood control(F) 140 
Hydroelectric (H) 250 
R+ F 300 
R+ H 380 
F + H 370 
R + F + H 410 
Table 12. Characteristic function 
So the different combinations of players are considered in order to examine all the 
possible planning alternatives and to value the most convenient (Table 13.). 
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Combinations Cost 
[R + L + H] 410 
[R] + [L + H] 530 
[L] + [R + H] 520 
[H] + [R + L] 550 
[R] + [L] + [H] 550 
Table 13. Combinations of players 
As we can see the Grand Coalition is the most efficient solution from an 
economical perspective for the system. Consequently, the problem which arises 
now is how to share the cost of the Grand Coalition in a fair and acceptable way 
for all the participants of the game. By using allocation methods of CGT it is 
possible to answer such question. 
4.2.1.1. Definitions 
a) If for every pair of disjoint coalitions S’ and S” we have : 3(04 ∪ 044) ≤ 3(04) + 3(044) (4)
then the characteristic function c is called subadditive and the relative game 
“subadditive”. 
If a game is subadditive then the players are stimulated to cooperate, because the 
unions of the two group of players will determine a cost lower then the sum of the 
autonomous costs. A game with a characteristic subadditive function will be 
characterized by economies of scale, so the Grand Coalition will be the most 
efficient from an economical perspective. This is the case when it is economically 
more convenient to realize common projects rather than independent projects. 
 
b) If for every pair of coalitions S’ and S’’, such as S4 ⊆ S", we have:
3(04) ≤ 3(044) (5) 
then the characteristic function c is called “monotonic”. 
It represents the situation in which the cost of a determined project increases as the 
number of participants to the same project increases.  
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4.2.1.2. Principles 
In order to determine a costs sharing in line with the criteria of efficiency, equity, 
acceptance and incentive for cooperation it is necessary to consider the following 
principles.  
Rationality principle 
In order to stimulate the cooperation among the players to achieve commonly a 
determined project, it must be guaranteed the principle defined by Ransmeier 
(1942) as “stand alone come test”. Such principle can be extended to every 
individual player; for this reason it is called individual rationality: 
9: ≤ 3(;) (6) 
where xi is the quantity of cost assigned to a player; or group rationality when it is 
referred to single coalitions. 
< 9: ≤ 3(0):∈>  (7). 
According to such principle, no player or group of players, forming a coalition, 
would accept a cost assignment lower than the cost which he/they would sustain 
participating in an autonomous way, i.e. upper than its own opportunity cost.  
Marginality principle 
The other principle is the so-called marginality principle or “incremental cost test” 
(Young, 1985). 
In general incremental cost or marginal cost of a coalition S is defined as the 
quantity3(2) −  3(2/0) (8). 
According to marginality principle, the following condition must be verified: 
< 9::∈> ≥ 3(2) −  3(2/0)         ∀   0 ⊆ 2 (9). 
Every player or set of players will have to sustain at least his own marginal cost  of 
entry in a coalition. Otherwise, the coalition of pre-existent players will be in an 
inefficient condition to finance the entry of the new player or set of players into it. 
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Rationality principle produces an incentive to the voluntary cooperation among 
the players, while the principle of marginality supplies conditions of equity in the 
game (Young, 1994). 
4.2.1.3. Game solutions 
As we said before, CGT with transferable utility tries to give answers about the 
modalities of costs (or benefits) sharing of a common action among the 
participants. Therefore the solution of a cooperative game means to define a useful 
criterion to share the costs commonly sustained by the players in an efficient and 
fair way. Such criterion has to supply adequate incentives for the cooperation 
among the players.   
In details, CGT supports solutions which include all the participants of the game, 
so the majority of solving methods refer to the cost sharing of the Grand Coalition 
(Parrachino  et al., 2002). Under such hypothesis, a generic solution conforms with 
sharing defined by a vector x of components [x1, x2, …, xn] such as
< 9: = 3(2):∈C  (10) 
where  xi is the quantity of cost assigned to player i. 
The previous equation satisfies the principle of efficiency, according to which the 
cost of the Grand Coalition is totally divided among all the participants of the 
game; under equation (10) it is shown that the principle of marginality and 
rationality are equivalent.  
The solution of a transferable utility game can be grouped in two branches 
(Fragnelli, 2010): 
- set-theorical solutions which individuate a set of vectors which share the 
value of the game among all the players 
- point solutions which individuate only one division and are more similar to 
the classic idea of solution of a problem. 
4.2.1.3.1. Set-theoretical solutions 
Core of a cooperative game 
The core of a cooperative game, defined by Gillies in 1953, is the set of allocations D ∈ EFsuch that those conditions expressed from the (7) and (10) equations, or at 
the same way (9) or (10), have to result valid for every S ⊆ N. The core is a closed, 
compact, convex subset of RN, but unfortunately it can results empty. 
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The condition which guarantee the existence of a core is that the characteristic 
function must be concave (Shapley, 1971), so: 
3(0 ∪ ') + 3(0 ∩ ') ≤ 3(0) + 3(')           ∀  0, ' ⊆ 2 (11). 
The core of a cooperative game represents a subset solution; inside there are 
several possibilities of cost allocation which respect efficiency, equity and 
incentive principles to the cooperation. These divisions of cost inside the core are 
such that no player can improve his own condition without making the others 
players condition worse.  
Let’s consider, for instance, the game of multi purpose reservoir described on 
paragraph 4.2.1. Firstly it is necessary to apply opportunely principles of 
rationality and marginality through which the values of maximum and minimum 
cost attributable to the three players can be defined. In fact, through the principle 
of individual rationality, see equation (6), the maximum cost sustainable by the 
player is determined, while the minimum cost is supplied from the principle of 
marginality for every single player (or in an equivalent way from the principle of 
rationality associated to coalitions), as expressed by equation (9). The results are 
expressed on Table 14. 
 
Rationality Marginality 
C(R) ≤ 160 C(R) ≥ C(N)-C(L+I) = 40 
C(L) ≤ 140 C(L) ≥ C(N)-C(R+I) = 30 
C(I)  ≤ 250 C(I) ≥ C(N)-C(R+L) = 110 
Table 14. Maximum and minimum values of cost 
Consequently, the core of the game can be analytically represented in the 
following system: 
HRegulation + Flood control + Hydroeletrical = 41040 ≤ Regulation ≤ 16030 ≤ Flood control ≤ 140110 ≤ Hydroeletrical ≤ 250 Y  (12). 
Furthermore, it is possible to represent graphically the core through a triangular 
diagram, as shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8. Core of the game of multi purpose reservoir 
The triangle is equilateral, its heights are proportional to the cost of the Grand 
Coalition and its points represents the set of possible (positive) allocations of cost. 
Every side is representative of a player and the distance between one of them and 
one point inside the triangle gives us the allocation cost related to the player. For 
instance, the barycentre gives us an equalitarian sharing of cost while the vertices 
correspond to the situation in which total cost is completely assigned to one user. 
The dashed lines represent the maximum and minimum cost sustainable by every 
player according to inequalities in (12) and, consequently, the painted area 
represents the core of the game. 
If the number of players is n > 3 the core can be represented in a space with a n-1 
dimension. 
Games with an empty Core 
Sometimes the core of a cooperative game can results empty if the characteristic 
function is not concave. If we consider, for example, the following three-players 
game, wherein:  
c(1) = c(2) = c(3) = 6 
c(1,2) = c(1,3) = c(2,3) = 7 
c(N) = 11 
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In such case, even if the characteristic function is subadditive, which means that 
the Grand Coalitions is the most efficient solution from an economic point of view, 
the game results with an empty core. In fact if we applying the marginality and 
rationality principles we obtain for every player: 
4 ≤ c(i) ≤ 6 
and utilizing the triangular diagram we can see the emptiness of the core, as 
shown in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. Game with an empty core 
So it involves that every allocation which share the cost of Grand Coalition among 
the players will be unstable, because at least one coalition will be stimulated to 
leave the group and to “play” autonomous.  
In fact, in the example the principles of rationality and marginality supply the 
same results for all three players because they have the same importance in the 
game. Therefore an equitable allocation could be the one that shares equally the 
cost of the most efficient alternative among the three players: 
9- = 9! = 9 = 3(2)Z =  113 ≅ 3,67 
But such division can not be convenient for two players who decide to cooperate 
excluding the third player. In fact, if the players 1 and 2 formed a coalition and 
divided their own cost equally, we would obtain: 
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9- = 9! = 3(1,2)Z − 1 = 72 = 3,5 
so there should be a saving respect to the previous allocation. Such situation will 
not be favourable for the third player who will be obliged to sustain a higher cost 
of c(3) = 6 and, above all, such a situation won’t be favourable for the whole 
system because the total cost will be  
c(1,2) + c(3) = 7 + 6 = 13 
which do not represent the most efficient solution from an economic perspective. 
We deduce from this simple example that it is necessary that the core won’t be 
empty in order to obtain an equitable and fair sharing which stimulates the 
cooperation among the users and the research of the most efficient solution.  
If the core is empty the cooperation among the players is not spontaneous but it 
can be forced by an external authority modifying the conditions of the game in 
order to allow the creation of the core, for example, by imposing a tax for every 
subcoalition of N.  
The imposition of a tax is a modality to stimulate the players to cooperate among 
themselves, i.e. an incentive to cooperation in order to achieve the most efficient 
solution for the whole system. 
Least core 
To determine the obtainable least core we have to value, through linear 
programming, the minimum tax δ to impose, i.e. in mathematical terms (Einy et al., 
1998):
\]^
]_ min a b. d. < 9: ≤ 3(0) + a    ∀0 ⊂ 2:∈> < 9: = 3(2):∈C
Y 
 
 
(13). 
Proportional least core 
It is a variation of the previous model which considers a proportional tax to the 
cost of every coalition. To obtain this condition, the linear programming problem 
to be solved will be: 
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\]^
]_ min f b. d. < 9: ≤ 3(0)(1 + f)    ∀0 ⊂ 2:∈> < 9: = 3(2):∈C
Y 
 
(14).
4.2.1.3.2. Point solution concepts 
As we have seen the core of a cooperative game represents a set of acceptable 
solutions. In many cases, however, it is a good idea to supply a unique cost 
allocation among the players, in order to define only one vector which satisfies the 
equation (10). So we have the problem to choose among different possibilities.  
The principal and most used point solution concepts of CGT are:  
- the Alternative Cost Avoided method (ACA); 
- Shapley value; 
- the nucleolus and its variant “per-capita”. 
Alternative Cost Avoided method (ACA) 
Given a cooperative game for an established player i we can define: 
- separable cost : its marginal cost as regards the Grand Coalition:  
mi = c(N) - c(N - i) 
- alternative cost: its stand-alone cost: c(i). 
- remaining benefit: the difference between the alternative cost and the 
separable cost: ri = c(i) - mi 
Such ACA method assigns the cost to many players according to the following 
formula:
9: = g: + h:∑ hjj∈C k3(2) − < gjj∈C l (15). 
According to it, every player pays entirely his own separable cost, while non 
separable costs m3(2) − ∑ gjj∈C n are divided in proportion to the remaining 
benefit. 
This method is valid if h: ≥ 0; this is possible if characteristic function is 
subadditive. Furthermore for a maximum three-player game, with a subadditive 
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characteristic function, the solution is inside the core, if such core results 
nonempty. 
Shapley value 
The Shapley value of a cooperative game is an allocation method which supplies a 
single cost allocation φ able to satisfy certain axioms. The solution proposed by 
Shapley, in fact, was defined in a such a way that it was possible to verify some 
properties, here illustrated. 
Symmetry 
An allocation φ is defined symmetric if, taken two players i e j, such as: 3(0 ∪ ;) = 3(0 ∪ o)   ∀  0 ⊆ 2 ∖ q;, or (16), 
then:
φi = φj (17). 
Dummy player 
A player i is a dummy player if: 3(0 ∪ ;) = 3(0) + 3(;)   ∀  0 ⊆ 2 ∖ q;r (18), 
In case of a dummy player, Shapley value of such player is equal to his stand 
alone cost, i.e.: 
φi = c(i) (19). 
 
Additivity 
An allocation φ is defined additive if, given two games u and v and given the sum 
game (u+v) defined from: (u + v)(S) = u(S) + v(S)     ∀ S ⊆ N (20), 
it states that: φv(u + v) = φv(u) + φv(v)      ∀i ∈ N (21).
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Additivity condition is useful when we want to divide the realization of a project 
in different phases, or, vice versa, we want to unify different fulfilments, 
maintaining unvaried the assignment of costs to the users.  
Theorem (Shapley, 1953): for every set N there is only one method of cost 
allocation that  is symmetric, additive and do not produce any advantage and 
disadvantage to a dummy player. Such method takes the name of Shapley value 
and it is equal to 
φv = < |S|! (|N − S| − 1)|N|! yc(S + i) − c(S)z	⊆{,v  (22) 
where 
|S| cardinality of coalition S, i.e. number of players belonging to coalition S; for 
example S = {a,b} |S| = 2 
|N| cardinality of the Grand Coalition, which is equal to the number of players 
of the game, i.e. n. 
Shapley value is based on marginal contribution that every player can add to 
possible coalition (Fragnelli, 2010). According to Young (1985) it can be interpreted 
as the average of marginal contribution that every player would add to the Grand 
Coalition if it was formed by one player per time.  
If the game is subadditive, Shapley value guarantees the total covering cost i.e. it 
satisfies the equation (10), but it is not sure that it is included inside the core. It 
belongs to the core if the characteristic function is concave, as expressed by (11). 
 
The nucleolus 
If it is fundamental the existence of a point solution inside the core, if it exists, then 
Shapley value does not satisfy such request. The most important unique method 
defined in order to result inside the core, in case in which this is a nonempty, is the 
so called nucleolus. Such nucleolus, defined by Schmeidler (1969), is based on the 
idea to select an allocation that makes the least-well-off coalition as well-off as 
possible (Young, 1985). In fact, the research of a point inside the core starts from 
the assumption to select an allocation which make the maximum discontent of a 
coalition as the minimum possible. 
The problem is to agree on a meaning of "well-off". As reported by Young (1985) 
we can say that coalition S is better off than T, relative to an allocation x , if 
c(S) − < xv > 3(T) − < xvv∈v∈	  (23). 
We define excess of S relative to x the quantity: 
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e(x, S) = c(S) − < xvv∈	  
(24), 
and the nucleolus represents the cost allocation that minimise the maximum 
excess (Young, 1994), valuable using the linear programming according to the 
following imputation: 
H max  b. d.  (9, 0) ≥     ∀ 0 ≠ 2< 9: = 3(2):∈C
Y (25). 
In the restrictions the Grand Coalition is excluded because its excess is always 
null. 
If there is a point solution x to the problem (25) then this is the nucleolus, 
otherwise it is necessary to use some algorithms, for example Kopelowitz's 
algorithm (1967), which allows to supply a solution. 
The idea of the nucleolus is to find a solution in the core that is "central" in the 
sense of being as far away from the boundaries as possible (Young, 1985). In case of 
a two players game the core is represented by a segment and its medium point 
corresponds to the nucleolus. Moreover, even if the core is empty, the method of 
nucleolus supplies a solution. 
 
Nucleolus per-capita 
A reasonable variant of the nucleolus is to define the excess of a coalition on a per 
capita basis: 
(0) = 3(0) − ∑ 9::∈>
|0|
 (26).
Under such condition, the solution of the related problem of linear programming 
expressed by (25) supplies a per capita nucleolus or normalized nucleolus (Grotte, 
1970). 
4.2.2. Conclusions 
To conclude such theoretical treatise, it is necessary to say that the only 
disadvantage of CGT is to require much information in presence of many players. 
In fact, it is opportune to value for all possible coalitions the relative associated 
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cost and the number of coalition of the game increase exponentially in function of 
the number of players: for n players the coalitions are equal to 2n – 1. 
The necessity to estimate minimal costs for every coalition is a prerogative of CGT. 
In fact, although we need a method of cost sharing for the more efficient 
alternative to the system, it is necessary to estimate also the costs associated to 
every coalition of the game, forasmuch they represent the parameters necessary to 
a fair, just and efficient allocation among the players. 
4.2.2.1. Application to complex systems 
Hereafter some applicative studies of cost allocation for complex systems, based 
on CGT methods, are presented. The examples proposed are listed according to 
the complexity of the problem and of the analysed system. Firstly it is illustrated 
the case of Tennessee Valley Authority, considered one of the first applicative 
cases of Game theory; then it is considered the application realized to the airport 
of Birmigham. Finally it is analysed the cost sharing realized for two complex 
water systems: the Swedish region of Skane and a municipal water system. 
Other interesting applications of CGT in water resources are reported in 
Nakayama & Suzuki (1976), Gately (1974), Braden et al. (1991), Harrison & Tisdell 
(1992), Ambec & Sprumont (2000), Wang et al. (2003), Deidda (2009). 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA, 1938) 
One of the first CGT application to real systems is represented from the case of 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), from 1938, i.e. previous to the publication of 
the book of Von Neumann e Morgenstern (1944). 
TVA was instituted in the thirties to stimulate the economic activity in the mid-
southern USA. One of its main objective was to build a series of dams and 
reservoirs along the Tennessee River in order to generate hydroelectric power, 
control flooding, and improve navigational and recreational uses of the waterway. 
Economists, analysing costs and benefits of the project observed that there was no 
completely obvious way to attribute costs to these purposes, because the system is 
designed to satisfy all of them simultaneously. 
The concepts that they devised to deal with this problem foreshadow modern 
ideas in game theory, and the formulas of allocations used are still in use (in a 
different way) from different agencies of control of water systems among which 
“Bureau of Reclamation in the United States Department of the Interior”. 
The costs shown in Table 11 have been evaluated by TVA for the construction of a 
reservoir for three different operators: navigation {n}, flood control {f}, power {p}. 
It can be noted as such information reflect the structure of the characteristic 
function of a cooperative game. 
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Coalition Cost [M$] 
{n} 163,520 
{f} 140,826 
{p} 250,096 
{n, f} 301,607 
{n, p} 378,821 
{f, p} 367,370 
{n, f, p} 412,584 
Table 15. Characteristic function TVA 
Cost allocation used by the American authority was not based on mathematical 
formulas but on so called “evaluation” (TVA, 1938). On the impossibility to adopt 
any formal allocation among the known one at present, it was used an allocation 
criterion that is precursor of ACA method, whose results were rounded off 
through “evaluations” (Ransmeier, 1942). 
Airport landing fees (Littlechild & Thompson, 1977) 
Landing taxes of airplanes on airports are often established to cover costs of 
construction and maintenance of runways. The cost of construction of a runway is 
determined from the size of the biggest plane which lands on a specific airport.  
In general, planes which will use the runway can be grouped in t disjoint subsets 
{N1, N2, …., Nt} according to the length of runway necessary to land, so that the 
airplanes of the subset Ni require a runway equal to ci with ci < ci+1 (Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10. Scheme of a landing runway 
For this kind of problems it is showed that Shapley value of every plane 
corresponds to sharing cost obtained in the following way (Fragnelli, 2010): the 
cost of the first part of runway is divide among all the planes, because everyone 
uses it; the cost of the second part, [c2-c1], is divided among the planes of subsets 
{N2, N3, …, Nt}, and so on, until the cost of the last part, [ct-ct-1], which is divided 
among the planes of subset Nt that are the only in using it. 
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So, the Shapley value formula becomes: 
φv = φv,- + cv − cv,-
|Nv ∪ Nv- ∪ … ∪ Nv|
 (27) 
A real case of this kind of game has been analysed for the airport of Birmingham 
for which data of landing of different aeroplanes have been calculated for the 
years 1967-1968. From these data, chargeable costs to every class of aircraft and the 
relative allocation of costs applying the method of Shapley have been calculated 
(Littlechild & Thompson, 1977) (Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11. Data of the airport of Birmigham 
Municipal Cost Sharing (Young et al., 1982) 
During the eighties Young et al. (1982) realized an interesting study using 
different CGT cost allocation methods considering the water system of region 
Skane in the Southern Sweden.  
Such region is formed by 18 provinces whose water supply is guaranteed from 
three sources of supply: a groundwater source and two independent pumping 
systems which distribute the resource coming from the two lakes Vombsjon and 
Ringsjon (Figure 12) 
During the ‘70s, the local authorities realized that water supply in use was not 
sufficient to guarantee the resource for future demands. So, different measures 
were analysed to increase water system, as the realization of new pipes, the 
increase of the pumping capacity and of the use of the groundwater resource. 
On the basis of such scenario, Young et al. (1982) analysed the relative cooperative 
game with the aim to apply the different methods to allocate the modernization 
cost of system among the different provinces of the Swedish region. 
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Figure 12. Water system of the region Skane 
The first problem was to identify the players. Considering every province as an 
independent player, it should be calculated the value of the function of cost for 
every possible coalition, i.e. 218 – 1 = 262'143. But it was clearly impossible. So, the 
provinces were grouped in 6 players, where the areas of similar characteristic were 
unified, in reference with the presence of a common water system, with the 
geography and the hydrology. (Figure 12). 
For every coalition the least costs necessary to satisfy the demand including the 
future requests has been evaluated. The costs linked to water transport and water 
treatment have been calculated in function of the flow and of the distance from the 
source, through empirical formulations present in appendices of the article of 
Young et al. (1982). 
The results obtained are present in the following Figure 13, where the letters that 
represent the single players are separated with commas just in case the coalition 
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do not present economies of scale, so, the value of the function cost has been 
evaluated from the sum of costs of the single players. 
 
Figure 13. Characteristic function 
Once obtained the characteristic function of the game, different allocations of costs 
of the Grand Coalition have been evaluated (Table 16). 
 
Cost Allocation [106 Skr (Swedish Kroner)] 
 
A H K L M T 
Proportional to the population  10,13 21.00 3,19 8,22 34,22 7,07 
Proportional to demand 13,07 16,01 7,30 6,87 28,48 12,08 
ACA 19,54 13,28 5,62 10,90 16,66 17,82 
Shapley value 20,01 10,71 6,61 10,37 16,94 19,18 
Nucleolus 20,35 12,06 5,00 8,61 18,32 19,49 
Nucleolus per-capita 20,03 12,52 3,94 9,07 18,54 19,71 
Table 16. Cost allocation 
Efficient and equitable impact fees for urban water system (Lippai & 
Heaney, 2000) 
The research of Lippai & Heaney (2000) refers to the determination of water urban 
rates through the use of principles of CGT. Through the results the authors put in 
evidence that in water rates the CGT costs allocation methods are more efficient 
with respect to the traditional methods based on a volumetric sharing.  
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The study considers a hypothetical water urban system fed by only one source 
that supplies three users: two residential blocks of low (user L) and middle density 
(user M) plus a warehouse (user W). It has assigned the water demand to every 
user and has defined the geometric scheme of the water system (Figure 14). 
 
 
Figure 14. Water scheme of reference 
 
Every possible coalition of user is characterized from a different position in the 
system and different water demands; this will have an effect on development and 
on dimensions of the water system and also on the relative cost function. To define 
the characteristic function of game it was considered for every coalition the least 
cost by the simulation program WinPipes belonging to software EPANET, which 
allows to minimize pressure drop, and by an optimization model to define the 
optimal economic solution. 
The construction cost considers: 
- the cost of the distribution system piping; 
- the cost of the storage tank; 
- the cost of the domestic and fire pumping system. 
 
The characteristic function is present on Figure 15. 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Characteristic function 
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Cost allocation has been valued using the ACA method which produces the 
results present on Table 17. 
 
Coalition Cost [M$] 
L 227 
M 188 
W 668 
Table 17. Cost allocation for 3 players 
It was also valued cost allocation considering the system constituted by only two 
players, unifying the residential blocks in only one player. In such case the cost 
allocation is the following. 
 
Coalition Cost [M$] 
LM 376 
W 707 
Table 18. Cost allocation for 2 players 
If we compare the two allocations it is evident how the second one associates a 
higher cost for user W. So, we doubt whether one of the two solutions is the 
appropriate one. The answer of the authors is the same we have to give every time 
it is necessary to choose an allocation method of costs among the many one, i.e. the 
choice depends on the context of the game.  
In our case if we consider the realization all over again of a water system, on 
which users have the same priorities of use of resource, then it is right to consider 
the players in an autonomous way; so the first allocation will be the appropriate 
one. But, if we consider the realization of a project in which two users have 
previously chosen some agreement of cooperation and a third one decides to enter 
into the same later, then the second solution will be preferable. 
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5. The optimization model 
WARGI 
To study and analyze a water resources system in an integral form it is necessary 
to use mathematical and processing models which shall represent 
interrelationships among different elements: rivers, reservoirs, groundwater, 
water pipes, water users, etc. As expressed by Rizzoli & Young (2007) software 
systems that integrate models, or databases or other decision aids, and package 
them in a way that decision makers can use are commonly referred to as Decision 
Support Systems (hereafter DSS). 
The practice of developing and using mathematical models of physical systems 
became common in most of the physical sciences with the advent of computers. 
Computer modelling is common used both as a method for scientists to test 
hypotheses and so better understand the way such systems function, and also as a 
predictive tool for those who manage such systems. Modelling provides a rapid 
means of investigating the expected response of a system to possible future 
changes, by undertaking the necessary computations which are commonly 
complex and data intensive (Rizzoli & Young, 1997). 
As said by Heinz et al. (2007) the principal advantages of computer models for 
water systems are: 
- they force us to be specific in representing our understanding of a system 
and identify gaps in our knowledge; 
- they allow us to assess if simplified representations of uncertain aspects are 
likely to be adequate; and 
- they allow us to apply our current knowledge to evaluate management 
alternatives. 
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Approaches to modelling river basins are typically simulations and optimization. 
Hydrologists, engineers, economists and other social scientists are to be involved 
in developing these models, with increasing involvement from stakeholders to 
ensure that models address their concerns and can be understood and trusted by 
diverse interests in a basin (Lund & Palmer, 1997; Palmer et al., 1999; Sechi & Sulis, 
2009). 
Simulation models are used to examine and evaluate specific “what if” scenarios, 
consisting of particular management decisions under particular scenario 
conditions (such as water demands or climate). Simulation models are relatively 
precise surgical tools for examining very specific conditions. They are excellent for 
exploring precise and specific management policies, and for exploring the ability 
of our quantitative understanding to mimic field behaviour. 
While simulation models can estimate the effects of specific alternative water 
management strategies, hydro-economic optimization tools can identify promising 
combinations of diverse actions within natural and human-made constraints, such 
as availability of water resources and statutory rules. Optimization models help to 
identify “what’s best” in a broad sense, for refinement and testing with detailed 
simulation studies and negotiations. 
As the number of options increases, simulation modelling alone cannot examine 
anything remotely close to all possible alternatives. Searching over large complex 
solution spaces for promising combinations of solutions requires optimization 
modelling. Optimization models typically employ a simpler formulation of the 
system than simulation models. Nevertheless, optimization models have their 
own limitations, requiring simplifications to accommodate optimization solution 
algorithms. Combined simulation–optimization methods allow optimization 
models to identify promising combinations of options, with simulation modelling 
to test and refine optimization model results (Lund & Ferreira 1996, Sechi & Sulis, 
2009). 
5.1. WARGI 
Within such work DSS WARGI (Water Resources System Optimization Aided by 
Graphical Interface) (Sechi & Zuddas, 2000; Manca et al., 2004; Sechi & Sulis, 2009), 
developed from CRIFOR (Centro di Ricerca e Formazione delle Reti - Networks 
Investigation and Formation Centre) of the University of Cagliari, has been used. 
This is a software based on an optimization approach developed for multi 
reservoirs and multi users water resource systems which allow to construct in a 
graphic interactive mode a system of study and to insert required data 
(hydrological, hydraulic, infrastructural, economic, etc.). On the basis of 
introduced information, WARGI can create an apposite file, codified according to 
MPS standard (Mathematical Programming Standard), which can be read and 
solved by many solvers on the market. For this research an optimization approach 
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in linear programming (LP) has been used utilizing solver CPLEX 
(http://www.ilog.com/products/cplex/). 
In this research, WARGI is used to achieve the best water resource system 
performances. Using it we are able to calculate the least cost related to every 
coalition of the cooperative game to be analyze, and consequently to value its 
characteristic function. 
 
Figure 16. Initial interface of WARGI 
Use of program WARGI is organized into following steps: 
1. system representation through icons; 
2. data entry (hydrological, hydraulic, infrastructural, economic…) in every 
element of water system (nodes and arcs); 
3. saving water system in a file IDR and MPS file generation; 
4. problem resolution with creation of file OUT by solver; 
5. graphic display of results. 
Minimum time step which is possible to use, corresponds to one month, a 
conventional interval used from the majority of water resources system models.  
However it is possible to personalize such process by choosing a bigger one, 
provided that it corresponds to a submultiple of 12 months. 
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5.1.1. System Representation 
Representation of water resources system is shown through a graph made of 
nodes and arcs, and every one of them represents an element of physical system of 
study. Such elements can be arranged and interconnected on a suitable area of 
program through the usage of particular icons (Figure 17). 
 
Figure 17. Area and icons for graph creation 
Elements that are possible to represent in WARGI are the following: 
- reservoirs; 
- civil, industrial and irrigational demand; 
- hydroelectric power stations; 
- confluences (which represent diversion dams or interconnection nodes); 
- groundwater; 
- pump station, desalinization plants, wastewater treatment plants and 
treatment plants; 
- hydraulic connexions (which represent water bodies or water pipes). 
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For water balance it is important to consider spills from reservoirs, from 
confluences and from groundwater which are not represented on the graph but 
they flow in a fictitious node called “sea node”.   
From sea node different arcs lead off other fictitious arcs which reach every system 
user. These represent the so-called deficit arcs, necessary to satisfy continuity 
equation in every demand node. On such node there is a transit of energy flow in 
default respect on water demand that the water system cannot produce. They 
represent possible water deficit for every user.  
In Figure 18 an example of a graph is visible and it represents an hypothetic water 
system. 
 
Figure 18. Example of graph in WARGI 
5.1.2. Data entry 
Entry of information for every water system element is generated through popup 
windows (from Figure 19 to Figure 22). Depending on the element, different fields 
shall be drawn up which allow to shape different elements from an hydraulic-
hydrological (users’ demands, hydrologic input, groundwater recharge, 
evaporations from reservoirs, …) infrastructural (dimensions of work, maximum 
and minimum capacity, pumping program,…) economical (data of costs, deficit 
and benefits,…) and environmental (minimum vital run off flow, infiltration, …) 
point of view. 
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Figure 19. Reservoir window 
 
Figure 20. Irrigational demand window 
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Figure 21. Pump station window 
 
Figure 22.Arc window 
Every water system element can be considered in two different ways: operative or 
in project, depending if such element exists or it has to be inserted. Depending on 
the choice, different information shall be required. 
For economic aspects, data required are: 
- construction cost; 
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- operating cost; 
- energetic cost for pumping. 
Moreover it shall be indicated: 
- spilling cost: cost linked to an extra resource which is removed from water 
system and transferred to “sea node” (only for node reservoir and node 
confluence);  
- interperiod transfer benefit: negative cost linked to the resource which is 
kept on time in reservoirs (only for nodes reservoirs) ; 
- deficit cost: cost linked to the amount of resource not given to demand 
(only for user nodes); 
- benefit linked to possible hydroelectric power stations (only for node 
hydroelectric power station). 
5.1.3. MPS file creation 
The optimization model is based on a reproduction of a conceptual scheme of 
water system of study through the use of a MPS file which codifies the related 
linear programming problem. 
Mathematical problem consists on minimizing the value of the objective function 
(OF) subject to a series of restrictions depending on data of water system elements. 
Objective function is subject of: 
- equation of continuity to nodes; 
- satisfaction of minimum and maximum capacity for nodes and arcs; 
- positive variables. 
Moreover, the version of program WARGI used for such survey considers other 
limitations which shall be analyzed afterwards.  
Universal format MPS, developed in 1960 from IBM, is a largely diffused format 
and compatible from the majority of mathematical programming software and it 
was created to solve LP problems.  
5.1.4. Optimization process 
OF optimization process is assigned to solver CPLEX; this is a commercial 
programming engine for mathematical optimization problems. It was originally 
developed by R.E. Bixby and sold via CPLEX Optimization Inc., which was 
acquired by ILOG in 1997 that was finally acquired by IBM in January 2009. The 
software solves integer programming problems, very large linear programming 
problems, quadratic programming problems, and has recently added support for 
problems with convex quadratic constraints. It includes a pre-solve algorithm for 
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problem size reduction, sophisticated branching and cutting-plane strategies and 
feasibility heuristics. 
Such program can read LP problem contained in MPS file, then it optimizes the OF 
and inserts optimization results in another file of extension “OUT”.  
5.1.5. Display of results 
The last step of the use of program WARGI consists in visualization of results. 
WARGI can read the OUT file, which contains a solution to LP problems created 
by the solver. It can also represent results through simple graphs giving water 
flows related to every water system element for every time step (Figure 23 and 
Figure 24). Moreover, such model can create an appropriate file in text format 
representative of water flows which can be utilized by the user for his necessities.  
 
Figure 23. Stored volumes in a reservoir 
5.1.6. WARGI changes for CGT methodology 
During researching activity some changes have been made to WARGI program to 
adapt better to CGT approach exigencies. Windows related to users nodes have 
been modified to insert other restrictions to OF which consider a minimum 
amount of water demand to supply. 
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Such procedure agrees with what established by some European Hydrologic 
Management Plan. For example in Spain the decree “Instrucciones de Planificación 
Hidrológicas” (Water Planning Instructions) (MMARM, 2008), that has the 
purpose to establish criteria to elaborate hydrologic plans for Spanish river basins, 
defines the so-called “niveles de garantia” (guarantee levels) for every different 
kind of water user. These represent the entity of maximum admitted deficit for 
every demand, expressed as a percentage of monthly/yearly water requests. They 
are different depending on water user typology: 
 
Figure 24. Water flow in entry for an irrigational demand 
For urban and industrial users: 
- the deficit in a month cannot be more than 10% of the corresponding 
monthly request; 
- in ten consecutive years, the sum of deficit cannot be more than 8% of the 
yearly request; 
for irrigational user: 
- the deficit in a year cannot be more than 50% of the yearly request; 
- in two consecutive years, the sum of deficit cannot be more than 75% of the 
yearly request; 
- in ten consecutive years, the sum of deficit cannot be more than 100% of the 
yearly request. 
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In order to consider a minimum amount of resource for every user, the restrictions 
inserted in WARGI are such as: 
 
- for deficit related to monthly request: 
9:j ≤ f:+:j (28). 
where: 
xij: water flow on deficit arc for i-user node in j-period; Rv: water demand of i-user node in j-period; 
αi: entity of maximum admitted deficit for i-user node. 
 
 
- for deficit related to yearly request: 
< 9:j(j- ≤ f::  (29)
where 
iD
_
: average of yearly water demand for  i-user node; 
n: time step related to maximum admitted deficit (1 year: n=12; 2 years: 
n=24, 10 years: n=120). 
iD
_
is evaluated as: 
 
: = ∑ +:(:-Z  
 
(30)
 
Italian legislation does not provide any limitation relative to the allowed 
maximum deficit. But on the present study it was hypothesized that deficit would 
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be null, so α=0. Consequently the OF shall be subjected to other restrictions, 
represented by total supply of water users. 
 
For more details about WARGI see Salis et al. (2006). 
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6. Water system examined 
In this chapter we analyze the Sardinia water system, studying the regional 
multipurpose system and its different downstream sectors. So we describe in 
details the Flumendosa–Campidano system, one of the most important 
multipurpose schemes of the island, chosen for the application of the cost 
allocation methodology. 
The principal source of information and data here reported is the Management 
Plan for River Basin District of Sardinia (RAS, 2010), version March 2010. 
6.1. Territorial background 
Sardinia is placed in the centre of the western basin of the Mediterranean Sea 
(Figure 25) and it is extended in a surface of 24.000 km² with a population of 
1.648.000 residents. The climate is prevalently Mediterranean, characterized of a 
long period of dryness in summer and from mild and rainy winters with isolated 
frosts. 
The Sardinia hydrography is typical of Mediterranean regions. The main bodies of 
water which present perennial flow are reported in Table 1; the most important 
Sardinian river is the Tirso, followed by Flumendosa. 
The other bodies of water are characterized by torrential regime, mainly due to the 
narrow closeness between the mountains and the coast. Such bodies have 
prevalently big slopes in the majority of their course and are subject to flood in 
autumn and to periods of low water during the summer with the possibility of 
consecutive months of drought. 
Hydrographical system presents important anthropic changes with many 
infrastructures that modify the natural waterways; in fact all the lakes of the 
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island, except lake Baratz, are artificial and from them the water supply system for 
water users is originated. 
 
Figure 25. Mediterranean area 
 
Denomination Length 
[km] 
Basin 
[km²] 
Tirso  153,60 3365,78 
Flumendosa 147,82 1841,77 
Fluminimannu 95,77 1779,46 
Cedrino 77,18 1075,90 
Taloro 67,71 495,02 
Coghinas 64,40 2551,61 
Liscia 51,83 570,74 
Temo 47,71 839,51 
Table 19. Principal Sardinia rivers. 
Source CEDOC (2010) 
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Figure 26. Principal Sardinian river basins and rivers 
Source: CEDOC (2010) 
6.2. Sardinian water system 
Water supply system of Sardinia uses, almost totally, surface resources stored and 
regulated by artificial reservoirs. These have the task to protect from floods and in 
some cases to produce hydroelectric energy. Groundwater is used only for limited 
local needs.  
The regional territory is divided in seven hydrographical zones (Figure 27). It is 
also considered another system, the number 8, constituted by two reservoirs 
utilized only to flood protection: the Santa Vittoria dam on Mogoro River and the 
Monte Crispu dam on Temo River (Table 20). 
As reported in Chapter 2, Regional Law n˚19 of 6.12.2006 introduce the concept of 
“multipurpose water system”, named SIMR; this system supplies “wholesale” 
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water for every downstream sector as civil, irrigational, industrial and 
hydroelectric demands. 
 
System Denomination Basin [km2] 
1 Sulcis 1646 
2 Tirso 5372 
3 Nord Occidentale 5402 
4 Liscia 2253 
5 Posada – Cedrino 2423 
6 Sud Orientale 1035 
7 Flumendosa – Campidano – Cixerri 5960 
8  Dam for flood control  
Table 20. Sardinian water systems 
 
Figure 27. Sardinian water systems 
93 
 
Multipurpose section is managed by ENAS; civil section is organized in only one 
regional ATO (see Paragraph 2.2) on which there is only one operator: Abbanoa 
S.p.A; the irrigational sector is organized in nine land-reclamation syndicates and 
other agricultural areas run by ENAS. ASI and ZIR syndicates organize the supply 
water service for industrial demands, while ENEL S.p.A. and in a small way 
ENAS have the licence to manage hydroelectric power plants. 
 
Operator Demand 
ENAS Multipurpose, irrigational and hydroelectric 
ABBANOA S.p.A. Civil 
Land-reclamation syndicates Irrigational 
ASI and ZIR industrial  Syndicates  Industrial 
ENEL Hydroelectric 
Table 21. Water service operators 
The general structure of the regional water system  is illustrated in Figure 28. 
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Figure 28. Sardinia water system structure - Source Management Plan 
Regional Multi Purpose  
Water  System  
(ENAS) 
Civil sector 
Regional ATO 
(Abbanoa SpA) 
Hydroelectric 
Sector 
(ENEL and ENAS) 
Irrigation sector 
(9 syndicates and 
ENAS) 
Own 
sources 
Industrial sector 
(ASI and ZIR 
syndicates) 
Environment 
Sources of multi purpose system 
Legend: 
Minimal vital run-off flow 
Waste water 
Own 
sources 
Own 
sources 
Water flow 
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6.2.1. Regional multipurpose water system 
The SIMR is a very complex system which can be summarized as follows: 
• 32 dams for a total of: 
o total volume: 1.992 Mm3; 
o regulation volume: 1.870 Mm3; 
o authorized regulation volume: 1.497 Mm3; 
• 25 diversion dams; 
• more than 1000 km of water transfer works, as: 
o almost 800 km of pipelines; 
o almost 50 km of water tunnels; 
o almost 200 km of canals; 
• 47 pumping stations in a total of 70 MW of installed power; 
• 5 hydroelectric power plants for a total of 47,5 MW of power. 
Infrastructures that belong to SIMR have been included in different “hydraulic 
schemes” (Table 22) grouping to the same scheme all the water works that aim to 
satisfy water needs of the same territory. 
 
 
Hydraulic systems Hydraulic schemes 
1 - Sulcis 1-A Mannu di Narcao 
1-B Rio Palmas – Flumentepido 
2 - Tirso 2-A Taloro  
2-B Torrei 
2-C Tirso – Mogoro – Fluminimannu di Pabillonis 
3 - Nord – Occidentale 3-A Mannu di Pattada – Alto Tirso 
3-B Coghinas – Mannu di Porto Torres 
3-C Alto e Medio Temo – Cuga – Bidighinzu – Mannu di 
Ozieri 
3-D Mannu di Sindia 
4 - Liscia 4-A Liscia – Podrongiano 
4-B Pagghiolu 
5 - Posada – Cedrino 5-A Posada 
5-B Cedrino 
6 - Sud – Orientale 6-A Alto Flumendosa – Sa Teula 
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7 - Flumendosa – Campidano – 
Cixerri 
7-A Medio e Basso Flumendosa – Fluminimannu 
7-B Campidano – Fluminimannu – Mannu di Monastir 
7-C Leni 
7-D Cixerri – Rio Casteddu 
7-E Basso Cixerri – Fluminimannu – S. Lucia 
8 – Flood control reservoirs 8-A Dam on Temo River in Monte Crispu 
8-B Dam on Mogoro river in Santa Vittoria 
Table 22. Hydraulic schemes 
With regards to the amount of wholesale resource delivered to downstream users, 
we report in the Table 23 the volumes supplied from SIMR for the year 2009. 
 
 Volume 
[Mm3] 
Percentage 
[%] 
Civil demand 230,03 38 
Irrigational demand 341,9 57 
Industrial demand 27,32 5 
Total 599,25  
Table 23. Delivered volumes in 2009 
6.2.2. Civil sector 
According to what established in Regional Law 29/1997 that fulfilled the Galli 
Law 36/1994, it was defined a unique ATO coinciding with the regional territory 
whose management, starting from 2006, was given to Abbanoa S.p.A. enterprise. 
Regional ATO is organized in 8 districts, as shown in Figure 29; inside them there 
is the drinking distribution system that supplies residential and tourist sites of the 
island. 
Civil demand mainly uses the resource supplied from SIMR, and in some case it 
uses the water stored in little reservoirs managed directly from Abbanoa S.p.A. 
6.2.3. Irrigational sector 
Irrigational demand represents the biggest user of water resource on the island. In 
Sardinia, irrigation is managed from 9 land-reclamation syndicates (Figure 30), 
that control an irrigable surface equivalent to 185.916 hectares and irrigated 
surface of 53.108 hectares (reference to year 2007). 
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Figure 29. Civil districts 
The syndicates, as well as guarantee water supply to associated users, aim to 
achieve the following objectives: 
• management and maintenance of irrigational water distribution 
systems; 
• valorisation and rational use of water resources; 
• defence and safeguard of the soil; 
• defence of the environment and valorisation of territory. 
Irrigational water system is constituted essentially by transport and distribution 
pipelines and it includes pumping stations, where necessary. 
The main source of supply for every syndicate is represented by the wholesale 
resource acquired from ENAS and, in some case, depending on geographical 
localization, by the resource taken from own sources like groundwater sites, rivers 
and water springs. 
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Besides the irrigational districts of land-reclamation syndicate, we have to add 
some agricultural areas directly managed by ENAS. 
 
Figure 30. Land-reclamation syndicates of Sardinia 
6.2.4. Industrial sector 
The industrial sector manages both the water supply system for industrial plants 
grouped in ASI and ZIR, and the service of waste water collection and treatment. 
The Industrial demand includes 13 syndicates and 9 hand-crafts areas (Figure 31). 
Basso Sulcis 
Cixerri 
Gallura 
Nord Sardegna 
Nurra 
Ogliastra 
Oristanese 
Sardegna Centrale 
Sardegna Meridionale 
ENAS 
Land-reclamation 
syndicate 
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Industrial demand partially uses the resource supplied from SIMR because, apart 
from its local sources of resource as wells and water springs, it uses treatment 
plants for water reuse and in some cases small desalination plants. 
 
Figure 31. Industrial and hand-craft areas. 
Source: www.sardegnasuap.it 
 
6.2.5. Hydroelectric sector 
Sardinian hydroelectric system includes 19 hydroelectric plants (Table 24). 
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Water system Hydroelectric plant 
Tirso Taloro 
Cucchinadorza 
Baddu Ozzana 
Tumuele 
Cantoniera 
Pranu Antoni 
Nord Occidentale Ozieri 
Muzzone 
Casteldoria 
Posada - Cedrino Posada 
Cedrino 
Sud Orientale Alto Flumendosa I salto 
Alto Flumendosa II salto 
Alto Flumendosa III salto 
Flumendosa – Campidano – 
Cixerri 
Uvini 
San Lorenzo 
Settimo San Pietro 
Santu Miali 
Sarroch 
Table 24. Hydroelectric plants in Sardinia 
Most of such plants are managed by ENEL S.p.A, with only one of them that is 
reversible. Other plants belong to SIMR, in particular to Flumendosa-Campidano-
Cixerri multipurpose scheme, and so these are directly managed by ENAS 
6.3. The Flumendosa - Campidano 
multipurpose water system 
The cost allocation methodology has been applied considering a portion of the 
regional water system. We chose the so-called Flumendosa-Campidano system, 
one of the principal multipurpose water systems of Sardinia.  
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The system belongs to the river basin number 7, the Flumendosa – Campidano-
Cixerri, and it is constituted by three multipurpose schemes, 7A-B-E (see Table 22) 
that supply the three macro users of the centre-southern zone of the island, i.e.: 
• civil demand of district 1 and 3 of regional ATO, with the metropolitan 
area of Cagliari constituted by almost 400.000 residents; 
• irrigational demands of the “Sardegna Meridionale” Land-Reclamation 
Syndicate (hereafter CdB-SM) the biggest of the nine Sardinian 
Syndicates, constituted by 32 districts with a total irrigable surface of 
60.000 hectares.  
• irrigational districts managed by ENAS; 
• industrial demands “CASIC” of Sarroch and Macchiareddu. 
The principal resources of the system are represented by flows from Flumendosa, 
Mulargia and Fluminimannu River, to which are added resources coming from 
smaller water bodies. These resources are regulated by several infrastructures (7 
reservoirs and 7 diversion dams) and delivered to users through a net of pipelines, 
tunnels, canals and pumping stations. 
Moreover, the partial exploitation of the resource coming from the system number 
2 Tirso it is also possible, through the use of an interconnection with a pumping 
station in case of water scarcity. The basin of Tirso uses the resource stored in lake 
Omodeo, the biggest of Sardinia and one of the biggest in Europe. 
Also multipurpose schemes 6A and 1A have been inserted in the analysis, since 
even if they do not belong to the Flumendosa – Campidano system, they are 
hydraulically interconnected to such system and so they influence its behaviour: 
the system 6A is situated upstream of the scheme 7A, near the spring of 
Flumendosa river, while the scheme 1A draws resource on scheme 7E. 
102 
 
 
Figure 32. Flumendosa – Campidano water system 
In the table below, we report the water demands of the system. Final users have 
been grouped in different centres of demand according to the scheme reported on 
PSURI.  
 
 
User Scheme Centre  
of 
demand 
Name Request 
[Mm3] 
Operator Total 
user 
[Mm3] 
Civil 6A D72 Ogliastra 1,3 Abbanoa 101,5 
D72-
Flut 
Touristic 
Ogliastra 
1,5 
7A D41 Sarcidano1 0,6 
D45 Sarcidano2 7,8 
D57 Gerrei 0,5 
D44 Santu Miali 2,8 
D48 Donori 18,4 
D51-a San Michele 31,2 
Water system 
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User Scheme Centre  
of 
demand 
Name Request 
[Mm3] 
Operator Total 
user 
[Mm3] 
D51-b Settimo San 
Pietro 
23,2 
D51-
Flut 
Touristic 
Cagliari 
3,6 
7E D58 Sarroch 2 
D58-
Flut 
Touristic 
Sarroch 
1,6 
1A D54 Bau Pressiu 7 
Irrigational 6A D75-76 Ogliastra 11,27 Ogliastra Land-
reclamation 
syndicate  
93,26 
7A D39 Isili 0,99 ENAS 
D42 Trexenta 9,15 Sardegna 
Meridionale 
Land-
reclamation 
syndicate  
D43 Serrenti 21,9 
7B D46 San Gavino 9,02 
D47 Villasor -
Serramanna 
13,32 
D50-
D60 
Elmas-San 
Sperate 
11,01 
D52 Quartu-
Selargius 
6,92 
D59 Samassi 4,6 
7E D49 Leni 4,78 
D53 Uta 0,3 
Industrial 6A D73 Arbatax 1 Industrialization 
pole Tortolì - 
Arbatax 
16,00 
7E D55 Macchiareddu 10 CASIC 
D56 Sarroch 5 
Total      210,76 
Table 25. Water users of Flumendosa – Campidano system. 
Source: PSURI and SMGSIR. 
Afterwards, we describe the different multipurpose schemes which constitute 
water system chosen for our survey. 
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6A - Alto Flumendosa -Sa Teula 
Hydraulic scheme 6A is located in the central-eastern part of the island and it is 
formed principally from five dams linked in series, four managed by ENEL and 
the downstream one by ENAS.  
The main dam is called “Bau Muggeris” which delimits a reservoir of 63 Mm3 near 
to the spring of Flumendosa river. It also collects run-offs of Bau Mela and Bau 
Mandara rivers, that are delimited from the homonymous dams which realize two 
little reservoirs of 0,24 Mm3 and 0,31 Mm3. The three dams are connected in series 
through tunnels that deliver the resource to two hydroelectric plants realized in 
series. The second plant is linked to a little reservoir on Sa Teula river, of 0,14 Mm3 
of volume, connected to a third hydroelectric plant which discharges the resource 
directly to the river. This is delimited downstream from another dam, called 
“Santa Lucia” which forms a reservoir of 3,6 Mm³ of volume. The water system 
supplies the irrigational demand of Ogliastra land-reclamation syndicate (D75-76), 
the residential and tourism civil demands (D72, D72-Flut) and the industrial 
demands of the area of Tortolì – Arbatax (D73). 
 
Figure 33. Water scheme 6A 
7A - Medio e Basso Flumendosa – Fluminimannu 
The scheme consists of hydraulic infrastructures which permit to use the resources 
of Flumendosa, Mulargia, Flumineddu and Fluminimannu rivers. 
The main resource is represented by the water stored in the “Flumendosa” 
reservoir of 263 Mm³, delimited from the dam “Nuraghe Arrubiu”, and in the 
“Mulargia” reservoir of 320 Mm³, delimited from the “Monte Su Rei” dam; they 
are connected in series through a tunnel. The system receives also the resource 
from the reservoir of 1,44 Mm³ on the river Flumineddu, a Flumendosa affluent. 
Moreover the resources from the low course of Flumendosa river, derived from 
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“S’Isca Rena” diversion dam, are delivered to the Mulargia reservoir through the 
pumping station named “Basso Flumendosa”. 
In the north of the lake Flumendosa, there is placed the “Ponte Maxia” diversion 
dam which allows, through “Villanovatulo” pumping station, the derivation of 
resource to civil and irrigational demands of the surrounding zone (D39, D41, 
D45). They can also be supplied by the reservoir on Fluminimannu river of 12,24 
Mm3, delimited from “Is Barrocus” dam. 
From “Mulargia” reservoir a pipeline, in service of surrounding civil demand 
(D57), and a tunnel, which terminates in the “Sarais” node, are originated. “Sarais” 
node supplies northern districts of CdB-SM (D42) and then the resource can 
continue in western direction to the “Adduttore” canal or in southern direction to 
the “Mulargia-Cagliari” aqueduct. 
“Adduttore” canal supplies the northern irrigational districts of CdB-SM (D43) 
and civil demands of surrounding centres (D44). It ends into the little reservoir “Sa 
Forada”, delimited from the homonymous dam which guarantees a volume of 
1,33 Mm³. Here also the run-offs coming from Tirso river basin, through a water 
interconnection which includes the “Sardara” pumping station, can be delivered. 
“Sa Forada” reservoir is connected through a tunnel to the “Casa Fiume” 
diversion dam on the river Fluminimannu. The two dams constitute the central 
node of the water scheme Flumendosa-Campidano. 
 
Figure 34. Water scheme 7A (1) 
The “Mulargia-Cagliari” aqueduct feeds the potable water treatment plant of 
Donori, in service of surrounding centres (D48). In the final line it forks and 
delivers the resource to the two potable water treatment plant for the residential 
and tourist civil demands of metropolitan area of Cagliari (D51a, D51b, D51-Flut). 
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They can be also supplied with the resource stored in the little reservoir on the 
river Corongiu of 4,3 Mm³, directly managed by Abbanoa. 
 
Figure 35. Water scheme 7A (2) 
7B - Campidano: Fluminimannu-Mannu di Monastir 
The scheme takes origins from the “Sa Forada” and “Casa Fiume” reservoirs and 
consists of all the works that deliver the resources coming from the scheme 7A and 
from the Fluminimannu and Mannu rivers.  
From “Casa Fiume” diversion dam two irrigational canals, called “Ripartitore 
Sud-Est” and “Ripartitore Est-Ovest”, are originated. 
The first runs along Campidano area in direction North West – South West and 
feeds the central irrigational districts of CdB-SM (D47, D50-60). Near the town of 
Monastir the canal takes on the resource intercepted from the “Monastir” 
diversion dam on Mannu river and more downstream it is interconnected with the 
scheme 7E through a bidirectional pipeline. It goes on as a pipeline and it joints in 
the “San Lorenzo” node with a branch of “Mulargia-Cagliari” aqueduct. It follows 
in eastern direction and can feed the civil demand (D51b) and irrigational demand 
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(D52) of the surrounding area through two pumping stations, named “Simbirizzi-
civil” and “Simbirizzi-irrigation”; so it finishes in the “Simbirizzi” reservoir of 30,3 
Mm³. The reservoir, in service of the irrigational user, apart from storing the 
resource delivered from the upstream system, is used to take on the treated waste 
water of the urban area of Cagliari, given through the "Is Arenas" pumping 
station. 
The second canal from “Casa Fiume” diversion dam is developed in the west 
zone, it feeds the surrounding irrigational districts (D59) and finally it forks in the 
“Sud-Ovest” and “Nord-Ovest” canals. The first follows in direction south and it 
is connected to the “Cixerri” reservoir, while the second is developed until the 
limits of the Oristano province feeding northwest districts of the CdB-SM (D46). 
From “Sa Forada” reservoir the “Nuovo Ripartitore Sud-Est” pipeline is 
originated. The work represents the following of the transference line of resources 
from Tirso to Campidano. Moreover, such work results linked to the “Mulargia-
Cagliari” aqueduct through an interconnection with possibilities of bidirectional 
functioning, which increases the flexibility of water transfers in the system. Along 
its course this pipeline feeds the central districts of CdB-SM (D47,D50-60) and in 
“San Lorenzo” node it links with the “Ripartitore Sud-Est” and with a branch of 
“Mulargia-Cagliari” aqueduct. 
 
Figure 36. Water scheme 7B 
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7E - Basso Cixerri – Fluminimannu - Santa Lucia 
The scheme 7E uses the resources of the river Cixerri, integrated with those from 
diversion dams on Fanaris, Santa Lucia and Monti Nieddu rivers. 
 
Figure 37. Water scheme 7E 
The diversion on Fanaris river is connected to the second branch of “Sud-Ovest” 
canal that feeds the western districts of CdB-SM (D49) and ends in “Cixerri” 
reservoir. 
The “Cixerri” reservoir of 24 Mm3, delimited from the “Genna Is Abis” dam, is the 
principal node of the scheme. It is functional to the users’ needs of the south-west 
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area of Flumendosa-Campidano system and it permits the delivery of the resource 
to the system 1A. 
“Cixerri” reservoir is linked, through the homonymous pumping station, to the 
“Cixerri-Macchiareddu” pipeline. This can also receive the resource derived from 
the diversion dam on Santa Lucia river. The “Cixerri-Macchiareddu” pipeline 
feeds the surrounding irrigational districts (D53) and it enters in the 
“Macchiareddu” node; from this node a bidirectional interconnection to the 
scheme 7B, included the “Macchiareddu” pumping station, is originated. 
From “Macchiareddu” node also the industrial aqueduct takes origin. It is  
managed by the industrial syndicate “CASIC” and it is developed in direction 
south where it feeds the industrial pole of Macchiareddu and Sarroch (D55, D56) 
and the residential and tourist civil demand of the surrounding area (D58, D58-
Flut). 
The scheme is completed with the diversion dam on Monti Nieddu river which, 
through the homonymous pumping station, is interconnected to the final branch 
of the industrial aqueduct and allows to increase the available resource for users.  
1A - Mannu di Narcao 
Such a scheme is functional to supply civil demands (D54) directly linked to “Bau 
Pressiu” reservoir of 8,5 Mm3 on Mannu of the Narcao river. 
During water emergency in the period 1985 – 1990 the interconnection with the 
scheme 7E was realized to permit the water transfer from the “Cixerri” reservoir 
through the “Sulcis” pumping. 
 
Figure 38. Water scheme 1A
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7. Methodology of cost 
allocation 
7.1. Premise and objectives 
As we saw in a previous chapter, CGT allows us to value cost sharing among the 
participants of a project in a fair, efficient and impartial way, respecting the 
principles of individual acceptability and common agreement. 
So, the objective of the research was to develop a methodology of cost allocation 
applied to a water resources system using the CGT methods. For this reason we 
can give an original contribution both to mathematical sciences and to hydro-
economic modelling. 
This kind of methodology, based on mathematical science, allows us to give an 
adequate justification of adopted criteria, in order to determine a cost division 
which can be shared by all users. Moreover, through the cooperation among 
participants it is possible to maximise the efficiency of water resource 
management, a very important goal in Mediterranean water systems which are 
characterized by water scarcity. 
7.2. Description of methodology 
The methodology for the application of CGT to water resources systems consists 
essentially of the following steps: 
• Water system description: functional definition of the water system and 
evaluation of its different aspects (hydrologic, hydraulic, infrastructural, 
economic, etc.). 
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• Cooperative game planning: identification of the players and coalitions, 
analysis of priorities, etc. 
• Characteristic function (c.f.) valuation: set up of the optimization model, 
calculation of the minimum associated cost for every coalition and 
valuation of the c.f. of the game; 
• Game solution: application of CGT methods necessary to share the costs 
among the players. 
In the first step we have to identify all the important aspects for the description 
and characterization of water system, in particular the hydrologic, hydraulic and 
infrastructural aspects. During this phase we have to add the economic analysis 
necessary for the calculation of c.f. of the cooperative game: it will be 
indispensable to individuate the typology of cost which characterizes the water 
system and which we want to share among the different water users. 
In the case of construction cost allocation of new infrastructures, it is essential that 
the analysis of function costs are relative to the realization of works. This type of 
approach has been analyzed in the application described in Deidda (2009) with 
regards to the adaptation of the water resources system in the Turia river basin, in 
Spain, carried out in the international project “Azioni Integrate Italia-Spagna”. In 
this context the dimensions necessary to guarantee some standard service levels, 
defined by the Spanish Normative in the “Istrucciones de Planificacion 
Hidrologica” (see Chapter 5), have been evaluated and the costs among the users 
have been divided using a unique allocation criterion, the Shapley value. 
Nevertheless, quite often the situation is different: the system is already equipped 
and the exigency is to allocate the management costs. In this case it is necessary to 
consider the charges relative to the routine and supplementary maintenance costs, 
to the adaptation and substitution of the works and to the energy costs for the 
pumping. The application which will be illustrated hereinafter concerns the 
allocation of this typology of costs. 
In the second phase of the methodology we have to identify the players and to set 
up the cooperative game. The players can represent both individual users and sets 
of them, as in case of users belonging to an unique macrodemand (for example 
irrigational or industrial syndicate, urban municipalities, etc…). This step is 
important because we have to remember that the number of players affects the 
complexity of the problem as given n players the number of coalitions that we 
have to analyze is equal to 2n – 1. 
Then there is the most important phase of the methodology: the definition of c.f. of 
the game. According to the definition, c.f. is constituted from the set of minimum 
costs associated to all the possible coalitions of players. We have to insist on a 
concept: the necessity to value the minimum costs for every coalition is a 
prerogative of the CGT. In fact even if we want to share the costs of the Grand 
Coalition, which represents the best situation for the system in condition of 
subadditivity, it is also essential to value costs associated to subcoalitions, since 
such costs represent the necessary parameters that permit a fair and efficient 
sharing among the players. In our case the minimum cost of a coalition is defined 
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as the sum of the management costs of the “minimum” set of infrastructures 
necessary to totally satisfy the water request of the users in that coalition. This is 
possible thanks to the use of the optimization model WARGI which, in function of 
the costs linked to every infrastructure, optimizes the management of the system 
minimizing the OF representative of every coalition. Depending on the entity and 
on the spatial and temporal variability of water demand of the users in a coalition, 
it will vary the number and the kind of infrastructures to be used and the possible 
amount of resources to be pumped; consequently it will vary the sum of 
management costs of the infrastructures and so the associated costs to the specific 
coalition. 
The last phase, i.e. the game solution, needs the application of the CGT methods to 
share the costs of the water system among the players. We preferred to use a 
subset solution defining the core of the game, in such a way we can individuate 
for every player the minimum and maximum attributable cost. Using this kind of 
solution we have the chance to provide to the decision-maker an admissible range 
of costs related to every user, which results a useful tool to define water rates. 
Developing the methodology outlined above, two different approaches have been 
considered; these have different peculiarities in the application of CGT to water 
systems. 
At the beginning, it was defined the minimum set of infrastructures in service of 
every coalition associating to the relative users the maximum priority of use of 
water system. In such a circumstance the users in the coalitions have priority in 
using the resources and infrastructures of the system to satisfy their needs. This 
approach has determined some problems when high water requests were 
considered. In fact, as we will see later, the condition of subadditivity of the c.f. 
was not satisfied when the water demand of the system increased and so the 
Grand Coalition was not the most efficient solution. In this circumstance it was not 
possible to define the core of the game.  
In a second moment a totally different approach was used, because it was valued 
the allocation costs assigning to the users in coalition the minimum priority. In this 
case it is necessary to determine for every coalition, not the direct cost of use of 
infrastructures but the marginal one: This is the management cost linked to the use 
of available resource and of residual capacity of transportation and regulation 
infrastructures in relation to the preliminary usage of the water system by the 
players not belonging to the coalition being examined. In this case the 
determination of reference system configuration in which we have to realize the 
optimization (and consequentially the c.f evaluation.) is very hard-working. In fact 
for every coalition it is necessary to operate before the optimization of the system 
considering the only users out of the coalition in order to examine the entities of 
the resource and the capacity of the infrastructures available for the users in 
coalition. Operating with marginal costs it is shown that the c.f. of the game is 
subadditive, so the most efficient solution for the system is represented by the 
Grand Coalition and as a consequence we have the advantage of always being 
able to define the core of the cooperative game. 
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To better illustrate the cost allocation methodology we present hereinafter the 
results obtained on a exemplification of the Flumendosa-Campidano water 
system; instead, in the following chapter, we will apply the methodology to the 
whole complex system. 
7.3. Application to a simplified water 
system 
Water system description 
The methodology application and the comparison of results for the two different 
approaches have been done for the water system in Figure 39, which essentially 
represents a simplification of the Flumendosa – Campidano multi purpose water 
system. 
 
Figure 39. Water system 
The system is functional for the water supply of the three multi purpose macro 
demands: civil, irrigational and industrial. These can be supplied using the 
resource coming from two reservoirs in series and from a diversion dam situated 
downstream, these works are representative of the set of infrastructures of the 
multi purpose regional schemes 7A and 7B. Moreover, it is possible the partial 
usage of the run offs of the near basin through a pumping station which 
corresponds to Tirso-Flumendosa water interconnection. The sum of the pipelines, 
canals and tunnels of the real system is reproduced by the set of arcs in service of 
the three users. The two reservoirs have a capacity of 260 Mm3 the first and 320 
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Mm3 the second. To simplify the calculation we did not apply upper bounds for 
the other elements of the graph. 
The three users have different water demands, whose percentage share during the 
hydrologic year (from October to September) is reported in Table 26 in accordance 
with what reported in PSURI (RAS, 2006a). The civil and industrial users are 
characterized by a constant monthly demand, while the irrigational user is 
characterized by a bigger demand in the dry period (April-September), with a 
peak in the month of July (Figure 40).  
 
 Irrigational 
[%] 
Civil and Industrial 
[%] 
October 4,05 8,33 
November 2,11 8,33 
December 1,46 8,33 
January 1,62 8,33 
February 1,62 8,33 
March 2,92 8,33 
April 6,16 8,33 
May 10,86 8,33 
June 18,64 8,33 
July 24,8 8,33 
August 18,31 8,33 
September 7,45 8,33 
Table 26. Percentage division of water demand. 
Source PSURI 
 
Figure 40. Graph of water demand division 
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Hydrological inputs have been extracted from PSURI. The regional document 
provides the series of run offs for 53 years of reference on the basis of observed 
data in the main hydrographical station of Sardinia. Three hydrological inputs, 
linked to the two reservoirs and to the diversion dam, that are relative to 
Flumendosa-Campidano system have been chosen. Moreover it is hypothesized 
that in case of water scarcity high water drawing (100 Mmc/year) from the 
adjacent river basin is possible. 
The series of run offs are reported in the following figures. 
 
Figure 41. Hydrological input Dam 1 
 
Figure 42. Hydrological input Dam 2 and Diversion Dam 
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According to the hydrological series, the time-length chosen for the hydro-
economic analysis is equal to 53 years, with a monthly time-step. 
In relation to the economic aspects, as we said in the premise, we want to analyze 
management costs of the system considering maintenance costs of infrastructures 
and possible energy costs linked to pumping. 
Regarding the maintenance costs, we used values reported on PSURI, that are 
estimated on the basis of the model in Chapter 2. The yearly maintenance cost of 
the works in the graph is due to the sum of the routine and supplementary 
maintenance costs of the corresponding infrastructures of the Flumendosa – 
Campidano system (Table 27). 
 
 
Graph element Flumendosa - 
Campidano work 
Routine 
maintenance 
cost 
(source 
PSURI) 
[€/year] 
Supplementary 
maintenance cost 
(source PSURI) 
[€/year] 
Total 
maintenance 
cost 
[€/year] 
Dam 1 
“Nuraghe 
Arrubiu” Dam 
180.000 343.748 523.748 
Dam 2 
“Monte Su Rei” 
Dam 
180.000 318.878 498.878 
Tunnel 1 
“Flumendosa – 
Mulargia” Tunnel 
2.959 61.372 64.331 
Tunnel 2 
“Mulargia – 
Sarais” Tunnel 
4.962 111.642 116.604 
Canal “Adduttore” canal 130.617 223.334 353.951 
Pipeline 1 
“Mulargia – 
Cagliari” 
Aqueduct 
191.314 682.802 874.116 
Diversion dam 
“Casa Fiume” 
diversion dam 
10.000 4.000 14.000 
Pipeline 2 
Pipelines and 
canals 
809.858 1.116.668 1.926.526 
Pumping + 
Interconnection 
“Sardara” 
Pumping  + 
“Tirso – 
Flumendosa” 
Interconnection 
351.128 522.851 873.979 
Table 27. Maintenance costs 
The pumping station, in addition to the maintenance cost, is subject to energy 
costs, which are linked to the amount of resource to be pumped. 
From the analysis made by PSURI for the year 2006 the average energy unit price 
for pumping is equal to 0,05 €/m3. This value derives from the calculation realized 
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on 37 pumping stations in the regional territory in function of the average yearly 
volumes pumped and of the annual energy consumption. On that occasion an 
average unit price of kWh equal to 0,124 € had been adopted. 
Thanks to what was reported in the more actualized SMGSIR (RAS, 2008) it is said 
that the average unit price of the kilowatt hour suffered an increase which 
determined a value equal to 0,183 €/kWh. So, the correspondent average energy 
unit price is changed to 0,07 €/mc. To simplify the calculation, in this survey we 
decided to choose this value as the unique energy unit price related to pumping 
stations. 
 
Graph element Energy cost 
[€/mc] 
Pumping 0,07 
Table 28. Energy cost 
Cooperative game planning 
Once the different aspects of water system have been defined, we can start 
applying the cooperative game planning procedure. 
In our case every user represents a single independent player, so the game 
coalitions are formed by the single players, as [civil], [irrigational] or [industrial]; 
by their partial aggregation, as [civil + irrigational], [civil + industrial] or 
[irrigational + industrial]; and by the Grand Coalition that, as we know, is 
constituted by all players, i.e. [civil + irrigational + industrial]. The aim of the 
game is to share among users the cost of the most efficient alternative for the 
system which allows their complete water demand satisfaction. 
To apply the methodology we considered two water demand scenarios, as shown 
in Table 29. The first one is representative of the current situation of the 
Flumendosa – Campidano water system, while the second hypothesizes a 
situation of development of the irrigational water demand, according to what was 
reported in PSURI (RAS, 2006). Every scenario has been analyzed using the two 
different approaches described in the premise: different priorities, maximum and 
minimum, will be associated to users in the coalition. 
 
 
Yearly water demand 
[Mm3/year] 
Scenario A Scenario B 
Civil 80 80 
Irrigational 70 200 
Industrial 10 10 
Total 160 290 
Table 29. Water demand scenarios 
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Optimization model set up 
The minimum cost of every coalition is estimated optimizing the water system 
management through the DSS WARGI for each one. For every coalition an MPS 
file is associated and inside it there is a related OF to be optimized. Every OF is 
differentiated from the others exclusively by the different water demands of users 
in a coalition. 
Cost values considered in the OF are: 
• management cost of the infrastructures, i.e. maintenance and energy cost; 
• spilling cost; 
• interperiodal transfer cost for reservoirs. 
The OF optimization is constrained to: 
• equation of continuity to nodes; 
• maximum capacity for reservoirs nodes; 
• total satisfaction of users in coalition (i.e. absence of deficit). 
The spilling cost is related to the overabundance of resource which is eliminated 
from the system and transferred to the “sea node”. It is equal to zero for nodes 
with hydrological input, while for the others it takes a high value at will. In this 
way in the optimization phase it will be more convenient to transfer to the sea 
node the possible overabundant resource directly from the nodes with 
hydrological input; so it is possible to avoid the introduction inside the system of a 
surplus of resource which would determine a bigger use of the infrastructures and 
so a higher total cost. 
Interperiodal transfer cost is linked to the resource stored in time in a reservoir. 
This cost is considered equal to a small value at will in order to minimally penalize 
the regulation capability of the reservoirs and at the same time to avoid the storing 
of unnecessary resource and to guarantee the minimum use of the infrastructures. 
Inserting these two typologies of cost it is possible to use the minimum amount of 
resource assuring, as we want, the use of the minimum set of infrastructures 
necessary to satisfy the water system demands. 
Moreover, the optimization model WARGI allows one to assign a cost to the 
amount of the resource not given to the demands, the so called deficit cost. In this 
survey such a cost is equal to zero because the OF of every coalition is subject to 
the total users’ satisfaction. 
For every coalition the optimization outputs will provide water flows in water 
system; then in function of them we will evaluate the infrastructures in service of 
each coalition and so the related management cost. 
7.3.1. Maximum priority 
As we said, in this case the minimum cost of each coalition is calculated by 
assigning to its players the highest priority of use of water system resources and 
infrastructures. 
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7.3.1.1. Scenario A 
Characteristic function valuation 
A synthesis of optimization results is reported in Table 30, in which the 
infrastructures used by each coalition are reported. 
 
Table 30. Infrastructures used by coalitions 
Maximum Priority – Scenario A 
By analysing the results we can observe that neither the Grand Coalition nor the 
others use all the water system infrastructures. The Grand Coalition is the only 
one which uses both dams, while for the others the resource stored in dam 2 only 
is enough. The priority use of the second work is due to the fact that it presents a 
lower maintenance cost in respect to the other. Moreover, we can note that among 
all the coalition in which there is a civil demand, only the one formed by a single 
player uses pipeline 1. In other cases civil demand cooperates with the other 
players in the coalition using the canal and the pipeline 2, because, this way, a 
lower management cost is determined. Finally, we observe that the pumping 
station is never used: this means that the system does not have a water deficit 
since it is not necessary to supplement resource from the adjacent basin.  
On the basis of optimization outputs total management costs associated to every 
coalition are evaluated. These will be equal to the sum of maintenance costs of 
used infrastructures plus the possible pumping costs, both relative to the whole 
time-length. When an infrastructure is not constantly used every year, its 
maintenance cost will be considered for every year in any case, because the yearly 
maintenance, necessary to preserve the functionality of the work, will always be 
required. 
Coalitions Civil Irrigational Industrial Irr. + 
Ind. 
Irr. + 
Civ. 
Civ. + 
Ind. 
Grand 
Coalition 
Infrastructures 
Dam 1 NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Dam 2 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Tunnel 1 YES YES NO YES YES YES YES 
Tunnel 2  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Canal NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Diversion dam NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pipeline 1 YES NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Pipeline 2 NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pumping + 
Interconnection 
NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
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Total management costs of coalitions are reported in Table 31: because energy 
costs are nil, due to the unused pumping station, management costs are equal to 
maintenance costs. 
 
Coalition Yearly 
maintenanc
e Cost 
[M€/year] 
Total 
maintenance 
Cost 
(53 years) 
[M€] 
Energy 
cost  
(53 years) 
[M€] 
Total 
managemen
t Cost 
[M€] 
Civil 1,55 82,15 0.00 82,15 
Irrigational 2,97 157,41 0.00 157,41 
Industrial 2,91 154,23 0.00 154,23 
Irrigational – 
Industrial 
2,97 157,41 0.00 157,41 
Irrigational – Civil 2,97 157,41 0.00 157,41 
Civil – Industrial 2,97 157,41 0.00 157,41 
Grand Coalition 3,50 185,50 0.00 185,50 
Table 31. Management costs of coalitions 
Max Priority – Scenario A 
To simplify the calculation we did not make any cost actualisation, but by 
applying the common economic formulas this aspect will always be possible to 
consider. 
Total management costs associated to coalitions defines the c.f. of the game (Table 
32). 
 
Coalition Characteristic function 
[M€] 
Civil 82,15 
Irrigational 157,41 
Industrial 154,23 
Irrigational – Industrial 157,41 
Irrigational – Civil 157,41 
Civil – Industrial 157,41 
Grand Coalition 185,50 
Table 32. Characteristic function 
Maximum Priority – Scenario A 
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Consequently, we are able to verify if the Grand Coalition is the most efficient 
alternative for the water system, that means to check if it represents the best 
economical solution. For that we compare the cost of the Grand Coalition with 
those associated to all possible combinations of coalitions in order to estimate all 
the possible alternatives for water system. (Table 33). 
 
 
Combinations of Coalitions Cost 
[M€] 
Grand Coalition 185,50 
[Civil] + [Industrial – Irrigational] 239,56 
[Industrial] + [Civil – Irrigational] 311,64 
[Irrigational] + [Civil – Industrial] 314,82 
[Irrigational] + [Civil] + [Industrial] 393,79 
Table 33. Efficiency of the Grand Coalition 
Maximum Priority – Scenario A 
From Table 33 we observe that the cost of Grand Coalition is the least and this 
shows the convenience of cooperation among the players for the system. 
Therefore, the next step is represented by the application of the solution methods 
of CGT necessary to share the cost of Grand Coalition among the three players. 
 
Game solution 
As we said, we chose a subset solution, estimating the core of the game, through 
which it is possible to define the set of allocations that have to respect the limits of 
maximum and minimum cost attributable to every player. Such boundaries are 
evaluated by applying the marginality and rationality principles in the correct 
way: 
• the minimum value is equal to the marginal cost necessary to the single 
player to enter in the Grand Coalition; it can be calculated by 
subtracting the cost of the coalition constituted by other players from 
the cost of Grand Coalition; 
• the maximum value is equal to the cost associated to the single player, 
i.e. the stand alone cost. 
For the three water user we obtain the following boundary values. 
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Player Minimum value 
[M€] 
Maximum value 
[M€] 
Civil min(Civ) = c(N) – c(Irr-Ind) = 28,09 MAX(Civ) = c(Civ) = 82,15 
Irrigational min(Irr) = c(N) – c(Civ-Ind) = 28,09 MAX(Irr) = c(Irr) = 157,51 
Industrial min(Ind) = c(N) – c(Civ-Irr) = 28,09 MAX(Ind) = c(Ind) = 154,23 
Table 34. Minimum and maximum costs for the players. 
Max Priority – Scenario A 
Consequentially, the core of the game is constituted by the set of allocations which 
respect, at the same time, both above-reported ranges and total recovery of the 
cost of Grand Coalition. Analytically the allocations have to solve the following 
system:
HCiv + Irr + Ind = 185,5028,09 ≤ Civ ≤ 82,1528,09 ≤ Irr ≤ 157,5128,09 ≤ Ind ≤ 154,23 Y  
 
(31) 
 
If we express the boundary values in percentage we obtain: 
 
Player Minimum value 
[%] 
Maximum value 
[%] 
Civil 15,1 44,3 
Irrigational 15,1 84,9 
Industrial 15,1 83,1 
Table 35. Minimum and maximum percentage values for the players. 
Max Priority – Scenario A  
Graphic representation of the core according to the triangular diagram presented 
in Chapter 3 is reported in Figure 43. 
Moreover, in economic analysis linked to water resources it is interesting to 
express the boundary values that define the core of the game using unit cost per 
cubic metre of water delivered (Table 36). 
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Figure 43. Allocation of core 
Max Priority – Scenario A 
Player Minimum value 
[€/mc] 
Maximum value 
[€/mc] 
Civil 0,007 0,019 
Irrigational 0,008 0,042 
Industrial 0,053 0,291 
Table 36. Minimum and maximum unit costs for the players 
Max Priority – Scenario A 
Values shown in previous tables are the final results of the application of the 
methodology of cost allocation to the water system. 
7.3.1.2. Scenario B 
Another scenario characterized by a higher water demand was analyzed. It was 
chosen to “stress” the water system and to consequently consider the use of the 
pumping station. 
Characteristic function valuation 
Infrastructures used by coalitions are reported in Table 37. 
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Coalitions Civil Irrigational Industrial Irr. + 
Ind. 
Irr. + 
Civ. 
Civ. + 
Ind. 
Grand 
Coalition 
Infrastructures 
Dam 1 NO YES NO YES YES NO YES 
Dam 2 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Tunnel 1 YES YES NO YES YES YES YES 
Tunnel 2  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Canal NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Diversion dam NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pipeline 1 YES NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Pipeline 2 NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pumping + 
Interconnection 
NO YES NO YES YES NO YES 
Table 37. Infrastructures used by coalitions 
Max Priority – Scenario B 
Analysing the optimization output we can see that in this new scenario the water 
system run offs are not sufficient to satisfy some coalitions, so an extra resource 
through the use of the pumping station is required. This necessity belongs to every 
coalition in respect of the previous scenario have increased their water demand, 
i.e. those in which there is the irrigational user. The others, i.e. [civil], [industrial] 
and [civil + industrial], are characterized by the same results obtained in the 
previous scenario since their requests are the same and so the relative OF has not 
suffered changes. 
In function of the infrastructures used we evaluate the management costs linked to 
every coalition. In this case it is necessary to evaluate before for every coalition the 
pumped volumes to determine the relative energy cost (Table 38). 
 
Coalition Pumped volumes 
[Mmc] 
Energy cost 
[M€] 
Civil 0,00 0,00 
Irrigational 595,19 41,66 
Industrial 0,00 0,00 
Irrigational – Industrial 919,98 64,40 
Irrigational – Civil 3.803,13 266,22 
Civil – Industrial 0,00 0,00 
Grand Coalition 4.312,42 301,87 
Table 38. Pumped volumes and energy cost 
Max priority – Scenario B 
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Summing the two typologies of costs we determine the total management cost 
associated to every coalition. (Table 39). 
 
Coalition Yearly 
maintenance 
cost  
[M€/year] 
Maintenance 
Cost 
[M€] 
Energy cost 
[M€] 
Total 
management 
cost 
[M€] 
Civil 1,55 82,15 0,00 82,15 
Irrigational 4,37 231,61 41,66 273,27 
Industrial 2,91 154,23 0,00 154,23 
Irrigational - Industrial 4,37 231,61 64,40 389,02 
Irrigational - Civil 4,37 231,61 266,22 497,83 
Civil - Industrial 2,97 157,41 0,00 157,41 
Grand Coalition 4,37 231,61 301,87 533,48 
Table 39. Management costs of coalitions 
Max priority – Scenario B 
The c.f. of the game is reported in the following table. 
 
Coalition Denomination Characteristic 
function 
Civil Civ 82,15 
Irrigational Irr 273,27 
Industrial Ind 154,23 
Irrigational – Industrial Irr-Ind 389,02 
Irrigational – Civil Irr-Civ 497,83 
Civil – Industrial Civ-Ind 157,41 
Grand Coalition N 533,48 
Table 40. Characteristic function 
Max Priority – Scenario B 
 
Comparing costs associated to the possible combinations of coalitions we check if, 
also for this scenario, the Grand Coalition is the most efficient solution for the 
system (Table 41). 
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Combinations of Coalitions Cost (53 years) 
[M€] 
[Irrigational] + [Civil – Industrial] 430,68 
[Civil] + [Industrial – Irrigational] 471,17 
[Irrigational] + [Civil] + [Industrial] 509,65 
Grand Coalition 533,48 
[Industrial] + [Civil – Irrigational] 652,06 
Table 41. Efficiency of the Grand Coalition 
Max Priority – Scenario B 
We observe that in this case the cost of the Grand Coalition is not the least. So it 
implies the inconvenience of not defining the core of the game. 
Game solution 
For this scenario the most efficient alternative for water system management is 
represented by the combination of [Civil] and [Industrial+Irrigational] coalitions. 
In this case the game solution proposed by CGT would associate to the civil 
demand its stand alone cost and would define a sub core for the other players. 
(Table 42). 
 
 
Coalition Cost [M€] 
   Minimum 
[M€] 
Maximum 
[M€] 
Irrigational 
+ 
Industrial 
389,02 Irrigational c(Irr-Ind) – c(Ind) = 234,79 c(Irr) = 273,27 
Industrial c(Irr-Ind) – c(Irr) = 115,75 c(Ind) = 154,23 
Civil 82,15    
Table 42. Allocation cost. 
Max priority – Scenario B 
This kind of solution determines a combined use of the infrastructures for the two 
coalitions. Let’s consider for example the stored volumes in Dam 2, as shown in 
Figure 44. 
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Figure 44. Stored  volumes Dam 2 (a). 
Max priority – Scenario B 
Adding the values of the two coalitions we obtain the total stored volumes in the 
reservoir. 
 
 
Figure 45. Stored  volumes Dam 2 (b). 
Max priority – Scenario B 
Analyzing the graph in Figure 45 we can see that the reservoir, with a capacity of 
320 Mm3, is used over its maximum limit, which represents an infeasible solution. 
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Now let’s consider the run-off used by the two coalitions. Focusing on the 
hydrologic input linked to the second reservoir, we obtain the following graph. 
 
 
Figure 46. Available resource and used Dam 2. 
Max priority – Scenario B 
In Figure 46 the blue area represents the entity of the run offs available in 
correspondence of the Dam 2, while the green one represents the relative resource 
used by the two coalitions. We note that the green area is bigger than the other, 
this determines the second inadmissible condition of used resource being higher 
than the available one. 
This behaviour is intrinsic to the characteristics of the planned cooperative game. 
In fact associating the maximum priority to the users in coalition, the 
infrastructures with low cost will be firstly assigned by the optimizer to a generic 
coalition; but in this way, all the coalitions will be under the best conditions and so 
possible interactions with other players out of coalition will not be considered. 
This can determine an over-use of infrastructures and/or an over-exploitation of 
resource. Under these conditions the Grand Coalition will result the unique correct 
alternative because it is not subject to the behaviour of any player out of coalition. 
To conclude we can say that associating the maximum priority to the users in 
coalition, it is possible to use the allocation methodology described only in cases in 
which the Grand Coalition is the most efficient condition for the system. On the 
contrary apart from the impossibility to define the core of the game we would 
obtain inadmissible solutions.  
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7.3.2. Minimum priority 
On the basis of what we observed before, we considered another approach which 
took care of the iterations among external and internal players to a coalition. For 
this reason we chose to associate different priorities of use of the water system: 
minimum for the water users in a coalition and maximum for the others. 
In this way the lowest costs that form the c.f. of the game are going to be 
determined not from the direct costs of use of the infrastructures but from its 
marginal costs. These are determined in function of the available resource and of 
the residual capacities of the transportation and regulation works consequent to 
the preliminary exploitation of the system by players with a bigger priority. In this 
way, the definition of the optimal management of the system for the players in a 
coalition is influenced by the behaviour of the players out of it. 
For example, let’s consider the coalition constituted by the civil demand. 
Supposing that the players out of coalition, i.e. the irrigational and industrial 
demand, use 80% of the capacity of a reservoir, so the civil demand will dispose of 
the remaining residual capacity of 20%. In case that such amount is not sufficient 
to satisfy the player, he will have the need to use another infrastructure. 
The same evaluations have to be done for the estimation of the residual resource: 
the resource used by irrigational and industrial demand will be valued for each 
hydrological input, and then it will be subtracted from each run-off, defining new 
ones for the civil demand. 
Constraints related to resource and infrastructures capacities, called “marginality 
constraints” are evaluated preliminarily optimizing the system management for 
the player that, from time to time, will be out of coalition. 
The Grand Coalition will not be characterized by any marginality constraints 
because, not existing players out of it, such a coalition won’t be influenced in the 
exploitation of the system by anybody. 
So in this different approach of cost allocation, the coalition formed by partial 
unions of players will be damaged and, on the contrary, the total users 
cooperation will be reward. 
7.3.2.1. Scenario A 
Marginality constraints definition 
In the examined water system the only infrastructures with a limit in capacity are 
the reservoirs nodes and the possible water drawn from the near basin was 
hypothesized as unlimited. So the marginality constraints to be estimated are 
referred only by the residual capacity of the two dams and to the available 
resource linked to the reservoirs and to the diversion dam. 
 As we said, such values come from simple optimization procedures, in particular 
it is possible the use of the results of optimizations
approach because the coalitions that we analyzed before are formed by the players 
that for this approach from time to time are out of coalition.
Hereinafter we propose the detailed procedure for the evaluation of the 
marginality constraints for the coalition formed by the civil demand that is 
consequently  influenced by irrigation
Residual capacity of the reservoirs
Dam1 
As we can see in Table 
industrial users) do not use the first reservoir, so the whole capacity of the work 
will be available for the civil demand and it 
linked to it. 
 
Dam2 
As far as the second reservoir
available to the civil demand 
47 by the yellow area that is the complementary to the maximum capacity of the 
work (320 Mm3) respect to the 
Figure 47. Stored volumes and available volumes 
So, in the optimization procedures the coalition formed by the civil demand won’t 
dispose, for the whole period of analysis, the maximum capacity of the reservoir 
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 realized in the previous 
 
al and industrial users. 
 
30 the group of players out of coalition (irrigation
is not necessary any 
 is concerned, we report the residual capacity 
that is defined by the volumes represented in 
stored volumes for the users out of coalition.
in Dam 2
Dam 2 Available volumes [Civ]
Stored volumes [Irr + Ind]
al and 
constraint to be 
Figure 
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but only a limited and variable volume as shown in Figure 48. Such storable 
volume will be inserted in WARGI to define the relative MPS file. 
 
 
Figure 48. Residual capacity Dam 2 (a) 
 
Residual hydrological input 
Below the resource relative to the hydrological inputs used by players out of 
coalition is shown. 
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Figure 49. Input Dam 1 used by irr. and ind. demands 
 
Figure 50. Input Dam 2 and Diversion Dam used by irr. and ind. demands 
On the basis of the graphics in Figure 49 and in Figure 50, we value the residual 
resource available for the civil demand, defining new hydrological series. 
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Figure 51. Residual input Dam 1 (a) 
 
Figure 52. Residual input Dam 2 (a) 
 
0
50
100
150
200
250
M
m
3
Residual input Dam 1 Residual input Dam 1 [Civ]
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
M
m
3
Residual input Dam 2 Residual input Dam 2 [Civ]
135 
 
 
Figure 53. Residual input Diversion dam (a) 
Also this new hydrological input will be considered for the optimization process. 
Marginality constraints have also been evaluated for the other coalitions and are 
shown below. 
 
 
Residual capacity of the reservoirs 
 
Dam1 
As for civil demand, analyzing Table 5 we can see that every group of players, 
who from time to time are out of coalition, do not use the reservoir; so its 
maximum capacity is available for all the coalitions without any constraints. 
 
 
Dam2 
For the second reservoir we obtain the following limits of capacity. 
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Figure 54. Residual capacity Dam 2 (b) 
 
Figure 55. Residual capacity Dam 2 (c) 
The coalition which results the most disadvantaged is that one formed by 
industrial demand. This is due to the fact that its relative players out of coalition 
(civil and irrigational demand) need a big use of the work. 
 
0
40
80
120
160
200
240
280
320
360
M
m
3
Residual capacity Dam 2 IRR
IND
0
40
80
120
160
200
240
280
320
360
M
m
3
Residual capacity Dam 2
CIV-IND
IRR-IND
CIV-IRR
137 
 
Residual hydrological input 
Input Dam1 
 
Figure 56. Residual Input Dam 1 (b) 
 
 
Figure 57. Residual Input Dam 1 (c) 
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Input Dam2 
 
Figure 58. Residual input Dam 2 (b) 
 
 
 
Figure 59. Residual input Dam 2 (c) 
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Input Diversion dam 
 
Figure 60. Residual input Diversion dam (b) 
 
 
Figure 61. Residual input Diversion dam (c) 
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From the analysis of the graphs we note the presence of periods of zero input, 
especially for industrial user; this situation will condition the use of water 
infrastructures. 
 
Characteristic function valuation 
On the basis of marginality constraints optimization procedures, necessary to 
define the minimum set of infrastructures in service of every coalition, have been 
realized (Table 43). 
Grand Coalition presents the same results seen before because the relative OF was 
not modified as it is not subject to any marginality constraint. For others coalitions 
it is clear that, with respect to the previous approach, there is an increase in the 
number of used infrastructures: for example all the coalitions, except the one 
formed by the industrial demand, use both the reservoirs. The industrial user, on 
the contrary to the first approach, use only the first reservoir: its behaviour is due 
to the constraints linked to the second reservoir. In fact, as shown in figure 20, it 
has a low residual capacity of the work and that determines the preferential 
utilization of the upstream dam. Moreover, also in this case, the support of 
resource through the pumping station for any coalition is not necessary. 
 
Coalitions Civil Irrigational Industrial Irr. + 
Ind. 
Irr. + 
Civ. 
Civ. + 
Ind. 
Grand 
Coalition 
Infrastructures 
Dam 1 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Dam 2 YES YES NO YES YES YES YES 
Tunnel 1 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Tunnel 2  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Canal NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Diversion dam NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pipeline1 YES NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Pipeline2 NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pumping + 
Interconnection 
NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Table 43. Infrastructures used by coalitions 
Minimum Priority – Scenario A 
Once the infrastructures in service of every coalition are defined, we can value 
management costs related to each coalition (Table 44), the c.f. of the game (Table 
45) and the efficiency of the Grand Coalition (Table 46). 
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Coalition Yearly 
maintenance 
cost [M€/year] 
Total 
maintenance 
cost (53 years) 
[M€] 
Energy cost 
(53 years) 
[M€] 
Total 
management  
cost [M€] 
Civil 2,07 109,71 0.00 109,71 
Irrigational 3,50 185,50 0.00 185,50 
Industrial 3,00 159,00 0.00 159,00 
Irrigational-Industrial 3,50 185,50 0.00 185,50 
Irrigational - Civil 3,50 185,50 0.00 185,50 
Civil - Industrial 3,50 185,50 0.00 185,50 
Grand Coalition 3,50 185,50 0.00 185,50 
Table 44. Management cost of coalitions 
Minimum Priority – Scenario A 
Coalition Characteristic function 
[M€] 
Civil 109,71 
Irrigational 185,50 
Industrial 159,00 
Irrigational - Industrial 185,50 
Irrigational - Civil 185,50 
Civil - Industrial 185,50 
Grand Coalition 185,50 
Table 45. Characteristic function 
Minimum Priority – Scenario A 
Combinations of Coalitions Cost 
[M€] 
Grand Coalition 185,50 
[Civil] + [Industrial – Irrigational] 295,21 
[Industrial] + [Civil – Irrigational] 344,50 
[Irrigational] + [Civil – Industrial] 371,00 
[Irrigational] + [Civil] + [Industrial] 454,21 
Table 46. Efficiency of the Grand Coalition 
Minimum Priority – Scenario A 
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Even in this case, the Grand Coalition is confirmed as the most efficient 
alternative.  
Game solution 
On the basis of the c.f. of the game, the boundary values of cost attributable to the 
players are the following ones.  
 
Player Minimum value 
[M€] 
Maximum value 
[M€] 
Civil min(Civ) = c(N) – c(Irr-Ind) = 0,00 MAX(Civ) = c(Civ) = 109,71 
Irrigational min(Irr) = c(N) – c(Civ-Ind) = 0,00 MAX(Irr) = c(Irr) = 185,50 
Industrial min(Ind) = c(N) – c(Civ-Irr) = 0,00 MAX(Ind) = c(Ind) = 159,00 
Table 47. Values of minimum and maximum cost for the players 
Minimum Priority – Scenario A 
Then, the core is represented by the set of the solutions of the following system: 
 
HCiv + Irr + Ind = 185,500,00 ≤ Civ ≤ 109,710,00 ≤ Irr ≤ 185,500,00 ≤ Ind ≤ 159,00 Y  
(32). 
 
Expressing the boundary values in percentage we obtain: 
 
Players Minimum value 
[%] 
Maximum value 
[% 
Civil 0,0 59,1 
Irrigational 0,0 100 
Industrial 0,0 85,7 
Table 48. Minimum and maximum percentage values for the players 
Minimum Priority – Scenario A 
We can note that the minimum values for the three players are the same and equal 
to zero. This is due to the fact that the costs of coalitions formed by two players are 
equal to the one associated to the Grand Coalition, because they use the same 
infrastructures and so applying the marginality principle we obtain a null 
minimum value. Moreover, irrigational demand is characterized by a maximum 
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value equal to the cent per cent of the cost of Grand Coalition since they have the 
same management costs. 
Boundary values expressed in unit cost per cubic metre of water delivered are 
reported below. 
 
 
Player Minimum value 
[€/mc] 
Maximum value 
[€/mc] 
Civil 0,000 0,026 
Irrigational 0,000 0,050 
Industrial 0,000 0,300 
Table 49. Minimum and maximum unit costs for the players 
Minimum Priority – Scenario A 
Comparing these results with those of the previous approach, we note an increase 
in the range of boundary values, due to the raise of costs associated to all 
coalitions (except the Grand Coalition). Also from a graphic point of view we can 
note the expansion of the admissible area, as shown in Figure 62. The area 
represented in vertical lines correspond to the core of this game, while the smaller 
area, in oblique lines, symbolizes the core obtained before. 
 
Figure 62. Allocation of core 
Minimum Priority – Scenario A 
 Min Priority  Max Priority 
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7.3.2.2. Scenario B 
Marginality constraints definition 
With respect to scenario A there is a change in water demand for the irrigational 
user. This fact influences the marginality constraints only for the coalitions that 
have such users out of them, i.e. [Civil], [Industrial] and [Civil – Industrial]. For 
these coalitions related constraints are presented below, for the others the same 
obtained in precedence are confirmed. 
 
Residual capacity of the reservoirs 
 
Dam1 
In this case it is necessary to evaluate for the above-mentioned coalitions, also the 
residual capacity of the first reservoir, shown below. 
 
 
 
Figure 63. Residual capacity Dam 1 
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Dam2 
 
Figure 64. Residual capacity Dam 2 (d) 
In correspondence with some periods, we register a low residual capacity of 
reservoirs, that will influence their use for users in coalition.  
Residual capacity of the reservoirs 
Input Dam1 
 
Figure 65. Residual input Dam 1 (d) 
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Input Dam2 
 
Figure 66. Residual input Dam 2 (d) 
 
Input Diversion dam 
 
Figure 67. Residual input Diversion dam (d) 
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We can see that the three above-mentioned coalitions can benefit from a low 
hydrological input; this is due to the grand exploitation of the system by players 
out of coalition. In particular, run-off for industrial demand are null in 
correspondence with the two reservoirs, such demand won’t be rely on them for 
its supply. In these circumstances a big support of resources coming from the near 
basin through the pumping will be necessary. 
 
Characteristic function valuation 
The minimum set of infrastructures in service of coalitions is present in Table 50. 
In this case, all the coalitions use the pumping station for the impossibility of the 
only use of regulations infrastructures due to the scarce hydrological input and to 
the low capacity of reservoirs. With respect to these previous situations, the 
necessity of the pumping station and the consequentially use of pipeline 2 induce 
the civil demand to avoid the use of pipeline1, in order to obtain lower 
management costs. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the supply for industrial 
demand is only possible via the resources coming from the near basin and from 
the diversion dam. 
 
 
Coalitions Civil Irrigational Industrial Irr. + 
Ind. 
Irr. + 
Civ. 
Civ. + 
Ind. 
Grand 
Coalition 
Infrastructures 
Dam 1 YES YES NO YES YES YES YES 
Dam 2 YES YES NO YES YES YES YES 
Tunnel 1 YES YES NO YES YES YES YES 
Tunnel 2  YES YES NO YES YES YES YES 
Canal YES YES NO YES YES YES YES 
Diversion dam YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pipeline1 NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Pipeline2 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Pumping + 
Interconnection 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Table 50. Infrastructures used by coalitions 
Minimum Priority – Scenario B 
 
Hereinafter we present the pumped volumes and the relative costs (Table 51), total 
management costs related to coalitions (Table 52), the c.f. of the game (Table 53) 
and the efficiency of the Grand Coalition (Table 54). 
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Coalition Pumped volumes 
[Mmc] 
Energy cost 
[M€] 
Civil 3.392,44 237,47 
Irrigational 4.345.66 304,20 
Industrial 509.29 35,65 
Irrigational - Industrial 4.597.76 321,84 
Irrigational - Civil 4292.178 300,45 
Civil - Industrial 3.717,23 260,21 
Grand Coalition 4.312,42 301,87 
Table 51. Pumped volumes and energy cost 
Minimum priority – Scenario B 
Coalition Yearly 
maintenance 
cost 
[M€/year] 
Total 
maintenance 
cost 
[M€] 
Energy 
cost 
[M€] 
Total 
management 
cost 
[M€] 
Civil 4,37 231,61 237,47 469,08 
Irrigational 4,37 231,61 304,20 535,81 
Industrial 2,82 149,46 35,65 185,11 
Irrigational - Industrial 4,37 231,61 321,84 553,45 
Irrigational - Civil 4,37 231,61 300,45 532,06 
Civil - Industrial 4,37 231,61 260,21 491,82 
Grand Coalition 4,37 231,61 301,87 533,48 
Table 52. Management cost of coalitions 
Minimum Priority – Scenario B 
Coalition Characteristic function 
[M€] 
Civil 469,08 
Irrigational  535,81 
Industrial 185,11 
Irrigational - Industrial 553,45 
Irrigational - Civil 532,06 
Civil - Industrial 491,82 
Grand Coalition 533,48 
Table 53. Characteristic function 
Minimum Priority – Scenario B 
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Combinations of Coalitions Cost 
[M€] 
Grand Coalition 533,48 
[Industrial] + [Civil – Irrigational] 717,17 
[Civil] + [Industrial – Irrigational] 1.022,53 
[Irrigational] + [Civil – Industrial] 1.027,63 
[Irrigational] + [Civil] + [Industrial] 1.190,00 
Table 54. Efficiency of the Grand Coalition 
Minimum Priority – Scenario B 
Assigning the minimum priority to users in coalition also for the second scenario 
of water requests we can determine that the Grand Coalition is the most efficient 
solution and so, contrary to the previous approach, it is possible to apply the CGT 
solution methods. 
Game solution 
On the basis of c.f. of the game and applying suitably the rationality and 
marginality principles, the boundary values of attributable cost to players are the 
following.  
 
Player Minimum value 
[M€] 
Maximum value 
[M€] 
Civil min(Civ) = c(N) – c(Irr-Ind) =-19,97 MAX(Civ) = c(Civ) = 469,08 
Irrigational min(Irr) = c(N) – c(Civ-Ind) =41,66 MAX(Irr) = c(Irr) = 535,81 
Industrial Min(Ind) = c(N) – c(Civ-Irr) = 1,42 MAX(Ind) = c(Ind) = 185,11 
Table 55. Minimum and maximum costs for the players (a) 
Min Priority – Scenario B 
The presence of the negative minimum value for civil demand is due to the fact 
that the costs associated to coalition [Irrigational - Industrial] is bigger than that 
one of Grand Coalition, so the marginality value for civil demand is lower than 
zero. In our research we cannot consider the negative values and so we 
hypothesize that the lowest value for a coalition is equal to zero. Moreover, the 
maximum cost attributable to the irrigational user is bigger than that one of Grand 
Coalition; so, also in this case, we modified the boundary value and we put it 
equal to the cost of the Grand Coalition. 
 
The values which define the core are modified as follows: 
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Player Minimum value 
[M€] 
Maximum value 
[M€] 
Civil min(Civ) = c(N) – c(Irr-Ind) = 0,00 MAX(Civ) = c(Civ) = 469,08 
Irrigational min(Irr) = c(N) – c(Civ-Ind) = 41,66 MAX(Irr) = c(Irr) = 533,48 
Industrial min(Ind) = c(N) – c(Civ-Irr) = 1,42 MAX(Ind) = c(Ind) = 185,11 
Table 56. Minimum and maximum costs for the players(b) 
Minimum Priority – Scenario B 
 
The analytical expression of the core is the following: 
 
HCiv + Irr + Ind = 533,480,00 ≤ Civ ≤ 469,0841,66 ≤ Irr ≤ 533,481,42 ≤ Ind ≤ 185,11 Y  
(33). 
 
Expressing the boundary values in percentage we obtain the following table. 
 
Player Minimum value 
[%] 
Maximum value 
[%] 
Civil 0,0 87,9 
Irrigational 7,8 100,0 
Industrial 0,3 34,7 
Table 57. Minimum and maximum percentage values for the players 
Min Priority – Scenario A 
Hereafter, it is reported the graphic representation of the core (Figure 68) and the 
boundary values expressed in unit cost per cubic metre of water delivered (Table 
58). 
 
Player Minimum value 
[€/mc] 
Maximum value 
[€/mc] 
Civil 0,000 0,111 
Irrigational 0,004 0,050 
Industrial 0,003 0,349 
Table 58. Minimum and maximum unit costs for the players 
Min Priority – Scenario B 
151 
 
 
 
Figure 68. Allocation of core 
Min Priority – Scenario B 
 
7.4. Analysis of results 
We can observe that the evaluation of the minimum set of infrastructures and the 
relative management costs which determine the c.f. of the game, is dependent on 
the priority of use of resource and the infrastructures assigned to the players of a 
coalition. 
In the research two different approaches have been analyzed. In the first case we 
have considered the maximum priority, i.e. the minimum set of infrastructures, 
used by a coalition, included firstly the works which are economically more 
convenient, avoiding those more onerous as for example the pumping. Instead, in 
the second approach, the users in coalition have been characterized by the 
minimum priority and are bound to use infrastructures and resource after their 
exploitation by possible players out of coalition.  
The two priorities represent the extreme cases that can characterize a user in a 
water system, so their analysis can be very significant when analyzing cost 
function attribution. 
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For this reason, it is interesting to analyze the cost function related to the two 
approaches. Cost functions have been evaluated (see Figure 69) analyzing the 
same water system in which the irrigational user was eliminated to simplify the 
calculation, and we decided to calculate them considering the coalition formed 
only by civil user. The total water demand of the system has been valued fixed 
and equal to 220 Mm3/year, then, varying the civil water demand from zero to the 
limit value of 220 Mm3/year, we have obtained the cost function. In case of 
minimum priority, the marginality boundaries have been valued associating to the 
player out of coalition (in this case only the industrial user) a water demand 
complementary to that one of the civil user. 
 
 
Figure 69. Cost functions 
As was predictable, in case of low priority the cost function has a very high 
marginal value at the beginning, but both the curves arrive at the same point when 
the maximum water demand is reached. In case of high priority the cost function 
is increasing with an upward concavity: for small water demands it is necessary 
that few water works and the upper limit is represented by the activation of water 
drawing from the near basin through the pumping with a sensible increase of 
management costs. Analyzing the cost function with low priority, we note that in 
its final part the curve is decreasing: this behaviour is linked to the entity and 
typology of residual resources; in fact only in this zone the player can use a big 
amount of the most economical resources, reducing the use of the pumps. This is 
possible because, as we said, total water demand of the system has been assumed 
to be fixed. 
The different trend of the two cost functions is better explained showing Figure 70; 
here the cheapest resource (coming from reservoirs) used yearly on average by 
civil user in function of its water demand is reported. In case of maximum priority 
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the player has a precedence of use on the whole water inputs, so for low entities of 
water demand this is completely satisfied by the stored resource: in this context 
the function is equal to the bisector of the quadrant. After a certain quantity of 
water request, the cheapest resource is insufficient, and so it is necessary to use the 
most onerous resource through the pumping and consequentially the function is 
decreasing. Instead, in case of minimum priority, the stored volumes are not 
totally available for the user because it is influenced by preliminary use of the 
system by players out of coalition and it is necessary other resources for its 
satisfaction: therefore the curve is lower than the other. Moreover the function 
increases with a upward concavity: this trend is due to the fact that when the 
water demand of the user increases the complementary water demand of players 
out of coalition decreases: consequently there are more stored volumes available. 
 
 
Figure 70. Available resource coming from reservoirs 
It is also useful to examine the functions of unit cost per cubic metre of delivered 
water reported in Figure 71. In case of maximum priority the function is 
decreasing, until almost 120 Mm3. Then, when it is necessary the use of onerous 
resources, such function is changed assuming an increasing trend. On the 
contrary, considering the minimum priority, the unit cost function is constantly 
decreasing. 
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Figure 71. Unit cost functions 
In conclusion we can say that the trend of unit cost functions affects the c.f. of a 
game and consequentially it concerns the possibility to define the core. In fact, for 
decreasing functions, it is possible to state that the c.f. is subadditive and, 
therefore, the Grand Coalition is the most efficient solution for the system; while 
this assumption is not always valid when the functions have an increasing trend. 
Those situations have been found in the previous applications. In fact we saw that 
in case of minimum priority, changing water demands, the c.f. of the game 
remained subadditive; instead for maximum priority, when it was reached an high 
level of exploitation of the resource, we obtained a non-subadditive c.f. 
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8. Application to the 
Flumendosa - Campidano 
water system 
In the previous chapter we analyzed an exemplification of the Flumendosa – 
Campidano water system, in order to describe in details and in a more 
comprehensible way the different steps of cost allocation methodology. 
The application to the complete system is described in the present chapter. Here it 
is exclusively considered the second methodological approach, with the 
assignment of the minimal priority using the resource by the user in the coalition. 
In this way a subadditive c.f. is surely obtainable and, consequently, we can surely 
define the core of the game. 
8.1. Application to the complete system 
Water system description 
In Figure 72 we report the graph representing the complete Flumendosa – 
Campidano system, as previously described in Chapter 6. In the graph the water 
infrastructures and the centres of demand of the multi purpose schemes, that 
formed the water system, are present. 
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Figure 72. Flumendosa – Campidano water system 
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The different water infrastructures and their relative management costs, extracted 
from PSURI, are given in Table 59. Moreover, in the same table we report the 
values of maximum capacity for the reservoirs and the maximum flow for the 
pumping stations. To simplify the calculation we did not include upper bound for 
the diversion dams and for the transportation works. Some infrastructures do not 
present any management cost because, even if they are part of Flumendosa – 
Campidano, they do not belong to the multi purpose system, that is the object of 
this economic analysis. The cost linked to these infrastructures will be totally at 
their operators’ expense. 
 
 
Infrastructures Code Maximum limit 
of use 
Maintenance 
cost 
[M€] 
Dams Maximum capacity 
[Mm3] 
Is Barrocus Is Barrocus 12,24 0,267 
Flumineddu Flumineddu 1,94 0,280 
Nuraghe Arrubiu Nuraghe 
Arrubiu 
300,00 0,524 
Monte Su Rei Monte su Rei 332,00 0,499 
Sa Forada de S'Acqua Sa Forada 1,41 0,531 
Genna Is Abis Genna Is Abis 25,41 0,510 
Bau Pressiu Bau Pressiu 8,50 0,382 
Simbirizzi Simbirizzi 24,61 0,203 
Bau Mela Bau Mela 0,24 - 
Bau Mandara Bau Mandara 0,31 - 
Bau Muggeris Bau Muggeris 61,44 - 
Santa Lucia Santa Lucia 3,70 - 
Corongiu Corongiu 4,30 - 
Diversion dams 
Ponte Maxia Ponte Maxia  0,014 
S'Isca Rena S’Isca Rena  0,014 
Casa Fiume Casa Fiume  0,014 
Monastir Monastir  0,014 
Rio Fanaris Fanaris  0,014 
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Santa Lucia Santa Lucia  0,014 
Monti Nieddu Monti Nieddu  0,014 
Pumping stations Maximum flow 
[Mm3/month] 
Villanovatulo 7A.P1 0,66 0,010 
Basso Flumendosa  7A.P6 12,96 0,202 
Macchiareddu 7E.P3 10,37 0,065 
Monti Nieuddu 7E.P6 1,24 0,065 
Sulcis 1A.P1 3,85 0,109 
Sardara 2C.P3 5,18 0,076 
Simbirizzi Irriguo 7B.P3_irr 15,56 0,043 
Simbirizzi Civile 7B.P3_civ 6,22 0,109 
Cixerri 7E.P1 10,37 0,065 
Is Arenas 7B.P5 5,18 0,029 
Transportation Works 
Pipeline Sarcidano I  SARC1  0,048 
Pipeline Sarcidano II  SARC2  0,091 
Pipeline Sarcidano III  SARC3  0,065 
Tunnel Flumineddu - Nuraghe Arrubiu G1  0,082 
Tunnel Nuraghe Arrubiu - Monte Su Rei G2  0,064 
Tunnel Monte Su Rei - Sarais G3  0,117 
Connection S'Isca Rena diversion dam BF  0,090 
Canal Adduttore ADD  0,354 
Tunnel Sa Forada - Casa Fiume SF-CF  0,033 
Aqueduct Mulargia - Cagliari I  ACQ1  0,245 
Aqueduct Mulargia - Cagliari II  ACQ2  0,096 
Aqueduct Mulargia - Cagliari III  ACQ3  0,389 
Aqueduct Mulargia - Cagliari IV  ACQ4  0,086 
Aqueduct Mulargia - Cagliari V  ACQ5  0,058 
Connection Cixerri - Nuovo Partitore Sud-
Est 
CIX-NSE  0,109 
Partitore Sud Est I  SE1a  0,204 
Partitore Sud Est II  SE1b  0,203 
Partitore Sud Est III  SE2  0,243 
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Partitore Sud Est IV  SE3  0,186 
Nuovo Partitore Sud Est I  NSE1  0,219 
Nuovo Partitore Sud Est II  NSE2  0,226 
Nuovo Partitore Sud Est III  NSE3  0,107 
Connection Monti Nieddu diversion dam MN  0,099 
Connection Santa Lucia diversion dam SL  0,050 
Pipeline Cixerri - Macchiareddu I  CIX-MAC1  0,031 
Pipeline Cixerri - Macchiareddu II  CIX-MAC2  0,031 
Pipeline Sulcis SUL  0,086 
Partitore Est - Ovest EO  0,245 
Partitore Nord - Ovest NO  0,285 
Connection Nuovo Partitore - Acquedotto I  INS1  0,055 
Connection Nuovo Partitore - Acquedotto 
II  
INS2  0,027 
Partitore Sud - Ovest I  SO1  0,345 
Partitore Sud - Ovest II  SO2  0,069 
Connection Simbirizzi I  SIMB1  0,051 
Connection Simbirizzi II  SIMB2  0,053 
Connection Simbirizzi III  SIMB3  0,026 
Interconnection Tirso - Flumendosa I  TIR1  0,462 
Interconnection Tirso - Flumendosa II  TIR2  0,214 
Interconnection Tirso - Flumendosa III  TIR3  0,045 
Acquedotto Industriale I  AI1  - 
Acquedotto Industriale II  AI2  - 
Connection Ogliastra OGL  - 
Table 59. Maintenance costs of infrastructures. 
Flumendosa – Campidano 
The pumping stations are also characterized by their energy cost; we chose to 
assign to it the same value used in the previous reduced scheme: 0,07 €/m3. 
The nodes for water demands in the graph of Figure 72 are representative of the 
demand centres of the system, reported in Table 25 of Chapter 6. The monthly 
behaviour of the requests is the same previously adopted in Chapter 7 (see Table 
26 and Figure 40). 
The hydrological inputs of the system, that are linked to the reservoirs and to the 
diversion dams, have been taken from PSURI and they are shown below from 
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Figure 73 to Figure 76. These inputs have been inserted in the nodes of the graph 
called “Apo”. We remember that the regional document provides the series of run 
offs on the basis of observed data. 
The time horizon of analysis is always equal to 53 years, equivalent to the length 
of the hydrological series available from PSURI. 
 
Figure 73. Hydrological input (a) 
 
Figure 74. Hydrological input (b) 
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Figure 75. Hydrological input (c) 
 
 
Figure 76. Hydrological input (d) 
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Cooperative game planning 
In the CGT application the players of the game are the three macro users of the 
multipurpose system: civil, irrigational and industrial. These macro users are 
formed by all centres that are characterized by the same typology of water 
demand (as in Table 60). 
To simplify the calculation and to group inside the same player the centres of 
demands with the same homogeneous characteristics of localization and 
management we have chosen to ignore the users of the scheme 6A. However, 
these are opportunely considered during the optimization procedures. 
 
Player Centre of demand Total water request 
[Mm3/year] 
Civil D41, D44, D45, D48, D51-SM, D51-SS,  
D51-Flut, D54, D57, D58, D58-Flut,  
98,70 
Irrigational D39, D42, D43, D46, D47, D49, D50-60, 
D52, D53, D59 
81,99 
Industrial D55, D56 15,00 
Total  195,69 
Table 60. Water request of the players. 
Flumendosa - Campidano 
Since every player is formed by many agents, its management cost will be equal to 
the sum of the management costs of the infrastructures necessary to supply the 
demands belonging to it. 
Optimization models set up 
The adopted optimization procedures are the same described in the previous 
chapter: we generate a LP model using WARGI associated to every coalition. 
Analyzing the optimizations results we can individuate the infrastructures in 
service for every coalition and their relative management costs. 
Marginality constraints definition 
As we have previously described, when we assign the minimum priority to the 
players it is necessary to evaluate for every coalition their relative marginality 
constraints in order to determine the available resources and the residual capacity 
of the works. In this case the residual capacity is exclusively referred to the 
reservoirs and to the pumping stations because they are the only ones that have an 
upper bound related to the storage capacity transferring resources between time 
periods. 
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Characteristic function valuation 
On the basis of the marginality constraints for every coalition, all the optimizations 
have been carried out and the relative set of used infrastructures have been 
identified. The results are reported in Table 61. 
 
 
Coalitions Civil Irrigational Industrial Civ 
+Ind 
Irr 
+Ind 
Civ 
+Irr 
Grand 
Infrastructures 
SARC1+7A.P1+ Ponte 
Maxia  
YES YES - YES YES YES YES 
SARC2 YES - - YES - YES YES 
SARC3 YES - - YES - YES YES 
G1 YES YES - YES YES YES YES 
G2 YES YES - YES YES YES YES 
G3 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
BF+7A.P6+S’Isca Rena - - - - - - - 
ADD YES YES - YES YES YES YES 
SF-CF+Casa Fiume YES YES - YES YES YES YES 
ACQ1 YES YES - YES YES YES YES 
ACQ2 - - - YES - - - 
ACQ3 YES - - YES - YES YES 
ACQ4 YES - - YES - YES YES 
ACQ5 - - - - - - - 
CIX-NSE+7E.P3 - - - - - - - 
SE1a - - - - - - - 
SE1b - - - - - - - 
SE2 - - - - - - - 
SE3 YES YES - YES YES YES YES 
NSE1 - - - - - - - 
NSE2 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
NSE3 YES YES - YES YES YES YES 
MN+7E.P6+ Monti Nieddu - - - - - - - 
SL+Santa Lucia - - - YES - - - 
CIX-MAC1 YES YES - YES YES YES YES 
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CIX-MAC2 YES - - YES YES - - 
SUL+1A.P1 YES - - YES - YES YES 
EO YES YES - YES YES YES YES 
NO - YES - - - YES YES 
INS1 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
INS2 YES - - - - YES YES 
SO1 YES YES - YES YES YES YES 
SO2 YES YES - YES YES YES YES 
SIMB1 - YES - - YES YES YES 
SIMB2 - - - - - - - 
SIMB3 - - - - - - - 
TIR1 - YES - - YES - - 
TIR2+2C.P3 - - -  - - - 
TIR3 - - -  - - - 
Is Barrocus YES - - YES - YES YES 
Flumineddu - - -  - - - 
Nuraghe Arrubiu YES - YES YES - YES - 
Monte su Rei YES YES - YES YES YES YES 
Sa Forada - - -  - - - 
Genna Is Abis - - -  - - - 
Bau Pressiu YES - - YES - - YES 
Simbirizzi  - - -  - - - 
7B.P3_irr - YES -  YES YES YES 
7B.P3_civ - - -  - - - 
7E.P1 - - -  - - - 
7B.P5 - - -  - - - 
Monastir YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Fanaris - - -  - - - 
Table 61. Infrastructures used by coalition. 
Flumendosa - Campidano 
 
 
Hereafter we report for every coalition the total pumped volumes of every 
pumping station of the system during the whole time horizon of analysis.  
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Coalitions Civil Irrigational Industrial Civ + 
Ind 
Irr + 
Ind 
Civ + 
Irr 
Grand 
Pumping 
7A.P1 110,750 46,525 - 115,701 46,525 150,722 94,716 
7A.P6 - - - - - - - 
7E.P3 - - - - - - - 
7E.P6 - - - - - - - 
1A.P1 212,781 - - 212,781 - 212,781 212,781 
2C.P3 - - - - - - - 
7B.P3_irr - 371,000 - - 371,000 371,000 371,000 
7B.P3_civ - - - - - - - 
7E.P1 - - - - - - - 
7B.P5 - - - - - - - 
Total 323,530 417,525 0,000 328,482 417,525 734,503 678,497 
Table 62. Pumped volumes expressed in Mm3. 
Flumendosa - Campidano 
From the previous tables it is clear that the Grand Coalition has not used all 
infrastructures. This means that under the current water requests and the 
hydrological inputs of PSURI the Flumendosa – Campidano water system is 
correctly sized and no pumping  from the external source is required. 
On the basis of the used infrastructures and the pumped volumes we obtain the 
following management costs related to the coalitions of the game.  
 
Coalition  Maintenance 
costs 
[M€] 
Pumping costs 
[M€] 
Management Costs 
 
[M€] 
Grand Coalition 245,87 47,49 293,36 
Civil 255,13 22,65 277,78 
Irrigational 190,79 29,23 220,02 
Industrial 49,60 0,00 49,60 
Civil – Irrigational 253,41 51,42 304,83 
Irrigational - Industrial 177,31 29,23 206,54 
Civil - Industrial 262,21 22,99 285,20 
Table 63. Management costs of coalitions. 
Flumendosa - Campidano 
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Therefore the c.f. is the following. 
 
Coalition Characteristic function 
Grand Coalition 293,36 
Civil 277,78 
Irrigational 220,02 
Industrial 49,60 
Civil – Irrigational 304,83 
Irrigational - Industrial 206,54 
Civil - Industrial 285,20 
Table 64. Characteristic function. 
Flumendosa – Campidano 
Finally we value the efficiency of the Grand Coalition comparing its cost with that 
one of the other alternatives. 
 
Combinations of Coalitions Cost 
[M€] 
Grand Coalition 293,36 
[Industrial] + [Civil – Irrigational] 354,43 
[Civil] + [Industrial – Irrigational] 484,32 
[Irrigational] + [Civil – Industrial] 505,22 
[Irrigational] + [Civil] + [Industrial] 547,40 
Table 65. Efficiency of the Grand Coalition. 
Flumendosa - Campidano 
As it was expected, from an economic point of view the Grand Coalition is the 
most efficient combination for the system. 
 
Game solution 
According with the c.f. of the game the boundaries values of cost for every player 
are evaluated, see Table 66. As we said in the previous chapter the negative values 
are not admissible, therefore the minimum cost associable to the demands is equal 
to zero. 
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Player Minimum value 
[M€] 
Maximum value 
[M€] 
Civil 86,82 277,78 
Irrigational 8,16 220,02 
Industrial 0,00 49,60 
Table 66. Minimum and maximum costs for the players. 
Flumendosa - Campidano 
Analytically the core is represented by the set of allocations that verify the 
following system: 
 
HCiv + Irr + Ind = 293,3686,82 ≤ Civ ≤ 277,788,16 ≤ Irr ≤ 220,020,00 ≤ Ind ≤ 49,60 Y  
(34). 
 
Hereafter in Figure 77 there is the graphic representation of the core.  
 
Figure 77. Allocation of core. 
Flumendosa - Campidano 
Ind < 49,6 
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The boundaries values expressed in percentage and in unit cost are reported in the 
following tables. 
 
Player Minimum value 
[%] 
Maximum value 
[% 
Civil 29,6 94,7 
Irrigational 2,8 75,0 
Industrial 0,0 16,9 
Table 67. Minimum and maximum percentage values for the players. 
Flumendosa – Campidano 
 
Player Minimum value 
[€/mc] 
Maximum value 
[€/mc] 
Civil 0,017 0,053 
Irrigational 0,002 0,051 
Industrial 0,000 0,062 
Table 68. Minimum and maximum unit costs for the players. 
Flumendosa – Campidano 
 
8.2. Analysis of results 
Starting from the obtained results it is possible to make some interesting analyses 
and comparison with the current allocation rates assigned by the Regional Board 
(ENAS). 
First of all, we have to consider that the methodology has been applied to a limited 
part of the regional water system and it exclusively analyzes the management cost 
of the infrastructures. The study does not consider other typologies of cost, as the 
staff cost. 
However, it is possible to extend the results to the whole multi purpose water 
system applying the percentage boundary values obtained to the total cost of 
ENAS. In this way we can also divide among the players some typologies of cost, 
as for example the staff costs, that are difficult to assign to the users. 
Hereafter we report the budget of the ENAS expenses for the year 2010 (source 
Official Gazette of Sardinia of 03/07/2010). 
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Category [€] 
Expenses for the Institutive Agencies 213.000 
Staff expenses 19.190.000 
Purchase of goods and services 28.290.000 
Other current expenses  287.000 
Total 47.980.000 
Table 69. Budget of ENAS expenses for 2010 
 
The income ENAS for activities different from the sale of wholesale water are 
reported hereafter. 
 
Category [€] 
Sale of electric energy 4.412.000 
Planning and realization of works 5.620.000 
Income from RAS 17.000.000 
Income from other Companies 550.000 
Total 27.582.000 
Table 70. ENAS incomes for 2010 
 
According to the previous tables, the income from rates necessary to reach the 
break-even are equal to the difference between the expenses and the income for 
activities different from the sale of wholesale water.  
 
Category [€] 
Total net expenses 20.398.000 
Table 71. Net expenses ENAS for 2010 
 
Now if we apply to this cost the percentage boundaries values, obtained for the 
Flumendosa – Campidano (see Table 67), we find the following values expressed 
in millions of euro per year. 
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Player Minimum value 
[M€] 
Maximum value 
[M€] 
Civil 6,04 19,32 
Irrigational 0,57 15,30 
Industrial 0,00 3,45 
Table 72. Minimum and maximum costs for the players. 
Regional multipurpose water system 
Moreover, we can consider the volumes of wholesale water assigned for the year 
2010 to the three multipurpose demands, reported in Official Gazette of Sardinia 
of 03/07/2010, to obtain a theoretical range of unit cost per cubic metre for every 
user (Table 74). 
 
User Mm3 
Civil 230,1 
Irrigational 389,2 
Industrial 30,4 
Total 649,7 
Table 73. Assigned wholesale water volumes for 2010 
Player Minimum value 
[M€] 
Maximum value 
[M€] 
Civil 0,0262 0,0840 
Irrigational 0,0015 0,0393 
Industrial 0,0000 0,1134 
Table 74. Minimum and maximum unit costs for the players. 
Regional multipurpose water system 
Such values are now comparable with the ENAS rates for 2010 on Table 75.  
User Rate 2010 
Civil I 0,025 
Civil II 0,056 
Irrigational I 0,005 
Irrigational II 0,015 
Industrial 0,23 
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Table 75. ENAS rates for 2010 
Comparing the values, we can note that for the civil and irrigational users their 
current rates are contained inside the theoretical range given by the CGT core (we 
ignore the little difference for the minimum civil value); while for the industrial it 
is outside. This fact implies that, under these conditions, the current rates do not 
belong to the core of the game and so they do not respect the illustrated CGT 
principles of equity and impartiality. 
8.2.1. Hypothesis of rates 
Moreover, according with preceding results, it is interesting to define a new rating 
plan based on allocation cost methodology. New rates have to be based on the 
theoretical range reported in Table 72 and they have to cover the ENAS expenses 
(Table 71), in order to respect the principle of the recovery of costs required from 
the European Directive 2000/60/EC. Therefore some rating hypotheses are 
proposed below. 
Considering that the maximum theoretical value for the industrial demand is 
lower than its current rate, we decide to attribute to it its maximum theoretical 
limit equal to 0,1134 €/m3. This value, on the basis of the assigned wholesale water 
volumes, determines a cover of the ENAS expenses equal to 16,9%. 
The remaining 83,1% has to be divided between the civil and irrigational 
demands. If we choose to adopt the minimum theoretical value of 0,0015 €/m3 for 
the irrigational demand, this covers only the 2,8% of the ENAS expenses. So the 
civil demand will be charged with the residual 80,3% which determines an unit 
cost equal to 0,0712€/m3. 
Another alternative is the one that applies to the irrigational demand its minimum 
current rate, i.e. 0,005 €/m3, which determines a covering of expenses equal to 
9,6%. The civil demand in this case will cover the residual 73,5% which determines 
an unit cost equal to 0,0652€/m3. 
One more hypothesis can be done associating the maximum current rate for the 
irrigational demand, equal to 0,015€/m3 that cover the 28,6% of the expenses, and 
then to charge the civil demand with the residual 54,5%, that corresponds to a unit 
cost equal to 0,0483€/m3. 
 
Player Hypothesis 1 
[€/mc] 
Hypothesis 2 
[€/mc] 
Hypothesis 3 
[€/mc] 
Civil 0,0712 0,0652 0,0483 
Irrigational 0,0015 0,0050 0,0150 
Industrial 0,1134 0,1134 0,1134 
Table 76. Hypothesis of rates. 
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To conclude this investigation, we finally executed an analysis of sensitivity of the 
rates between the civil and irrigational demands, fixing the value of industrial user 
equal to 0,1134 €/m3. We obtained that an increase of 0,01 €/m3 for the irrigational 
determines a decrease equal to 0,0169€/m3 for the civil, while the same increase 
applied to the civil determines a decrease for the irrigational equal to 0,0059€/m3. 
 
Player  [€/mc] [€/mc] 
Civil + 0,01 -0,0169 
Irrigational -0,0059 +0,01 
Table 77. Analysis of sensitivity 
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9. Conclusions and 
perspective 
9.1. Conclusions 
In this thesis the problem of cost allocation in a water resources system has been 
faced and sorted out considering CGT. At the beginning it has emerged the 
necessity of a change in defining water rates; in particular, as we saw in Chapter 2, 
the Directive 2000/60/EC requires the realization of an economic analysis of the 
water use in a river basin-scale; the Directive also provides that the pricing politics 
have to take into account the principle of recovery of costs and the economic 
sustainability of the final user. Moreover we showed how the currently methods 
of allocation do not take into account the user's willingness to pay and, frequently, 
such methods do not permit the total costs covering. 
Moreover we have underlined how the CGT can provide a valid contribution to 
the above mentioned problems. As we have widely described in Chapter 4, the 
CGT provides the necessary instruments to analyze those situations in which is 
fundamental to search a sharing mechanism that should be efficient, fair and it has 
to provide the appropriate incentives among the involved parts. Therefore, the 
cost allocation problem in a water system has been valued as a game in which it is 
necessary to determine the right payoff to be assigned to the different players, 
which represent in our case the water users. By the use of the costs allocation 
methods of CGT it has been possible to “make explicit” the process of negotiation 
with mathematical formulas which implement properties that guarantee equity, 
fairness and cooperation among the players. 
For these reasons, we have developed a methodology which permits to allocate 
the water services cost by the use of CGT. Such a methodology permits to achieve 
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a cost sharing which is acceptable, provides an adequate justification of the 
adopted criteria and also favours the cooperation among the users in order to 
maximize the efficiency of the management of the system. 
For that, we realized a cooperative game in which the users of a water system act 
as players in a coalition to achieve their water supply at the minimum cost. The 
use of the optimization model WARGI allows to value the least cost for every 
coalition, defining the optimal set of infrastructures necessary to satisfy the water 
requests of the players. WARGI permits to represent any water system and to 
easily enter the relative characteristic data: this makes the methodology totally 
applicable to every water system. From this point of view, such methodology does 
not present any macroscopic limit,  except the one linked to the number of players 
of the game because, as we can noted from the research, this element influences 
the number of optimizing operations to be realized. 
The minimum cost of the coalitions of the game defines the characteristic function: 
this is the key element of the methodology, through which is possible to get the 
solution of the game. We chose to use the core solution, that represents the area of 
the admissible cost allocation values and, through this, it is possible to supply the 
boundaries values of cost for every player. Inside the core, as we saw, there are all 
the allocations which satisfy the principles of equity, fairness, justice, efficiency 
and which guarantee the costs recovery. The core of a cooperative game can 
represent an useful instrument to define or to adjust water rates. The valuation of 
the core is a valid support in the management of the water resources for the 
achievement of the economic analysis required by the European Directive. 
The application to the water system Flumendosa-Campidano in Sardinia has 
permitted to better appreciate the most important characteristics of the 
methodology and to analyze some critical points. In this specific case, we have 
examined the maintenance costs added to the pumping costs and then we got on 
to their allocation among the three principal water users, defining their relative 
range of costs. 
We have also considered two different approaches, associating to the players the 
minimum and the maximum priority of the use of resource and infrastructures of 
the system. The obtained results have permitted to weigh the pros and the 
limitations of the methodology and also they have enabled to value the evolution 
of the allocation in functions of the assigned priority. 
To conclude we want to underline not the computations and the numerical results 
presented in the thesis, but the procedure adopted to achieve them. In fact, such 
methodology is easily adaptable to allocate different typologies of cost and it is 
applicable to every water system: the only need is to use an adequate optimization 
model to calculate the minimum cost linked to the coalitions. 
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9.1.1. Original contributions 
This thesis has provided an original contribution both in mathematical science, in 
particular in Game Theory, and in hydro-economic modelling, especially in water 
resources management.  
The main novelty is represented by the definition of a methodology that 
implements the concepts and the methods of CGT for water resources systems. 
During this research, other contributions have come up and they are listed 
hereafter: 
- the definition of a criterion for the allocation of management costs in a 
multi purpose water system; 
- the calculation of the characteristic function in a cooperative game 
representing a complex water system through the use of an optimization 
model; 
- the assignation of water services costs to the water users in function of their 
use of infrastructures; 
- the calculation of the range of costs associated to a water user; 
- the analysis of the relationships between the cost functions and the 
characteristic function in a cooperative game; 
- the use of a methodology of cost allocation which makes explicit, clear and 
comprehensible the applied methods, with a transparent decision-making 
process; 
- the development of a support that realizes the economic analysis of water 
use in a river basin-scale, as required by the European Directive; 
- the definition of a method which favours the cooperation of the water users 
and reduces rivalry and disputes linked to the water resource; 
- the realization of an instrument for the estimation of water rates which: 
o consider the user’s willingness to pay; 
o respect the cost recovery principle stated by European Directive; 
o are equal, impartial and commonly shareable; 
o are justified by a clear and comprehensible method of calculation, 
which permits to show to the user the motivations on the basis of a 
determined water price; 
o are valued in function of an hydrology analysis with a long time-
series. 
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9.2. Future research 
At the end of this document, on the basis of the achieved results and the 
limitations found in the development of the work, the following main possible 
developments of research have been individuated: 
- to study in details the cost functions of the infrastructures in order to 
improve the information to be entered in the optimization model and the 
quality of the economic results; 
- to extend the application of the methodology to the whole regional multi 
purpose water system and to the downstream water systems, as inside the 
civil districts or the  irrigational areas; 
- to expand the number of players considering other water users, as the 
hydroelectric production, the fish farming or the recreational uses; 
- to develop an optimization tool which automates the calculation process of 
the coalition costs; 
- to match the optimizing process with a pre and/or post simulative phase in 
order to value different scenarios with different management alternatives; 
- to explore the possibilities offered by the application of the CGT to the 
systems characterized by insufficient resources for the total supply of the 
users. With regards to this, we suggest the use of a particular class of games 
called bankruptcy games (Curie et al., 1987): these are particularly adapted 
for the systems marked out by scarce water resources; 
- to examine different levels of priority associated to the water users. In this 
case it will be necessary to decide preliminarily which level has to be 
assigned to the coalitions formed by players with different priorities. For 
example it will be possible to choose the lowest priority of the players 
which belong to the coalition; 
- to represent the players not only in function of the typology of water user 
(civil, irrigational, industrial) but also in function of a specific level of their 
water request. For example we can divide the civil demand in two players: 
one related to the 80% of the total request, and the other to the remaining 
20%. 
Particularly, these two last aspects seems to be very interesting, because put 
together they can represent more adherently the current management behaviour 
carried out in water systems by water Authorities. In fact, they administrate the 
resource mainly on the basis of different priorities linked to the typology of the 
users and to their level of flexibility. 
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Appendix A - Introduzione 
Motivazione della ricerca 
La gestione dei servizi idrici 
L’acqua, l’elemento essenziale per la vita e fattore indispensabile per lo sviluppo 
umano, oltre che essere considerato da sempre come bene sociale, ha assunto negli 
ultimi anni anche la caratteristica di bene economico. Di conseguenza risulta 
importante dare alla risorsa idrica il giusto valore che tenga conto del suo utilizzo, 
consumo, deterioramento e dell’eventuale inquinamento, in maniera da 
incoraggiare l’utente ad un uso più sostenibile. 
In Italia e nella maggior parte dei paesi europei l’assegnazione di sovvenzioni, 
sussidi, rimborsi e contributi da parte dei governi alle varie aziende, consorzi ed 
enti gestori del servizio idrico è risultata per anni, ed è tuttora, una pratica 
ampiamente diffusa, quasi dovuta, che ha portato il più delle volte ad un 
deprezzamento della risorsa. 
Tuttavia sono in fase di attuazione nuove politiche economiche comunitarie più 
restrittive; in particolare, la recente Direttiva Europea 2000/60/CE (EU, 2000) ha 
promosso la necessità di un’analisi economica dell’uso idrico, introducendo il 
principio del recupero dei costi, con l’obiettivo di sostenere la salvaguardia e il 
miglioramento qualitativo e quantitativo dei corpi idrici. 
In questo contesto risulta fondamentale portare avanti una politica tariffaria che 
sia solidamente fondata su un’attenta analisi di allocazione dei costi tra gli utenti 
di un sistema di risorse idriche. 
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La Direttiva Quadro 2000/60/CE 
Come detto in precedenza, negli ultimi anni la Comunità Europea ha posto 
particolare attenzione alle problematiche in materia di risorse idriche; in tal 
contesto si inserisce la Direttiva 2000/60/CE che si pone l’obiettivo di perseguire il 
miglioramento dello stato dell'ambiente e in particolare dei corpi idrici ricadenti 
all’interno del territorio comunitario. 
La Direttiva stabilisce un quadro di riferimento nella politica dell’acqua ed ha 
come obiettivo principale quello di raggiungere il buono stato di salute della 
risorsa idrica, proteggendola ed evitando il suo deterioramento per gli usi futuri. 
Per ottenere questo obiettivo viene assegnato un peso molto importante all’analisi 
idrologica finalizzata alla quantificazione della risorsa, alla gestione delle risorse 
idriche, alla partecipazione, informazione e consultazione pubblica ed infine 
all’analisi economica per garantire l’efficienza dei sistemi di utilizzazione. 
Le problematiche legate alla definizione dei criteri per la gestione economicamente 
efficiente dei sistemi idrici, rappresenta uno dei temi più importanti presenti nella 
Direttiva Europea. Questi aspetti sono trattati in particolare negli articoli 5 e 9 
della stessa. Nell’art. 5 è previsto che gli Stati membri provvedono affinché, per ciascun 
distretto idrografico, […] sia effettuata […] e completata entro quattro anni dall'entrata in 
vigore della Direttiva […] un'analisi economica dell'utilizzo idrico. Nell’art. 9 è detto 
che gli Stati membri tengono conto del principio del recupero dei costi dei servizi idrici, 
compresi i costi ambientali e relativi alle risorse, prendendo in considerazione l'analisi 
economica effettuata […] in particolare, secondo il principio di «chi inquina paga». 
Inoltre, entro il 2010, si dovrà provvedere affinché le politiche dei prezzi dell'acqua 
incentivino adeguatamente gli utenti a usare le risorse idriche in modo efficiente […] e si 
pervenga al recupero dei costi dei servizi idrici a carico dei vari settori di impiego 
dell'acqua, suddivisi almeno in industria, famiglie e agricoltura, sulla base dell'analisi 
economica effettuata secondo l'allegato III e tenendo conto del principio «chi inquina paga» 
(EU, 2000). 
L’introduzione degli indicatori economici sopracitati, necessari per il 
raggiungimento degli obiettivi ambientali, implica riconoscere alla risorsa idrica 
un valore economico, proprio delle risorse finite. L’analisi economica riveste 
quindi un ruolo decisivo nella gestione delle risorse idriche e nel disegno delle 
nuove politiche dei prezzi dell'acqua. 
Il problema dell’allocazione dei costi e la Teoria dei 
Giochi Cooperativi 
I metodi tariffari attualmente utilizzati, che verranno analizzati nel dettaglio nel 
Capitolo 6, hanno il difetto di ignorare il problema della motivazione: ci si chiede, 
infatti, perché gli utenti finali debbano accettare un’assegnazione che ecceda i loro 
costi opportunità o la loro disponibilità a pagare (Young, 1985). 
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Il problema principale per la definizione di una nuova politica tariffaria, quindi, 
non risiede nella ricerca di una modalità di ripartizione dei costi tra gli utenti, 
ovvero nella ricerca di una determinata legge di allocazione delle spese, bensì su 
come ripartire in maniera equa e giusta i costi sostenuti. Ciò significa trovare 
un’allocazione dei costi che sia imparziale per tutti i partecipanti al progetto al fine 
di promuovere e garantire la collaborazione fra gli utenti e quindi la fattibilità di 
un progetto comune che permetta la riduzione dei costi per tutti i beneficiari. 
Come riportato nell’articolo di Young (1994) la Teoria dei Giochi Cooperativi (di 
seguito CGT) fornisce gli strumenti necessari per analizzare situazioni in cui 
risulta basilare la ricerca di un meccanismo di ripartizione che sia efficiente, giusto 
e fornisca appropriati incentivi tra le varie parti coinvolte. Lemaire (1984) asserisce 
che la soluzione a un problema di allocazione dei costi è identico alla 
determinazione del valore di un gioco cooperativo. La ripartizione di un costo fra 
vari utenti può, infatti, essere visto come un gioco in cui occorre determinarne la 
giusta allocazione fra i diversi giocatori. Un gioco cooperativo appartiene alla 
scienza matematica denominata Teoria dei Giochi. 
La Teoria dei Giochi sviluppata intorno alla metà dello scorso secolo (Von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) analizza situazioni di conflitto in vari ambiti e ne 
ricerca soluzioni competitive e/o cooperative, ovvero studia le decisioni 
individuali in situazioni in cui vi sono interazioni tra diversi soggetti decisionali. 
Nella letteratura scientifica sono presenti numerosi casi di ripartizione dei costi 
che utilizzano i principi della CGT: gli ambiti applicativi sono vari e concernono 
anche studi legati alle risorse idriche (TVA, 1938; Young & Okada, 1982; Lippai & 
Heaney, 2000; Deidda et al., 2009). 
Attraverso l’uso delle tecniche di assegnazione dei costi proprie della CGT è 
possibile “esplicitare” il processo di negoziazione attraverso formule matematiche 
che implementano proprietà tali da garantire l’equità, la giustizia e la 
cooperazione tra gli utenti coinvolti in un progetto, con il fine di ottenere una 
soluzione accettabile da tutti. 
Tuttavia, l’applicazione della CGT si è limitata essenzialmente all’ambito 
economico e matematico, evitando la complessità e l’eterogeneità dei problemi di 
carattere ingegneristico, come nel caso della gestione dei sistemi di risorse idriche. 
Il calcolo di un gioco cooperativo richiede un’analisi del costo minimo del sistema, 
il che implica un processo di ottimizzazione il cui ordine di grandezza cresce 
esponenzialmente in funzione del numero di agenti coinvolti. Pertanto la necessità 
di disporre di adeguati strumenti di modellazione è risultato il principale ostacolo 
per la risoluzione di problemi di assegnazione del costo nel caso di sistemi 
complessi (Deidda, 2009). 
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Obiettivi della ricerca 
L’obiettivo principale del presente lavoro di ricerca è lo sviluppo di una 
metodologia basata sull’applicazione della CGT che contribuisca al processo di 
definizione di tariffe idriche conformi ai principi della Direttiva Europea 
2000/60/CE. 
La metodologia risulta di carattere generale, adattabile alle condizioni di differenti 
bacini idrografici e compatibile con gli strumenti in uso per la modellazione dei 
sistemi di risorse idriche. Il suo ambito di applicazione si potrà estendere alla 
soluzione di problemi di assegnazione dei costi sia a livello locale che a livello 
regionale. 
Con una metodologia di allocazione basata sulla CGT si potrà ottenere una 
ripartizione dei costi tra gli utenti che sia condivisibile, che fornisca un’adeguata 
giustificazione dei criteri adottati e che favorisca la cooperazione tra i soggetti 
interessati al fine di massimizzare l’efficienza nella gestione della risorsa idrica, 
obiettivo di notevole importanza nell’ambito dei sistemi idrici mediterranei 
caratterizzati da fenomeni di carenza idrica. 
Il presente lavoro di tesi si propone pertanto di fornire un contributo originale sia 
nell’ambito delle scienze matematiche sia in quello della modellazione idro-
economica. 
Infine si fa presente che tale ricerca si inserisce all’interno del progetto 
internazionale Azioni Integrate Italia-Spagna (MIUR, 2007) che prevede la 
collaborazione tra il Dipartimento di Ingegneria del Territorio dell’Università di 
Cagliari e il Departamento de Ingeniería Hidráulica y Medio Ambiente della 
Universidad Politécnica de Valencia, con l’obiettivo di sviluppare un sistema di 
supporto alle decisioni per la definizione del programma di misure per il 
raggiungimento degli obiettivi ambientali ed economici previsti dalla Direttiva 
Europea 2000/60. 
Metodologia di allocazione dei costi 
L’applicazione della metodologia prevede inizialmente l’identificazione di tutti gli 
aspetti necessari alla descrizione e caratterizzazione del sistema idrico di studio; 
successivamente occorre impostare il gioco cooperativo definendo i giocatori e la 
tipologia dei costi che si vuole ripartire. I giocatori possono rappresentare sia 
singole utenze che loro raggruppamenti funzionalmente coerenti, come nel caso di 
utenze appartenenti ad un'unica macrodomanda (ad esempio un consorzio irriguo 
o industriale, complessi urbani, ecc.). 
Si passa quindi alla fase più importante, ovvero la definizione della funzione 
caratteristica del gioco, elemento base della CGT. Questa è costituita dall’insieme 
dei valori di costo minimo associati a tutte le possibili coalizioni di giocatori, la cui 
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valutazione si effettua attraverso il programma WARGI (Sechi & Zuddas, 2000; 
Manca et al., 2004; Sechi & Sulis, 2009) basato su un modello di ottimizzazione 
specificatamente sviluppato per sistemi di risorse idriche. Il programma permette 
di costruire in modalità di grafica interattiva il sistema idrico di studio e di inserire 
agevolmente i dati richiesti (economici, idrologici, idraulici, infrastrutturali, ecc.) 
per la definizione funzionale del sistema. 
Una volta definita la funzione caratteristica è possibile fornire la soluzione del 
gioco applicando i metodi di ripartizione dei costi propri della CGT. 
Il sistema idrico di studio 
La metodologia è stata validata applicandola allo schema idrico Flumendosa – 
Campidano situato in Sardegna. 
L’isola è ubicata al centro del bacino occidentale del Mediterraneo e si estende per 
una superficie di circa 24 mila km2 con una popolazione di 1.648.000 abitanti. Il 
clima è prettamente mediterraneo, caratterizzato da un lungo periodo di siccità 
estiva e da inverni miti e piovosi con gelate sporadiche. 
A seguito dell’applicazione della L.R. n. 19 del 6.12.2006 in Sardegna è stato 
introdotto il concetto di “sistema idrico multisettoriale”, intendendo con esso 
l’insieme delle opere di approvvigionamento idrico e adduzione che, singolarmente o perché 
parti di un sistema complesso, siano suscettibili di alimentare, direttamente o 
indirettamente, più aree territoriali o più categorie differenti di utenti, contribuendo ad 
una perequazione delle quantità e dei costi di approvvigionamento (RAS, 2006b). Il 
sistema multisettoriale, la cui gestione è affidata all’Ente Acque della Sardegna – 
ENAS, provvede pertanto alla fornitura dell’acqua all’ingrosso alle principali 
macroutenze della regione: civile, irriguo e industriale. 
Le infrastrutture appartenenti al sistema regionale multisettoriale sono state 
accorpate in diversi “schemi” in relazione all’uso della risorsa, attribuendo al 
medesimo schema tutte le opere idrauliche che, se pur non direttamente 
interconnesse tra loro, concorrono al soddisfacimento dei fabbisogni idrici del 
medesimo territorio. 
Il sistema Flumendosa – Campidano risulta costituito da più schemi multisettoriali 
e permette l’approvvigionamento delle utenze della zona centro meridionale 
dell’isola. 
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Struttura del documento 
Il documento si struttura in nove capitoli, incluso il primo capitolo introduttivo. 
Nel Capitolo 2 viene descritta la normativa in tema di gestione di risorse idriche a 
livello europeo, nazionale e regionale, presentando nel dettaglio le norme di 
riferimento utilizzate nella ricerca. 
Nel Capitolo 3 viene analizzato il problema dell’allocazione dei costi, revisionando 
i principali metodi di ripartizione adottati, introducendo il concetto di 
“willingness to pay” e fornendo una possibile risoluzione al problema introdotto. 
Il Capitolo 4 è dedicato alla presentazione della CGT, con una breve descrizione 
iniziale della più generale Teoria dei Giochi. Si espongono nel dettaglio le 
definizioni, i principi e le soluzioni della CGT e si illustrano in conclusione alcune 
applicazioni a sistemi complessi. 
Il modello di ottimizzazione WARGI viene descritto nel Capitolo 5. Vengono 
analizzate nel dettaglio le fasi necessarie per l’ottimizzazione di un sistema idrico 
e si illustrano le modifiche apportate al programma per meglio adattarlo 
all’esigenze del lavoro di ricerca. 
Nel Capitolo 6 si descrive il sistema idrico di studio, il Flumendosa – Campidano, 
con le relative infrastrutture idrauliche e utenze collegate. Inoltre, si analizza in 
generale il sistema idrico della Sardegna e i vari settori idrici che lo compongono. 
Il Capitolo 7 è dedicato alla descrizione della metodologia di allocazione dei costi 
dei servizi idrici basata sull’uso delle tecniche della CGT. Nel capitolo vengono 
presentati i risultati ottenuti su un’esemplificazione dello schema Flumendosa – 
Campidano analizzando due scenari di richiesta e due differenti approcci 
metodologici. 
L’applicazione della metodologia allo schema completo Flumendosa – Campidano 
viene realizzata nel Capitolo 8 nel quale si propone in conclusione l’analisi dei 
risultati ottenuti e l’ipotesi di un nuovo assetto tariffario per il sistema idrico. 
La tesi si conclude con il Capitolo 9 nel quale vengono illustrati alcuni possibili 
sviluppi futuri di ricerca e dove vengono  presentate le conclusioni e i contributi 
originali forniti dal lavoro. 
Sono inoltre presenti due appendici finali nelle quali si riportano in lingua italiana 
il capitolo introduttivo e quello conclusivo. 
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Appendix B – Conclusioni e linee 
future di ricerca 
Conclusioni 
Nel presente lavoro di tesi è stato affrontato il problema dell’allocazione dei costi 
in un sistema di risorse idriche utilizzando le tecniche della CGT. È emerso come 
risulti necessario un cambiamento nelle politiche di definizione delle tariffe 
idriche. In particolare, come abbiamo visto nel capitolo 2, la Direttiva Europea 
2000/60/CE richiede che venga effettuata a scala di bacino un’analisi economica 
dell’uso idrico e che le politiche dei prezzi tengano conto del principio del 
recupero dei costi e della sostenibilità economica da parte dell’utente finale. 
Inoltre abbiamo mostrato come i metodi di allocazione attualmente utilizzati non 
tengano conto della disponibilità a pagare dell’utente e come il più delle volte non 
permettano la totale copertura dei costi. 
Abbiamo quindi evidenziato come la CGT riesca a fornire un valido contributo 
nell’ambito delle problematiche sopraelencate. Come ampiamente descritto nel 
capitolo 4, la CGT fornisce gli strumenti necessari per analizzare situazioni in cui 
risulta basilare la ricerca di un meccanismo di ripartizione che sia efficiente, giusto 
e fornisca appropriati incentivi tra le varie parti coinvolte. Il problema 
dell’allocazione dei costi in un sistema idrico è stato, quindi, visto come un gioco 
in cui occorre determinare il giusto pay-off da assegnare ai diversi giocatori, nel 
nostro caso rappresentanti gli utenti idrici. Attraverso l’uso delle tecniche di 
assegnazione dei costi proprie della CGT è stato possibile “esplicitare” il processo 
di negoziazione attraverso formule matematiche che implementano proprietà tali 
da garantire l’equità, la giustizia e la cooperazione tra gli utenti coinvolti in un 
progetto, con il fine di ottenere una soluzione accettabile da tutti. 
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È stata quindi definita una metodologia che permette di effettuare l’allocazione dei 
costi dei servizi idrici sfruttando la CGT e i modelli di ottimizzazione dedicati alla 
gestione delle risorse idriche. Questa permette di ottenere una ripartizione che sia 
condivisibile, che fornisca un’adeguata giustificazione dei criteri adottati e che 
favorisca la cooperazione tra i soggetti interessati al fine di massimizzare 
l’efficienza della gestione del sistema. 
Si è pertanto realizzato un gioco cooperativo nel quale gli utenti di un sistema 
idrico agiscono come giocatori in coalizione per il raggiungimento del loro 
approvvigionamento idrico al minimo costo. L’uso del modello di ottimizzazione 
WARGI permette di valutare il costo minimo per ogni coalizione, definendo il set 
ottimale di infrastrutture necessario per il soddisfacimento delle richieste idriche 
dei giocatori. L’utilizzo del modello di ottimizzazione WARGI permette di 
rappresentare qualsiasi sistema idrico e di inserire agevolmente i relativi dati 
caratteristici: ciò rende la metodologia totalmente applicabile a qualunque sistema 
di risorse idriche. Da questo punto di vista la metodologia non presenta alcuna 
limitazione macroscopica, se non quella legata al numero di giocatori scelti, poiché 
come emerge dalla ricerca, esso influenza il numero di operazioni di 
ottimizzazione da realizzare. 
L’insieme dei costi minimi del gioco definisce la funzione caratteristica, elemento 
chiave della metodologia, sulla base della quale si procede alla definizione della 
soluzione del gioco. Si è scelto di utilizzare la soluzione insiemistica del nulceo, 
che rappresenta l’area delle allocazioni di costo ammissibili e tramite esso è 
possibile fornire i limiti di costo associabili ad ogni giocatore. Al suo interno, come 
abbiamo visto, sono presenti tutte le allocazioni che soddisfano i principi di equità, 
accettabilità, giustizia, efficienza e che garantiscono la totale copertura dei costi del 
sistema. Il nucleo di un gioco cooperativo può rappresentare un utile strumento 
nella definizione o nell’adeguamento delle tariffe idriche che soddisfino i principi 
sopracitati. La valutazione del nucleo risulta inoltre un valido supporto 
nell’ambito della gestione delle risorse idriche per il compimento delle analisi 
economiche richieste dalla Direttiva Europea. 
L’applicazione al sistema idrico Flumendosa – Campidano in Sardegna ha 
permesso di apprezzare maggiormente le caratteristiche più importanti della 
metodologia. Nel caso in esame sono stati analizzati i costi di manutenzione del 
sistema sommati a quelli legati all’utilizzo degli impianti di sollevamento e si è 
proceduto alla loro allocazione fra i tre principali utenti idrici, definendo il relativo 
range di costo associato. 
Sono stati considerati due differenti approcci associando ai giocatori la priorità 
massima e minima di utilizzo della risorsa e delle infrastrutture del sistema. I 
risultati ottenuti hanno permesso di analizzare i pregi e i limiti della metodologia 
e hanno permesso di valutare l’evoluzione della ripartizione del costo associato 
agli utenti al modificare della priorità assegnata. 
In conclusione vogliamo focalizzare l’attenzione non tanto sui risultati numerici 
ottenuti quanto alla procedura realizzata per il loro conseguimento. La 
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metodologia infatti è facilmente adattabile per l’allocazione di differenti tipologie 
di costo e risulta applicabile a qualunque sistema idrico, con l’unica necessità di 
disporre di un adeguato modello di ottimizzazione per il calcolo del costo minimo 
legato alle coalizioni. 
Contributi originali 
Il presente lavoro di tesi ha permesso di fornire un contributo originale sia 
nell’ambito delle scienze matematiche, in particolare della Teoria dei Giochi, sia in 
quello della modellazione idro-economica per la gestione dei sistemi di risorse 
idriche. 
La principale novità risiede nella definizione di una metodologia per 
l’implementazione dei concetti e dei metodi caratteristici della CGT per i sistemi di 
risorse idriche con l’utilizzo delle tecniche di ottimizzazione. 
Durante il lavoro di ricerca sono emersi anche ulteriori contributi che elenchiamo 
di seguito: 
- la definizione di un criterio per la ripartizione dei costi di gestione di un 
sistema idrico multisettoriale; 
- il calcolo della c.f. in un gioco cooperativo rappresentante un sistema idrico 
complesso; 
- l’assegnazione dei costi dei servizi idrici in funzione dell’utilizzo delle 
infrastrutture da parte degli utenti; 
- il calcolo del range di ammissibilità dei costi associati ad un utente di un 
sistema idrico; 
- l’analisi delle relazioni tra funzioni di costo e c.f. in un gioco cooperativo; 
- l’utilizzo di una metodologia di ripartizione dei costi che rende espliciti, 
chiari e comprensibili i metodi applicati;  
- lo sviluppo di un supporto per la realizzazione dell’analisi economica a 
scala di bacino dell’uso idrico, come  richiesto dalla Direttiva Quadro; 
- la definizione di un metodo che promuove la cooperazione degli utenti in 
sistema idrico, riducendo la rivalità e le dispute legate alla risorsa; 
- l’attuazione di uno strumento di valutazione di tariffe idriche che: 
o considerino la disponibilità a pagare da parte dell’utente; 
o rispettino il principio del recupero dei costi della Direttiva Europea; 
o siano eque, imparziali e condivise da tutti; 
o siano giustificate da un metodo di calcolo chiaro e comprensibile, che 
permette di mostrare all’utente le motivazioni alla base di un 
determinato costo associato; 
o siano valutate in funzione di un analisi idrologica su un ampio 
intervallo temporale di studio. 
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Sviluppi futuri 
A conclusione del presente documento, sulla base dei risultati ottenuti e delle 
limitazioni incontrate nello sviluppo della tesi, sono stati individuati i seguenti 
sviluppi futuri di ricerca: 
- approfondire lo studio delle funzioni di costo delle infrastrutture per 
migliorare le informazioni da inserire nel modello di ottimizzazione e la 
qualità globale dei risultati economici; 
- estendere l’applicazione della metodologia all’intero sistema idrico 
multisettoriale regionale e a sistemi idrici secondari, come i distretti civili o 
le reti irrigue interne ai consorzi di bonifica; 
- ampliare il numero dei giocatori considerando altri usi idrici, come la 
produzione idroelettrica, l’itticoltura o gli usi ricreativi; 
- sviluppare un modello di ottimizzazione che automatizzi il processo di 
calcolo del costo delle coalizioni; 
- abbinare al processo di ottimizzazione una fase pre e/o post simulativa al 
fine di valutare differenti scenari con varie alternative gestionali; 
- esplorare le possibilità offerte dall’applicazione della CGT a sistemi 
caratterizzati da risorse idriche insufficienti per il completo 
approvvigionamento degli utenti. Si suggerisce a riguardo l’utilizzo di una 
particolare classe di giochi denominati di bancarotta (Fragnelli et al., 2008) 
che risultano particolarmente adatti per sistemi caratterizzati da risorse 
scarse; 
- esaminare differenti livelli di priorità associati alle utenze. In tal caso 
occorrerà decidere preliminarmente quale livello assegnare alle coalizioni 
formate da giocatori aventi differenti priorità, ad esempio si potrà scegliere 
di utilizzare la più bassa priorità dei giocatori appartenenti ad esse; 
- considerare i giocatori secondo i livelli di consumo delle utenze idriche. In 
tal caso ogni giocatore rappresenterà una tipologia di domanda e una sua 
determinata percentuale di richiesta idrica. 
Quest’ultimi due aspetti risultano particolarmente interessanti, in quanto 
rispecchiano l’effettivo comportamento gestionale attuato nei sistemi idrici da 
parte delle autorità competenti. Infatti queste gestiscono il sistema sulla base di 
differenti priorità legate alla tipologia delle utenze e ai loro livelli di consumo. 
 
 
